

UTMUN



Yalta Conference, 1945

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2. Embody their assigned country's/character's position, not their mannerisms (e.g., no accents, no props)
3. Use laptops or electronic devices during unmoderated caucuses to draft paperless resolutions/directives (subject to their committee director's permission)
4. Opt for diplomatic, respectful, and tactful speech and phrasing of ideas, including notes (e.g., no foul language, suggestive remarks, or obscene body language)
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A Letter from Your Director

Greetings Staff and Delegates,

Welcome to the Yalta Conference crisis committee at the University of Toronto MUN 2020! My name is Roberto Fusciardi and I will be your director for this committee. I am a third year International Relations and History double major with a focus in post-WWII and Cold War history. I have several years of Model UN experience on both sides of the conference – delegate and staff. This will be my fifth MUN conference as a staff member, and my third attendance at UTMUN. I have worked in almost every role of the crisis committee apparatus, including analyst, manager, chair, and now director. The reasons why I have chosen to work exclusively in crisis are hopefully the same ones that inspired you to participate in a crisis committee this year: interesting topics, fast-paced developments, and opportunities for quality debate.

Occurring right at the end of the War in Europe, with the fate of Nazi Germany all but decided, the Yalta conference would set the stage for the future of Europe as well as the entire post-war international system. With Allied forces encroaching on German territory from the west and Soviet forces several dozen miles from Berlin in the East, the Big Three turned their eyes towards their plans for the war in the Pacific, spheres of influence and division of territory in Europe, and most importantly what would happen to Germany to ensure that they would never again threaten the Great European Powers. It would not be an understatement to say that what was decided at this conference – and more importantly what was left undecided – would set the stage for how all of international relations was conducted for decades to come in one of the most tumultuous times in human history.

I hope you are all looking forward to this committee as much as I am, and I cannot wait to meet and work with all of you.

Regards,
Roberto Fusciardi
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Background

The War

In the winter of 1944-1945, Nazi Germany had been pushed back to its pre-war borders. The Allies had made significant gains on the Western Front, pushing the Nazis out of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. However, the real defeat for the Germans was on the Eastern Front, where the Soviet Red Army had pushed Germany all the way from Stalingrad to within 120 km of Berlin in the span of approximately 6 months.¹ The U.S.S.R had also supported and fought with national armies in Eastern European countries that had been occupied by the Germans and whose governments had been sympathetic to the Nazi cause.² Such was the case in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Some of these nations would even go on to declare themselves officially communist before the end of the war and would become key allies to the U.S.S.R. and strong members of the Warsaw Pact.³ The Soviets had also managed to liberate Warsaw, which saw the end to German occupation of Poland. While significant progress had been made on both the eastern and western fronts, it was clear coming into the conference that the Soviets held a strong advantage militarily and territorially.⁴

The decision for the conference to be held at Yalta reflected the power dynamic and attitudes that each of the leaders held towards each other at the time. Originally, Roosevelt had suggested to Stalin and Churchill that the conference be held in Malta or Cyprus, partly due to his unwillingness to travel with his health deteriorating at the time, and partly because they were locations in which the U.S. and U.K. had a distinct naval advantage.⁵ Stalin responded by insisting that his doctors told him he should not travel outside of Soviet territory, yet the Allies were very aware that his reluctance to leave was a combination of his fear of flying limiting his movement and his perceived advantage with the gains he had made on the eastern front.⁶ As W. Averell Harriman pointed out, Stalin should get, "some new doctors".⁷ Nevertheless, both Roosevelt and Churchill chose to placate Stalin by agreeing to meet within Soviet territory, indicating that they believed the key to diplomacy to be cooperation instead of strong arming. Roosevelt also had a policy of placing his faith in Stalin's word alone, seeing it as a key to achieving good relations.⁸ The rapport that they had built together over the years helped further cement this belief, which was honoured for the

1 Clairmont, Frederic. "Stalingrad: Hitler's Nemesis." *Economic and Political Weekly* 38, no. 27 (2003): 2

2 Ibid, 2-4.

3 Wolfe, Thomas W. "The Warsaw Pact in Evolution." *The World Today* 22, no. 5 (1966): 191-98, 192-193

4 Reiman, Michael. "About Russia, Its Revolutions, Its Development and Its Present." Peter Lang Publishing Group, (2016): 150-152

5 Schlesinger, Stephen C. *Act of Creation: the founding of the United Nations : a story of superpowers, secret agents, wartime allies and enemies, and their quest for a peaceful world.* (Boulder, Colorado:Westview Press, 2003), 302

6 Buhite, Russell D. *Decisions at Yalta* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986), 2.

7 Ibid.

8 Beevor, Antony. *The Second World War.* New York: Little, Brown and Company, (2012): 709.

most part by both sides.⁹

Churchill and Roosevelt briefly met several times before the conference itself, staying together at Malta before riding in the same motorcade from the airstrip at Saki to their residences in Yalta. Roosevelt, however, did not want Stalin to think that his western Allies were ganging up on him, so he kept the meetings as brief as possible.¹⁰ Churchill, on the other hand, wanted to present a strong Allied force, worried about how the U.S.S.R. would behave in post-war Europe; being left alone to face off against a Soviet threat should the conference go poorly would have surely meant the destruction of Britain which had already been weakened severely by Nazi attacks.¹¹

Stalin was coming into the conference from a position of relative power. His gains on the eastern front, combined with the fact that the conference was on home soil and his conventional military advantage made him confident that he would be able to negotiate terms and provisions that would benefit Soviet interests¹². He was also presenting a sort of united front with Churchill – who he had met with several times prior without the attendance of Roosevelt – that would even further his advantage against the Americans. Notably, Churchill and Stalin had agreed to the Percentages Agreement in secret without the knowledge of Roosevelt, dividing up the countries of Eastern Europe into spheres of influence with differing percentages of British and Soviet control. That is to say that all three had been meeting with each other, both publicly and secretly, for years preceding the conference and came in with very clear objectives for what they hoped to establish.

Roosevelt was interested mainly in two things: the establishment of the U.N. and Soviet aid in the fight against Japan. While the U.S. was making steady gains in the Pacific Theatre and Japan's industrial back was starting to break, the invasion of the island to completely eliminate the threat would have cost millions of American lives. As it stood, there was little aid from the British or the Soviets in the Pacific, and America needed Soviet support if he were to lower American casualties.¹³ The U.N. was his solution to the problems that had plagued Europe since the start of the century. It was a return to Great Power and Sphere of Influence rule that took heavy inspiration from its predecessor, the League of Nations. A collective security organization, Roosevelt thought, was the only way that could prevent the Great Powers in Europe from infighting and aggression. U.S. involvement in European wars had never been popular in America, and if Roosevelt could establish an organization that would effectively keep the peace then they could focus more on their own domestic ambitions.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Buhite. *Decisions*, 3.

¹¹ Leffler, Melvyn P. "Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold War." *International Security* 11, no. 1 (1986): 91-92

¹² Berthon, Simon; Potts, Joanna. *Warlords: An Extraordinary Re-creation of World War II Through the Eyes and Minds of Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin*. Da Capo Press, (2007): 285

¹³ Cienciala, Anna M. "Great Britain And Poland Before and After Yalta (1943-1945): A Reassessment." *The Polish Review* 40, no. 3 (1995): 286-289

Churchill was aware of his position at the time. Britain had been devastated by the war. Unlike America, it did not have the financial capacity to rebuild itself after the war and unlike the U.S.S.R., it did not have the population to support a renewed military effort. Churchill knew that Britain would come out of the war weaker than it had been in its history, and there was little it would be able to do if the Soviets broke their promises and began an invasion of Europe after American withdrawal and German defeat.¹⁴ If America did not intervene and come to their aid, there was little they could do themselves to stop the Red Army. Because of this, Churchill wanted to make sure that France would come to play a strong role on the world stage again – a country that they had been allied with in the past few decades and would be able to act as a buffer for Soviet aggression. Churchill was looking to make sure that, if the Americans withdrew for whatever reason, he would not be entirely defenseless against Soviet aggression.¹⁵ Also, both he and Roosevelt wanted free elections and self-determination in Eastern European countries, specifically Poland. This would hopefully act as a counter to Soviet influence in the region and prevent the U.S.S.R. from turning all of Eastern Europe into its puppets.

Stalin wanted several things from the conference. Mainly, he wanted to see the complete crippling of Germany, both economically and militarily.¹⁶ Germany had now fought and invaded the U.S.S.R. twice within the span of 30 years, and he saw the country very clearly as a threat that had to be permanently suppressed. He believed that, if left unchecked, there was nothing stopping Germany from reindustrializing and starting the process anew within several decades. Also, by far the most damage caused by the war was against the Soviets – Stalin was looking for strict reparations that would aid in the rebuilding of his country.¹⁷ Tied to this, Stalin wanted even more safety measures against a rising Germany in the form of a buffer zone.¹⁸ If he could manage to secure official recognition by the Allies about his influence over Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, he would create a belt across the entirety of Europe through which any future German (or even American) forces would have to schlep through.

Previous Conferences

Moscow Conference

The Third Moscow Conference was held from late October to early November of 1943 in the Kremlin in Moscow, U.S.S.R. It was attended by high-ranking diplomats, foreign ministers, and generals from the Big Four nations of the U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R., and the Republic of China to discuss the ongoing war effort as well as plans for international cooperation after the War.¹⁹

14 Neilson, Francis. "Churchill and Yalta." *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 14, no. 4 (1955): 350-352

15 Ibid, 355-358

16 Klepatsky, Lev. "European Security in the Context of the Yalta Conference." *International Affairs* 56, no. 4 (2010): 114-116

17 Ibid.

18 Omel'chuk, Dmitrii and Sergei Iurchenko. "The Crimean (Yalta) Conference." *Russian Politics & Law*, (2002): 83.

19 "The Moscow Conference." *Chronology of International Events and Documents* 3, no. 6 (1947): 175-179

The main outcome of the conference was the Moscow Declarations on General Security, Italy, Austria, and Atrocities.²⁰ The Declaration on Italy declared that fascism should be completely destroyed; the Declaration on Austria declared that Germany's annexation of the country was null and void; the Declaration on Atrocities declared that Germans that had committed war crimes would be judged in the country in which the crime was committed²¹; the Declaration on General Security, the most important for setting the stage for Yalta, declared that the Allies would remain at war until all enemies had unconditionally surrendered and that there was a need for an international collective security organization after the War.²²

Cairo Conference

The Cairo Conference was held in November of 1943 in Cairo, Egypt. It was attended by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Chiang Kai-Shek to discuss the Allied position in East Asia and was a precursor to the Tehran Conference held several days later.²³ The main outcome of the conference was the Cairo Declaration, stating that the Allies would continue military operations in East Asia until Japan had unconditionally surrendered. It set the stage for Yalta by outlining the goals of specifically the Americans in the Pacific Theatre as well as securing commitment from three out of four of the Big Four to fight the Japanese even after German defeat in Europe.²⁴

Tehran Conference

The Tehran Conference was held towards the end of November 1943 in the Soviet Union's embassy in Tehran, Iran. It was the first formal meeting between the "Big Three" of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Josef Stalin, and Winston Churchill. The main outcome of the conference was the opening up of a second front against Nazi Germany in Western Europe.²⁵ The Front was opened on June 6th, 1944 with D-Day and aimed to stretch Nazi forces thin with the eastern front turning in Soviet favour. Other outcomes of the conference included a recognition of Iran's independence, support of Yugoslavian resistance fighters against the Germans, and the agreement for all three leaders to keep in touch to further plan military operations.²⁶ It set the stage for Yalta by enabling communication networks as well as setting a precedent for meetings between the Big Three.

20 Mastny, Vojtech. "Soviet War Aims at the Moscow and Teheran Conferences of 1943." *The Journal of Modern History* 47, no. 3 (1975): 481-484

21 Lavrov, S. "The Moscow Conference: A Wartime Diplomatic Breakthrough." *International Affairs*, 60 (2012): 1-2

22 Mason, Edward S. "Reflections on the Moscow Conference." *International Organization* 1, no. 3 (1947): 475-480

23 Indochina, France, and the Viet Minh War, 1945-1954: Records of the U.S. State Department, Part 1: 1945-1949

24 Fred E. Pollock. *Pacific Historical Review* 81, no. 4 (2012): 669-71.

25 Eubank, Keith. "Summit at Tehran." (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1985): 170-173.

26 Overy, Richard. "Why the Allies Won." (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996): 245-246

Bretton Woods Conference

The United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference was held throughout July 1944 at Bretton Woods in New Hampshire.²⁷ The conference was attended by delegations from all of the Allied Nations and was held to discuss the structure of the international economic system after the War. There was a push from many of the western delegates (particularly the Americans) for laissez-faire free market economies and a series of international economic organizations that would assist with this. These included the International Monetary Fund (which allowed countries to withdraw from the fund after contributing a certain percentage of their GDP to it) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (which provides loans to lower-income or war-damaged countries to rebuild and help foster economic development). Also agreed upon at the conference was a system for international exchange rates, where currencies would be convertible and pegged to the gold standard.²⁸

Dumbarton Oaks Conference

The Washington Conversations on International Peace and Security Organization was held between August and October 1944 in the Dumbarton Oaks in Washington D.C.²⁹ Chaired by Under-Secretary of State Edward Stettinius Jr. and attended by delegations from the “Big Four” nations of the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and the Republic of China met to discuss and outline the framework for what an international organization to succeed the League of Nations.³⁰ The main topics of discussion were of what role the Soviet Union would play in the organization and how a security council would be constructed, particularly regarding veto power.³¹ The structure and framework negotiated at Dumbarton Oaks would then be further discussed and negotiated at Yalta.

27 U.S. Department of State Archive. “The Bretton Woods Conference, 1944.” U.S. Department of State Archive. U.S. Department of State. Accessed November 11, 2019. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/98681.html>.

28 Ibid.

29 Trueman, C N. “The Dumbarton Oaks Conference.” History Learning Site, May 26, 2015. www.historylearningsite.co.uk/world-war-two/the-war-conferences/the-dumbarton-oaks-conference/.

30 United Nations. “1944-1945: Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed November 11, 2019. www.un.org/en/sections/history-united-nations-charter/1944-1945-dumbarton-oaks-and-ylta/index.html.

31 Ibid.

Setting

Unlike other Crisis Committees which can sometimes be individualistic, the Yalta Conference will be very focused on unity among the delegations. The American, British, and Soviet delegations should work together to establish their goals and negotiate their issues, deciding amongst themselves what they are willing to sacrifice and what they cannot do without. However, this is not to say that individualism is entirely sacrificed at this committee. Delegates will not only have to manage what their delegation wants to achieve, but also convince other members of their respective sides that their approach is the best one to take. Some groups may take a more democratic approach; others may take a more authoritarian approach. The key to success in this committee is not only how well you manage diplomacy with opponents on the other side of the room, but also how well you manage diplomacy with those sitting right next to you.

Topics

Germany

Most pressing among the topics to be discussed at Yalta was the fate of Germany. Each side wanted something slightly different out of the discussions, and the fact that nothing could be decided about what the fate of Germany would be in the long run was one of the biggest causes of animosity between the two sides leading into the Cold War. The U.S.S.R. wanted to see Germany completely crippled and unable to ever launch an invasion again. German industry had proven itself to be too powerful to leave unchecked, and the Soviets were adamant about receiving reparations for the heavy casualties they suffered during the war. Britain wanted something similar, yet for a different reason. Britain wanted France to become a key player on the world stage again despite their defeat during the war; Churchill knew that France felt very similarly to the U.S.S.R. about Germany, having also been invaded by and suffered heavy casualties at the hands of the Germans twice within this century. Britain supported the idea of crippling Germany to aid France and help boost them up in the post-war. Roosevelt was worried about Soviet – and more importantly communist – influence and aggression in the post-war and wanted to keep Germany alive to some degree in the event that it needed to be used to assuage the Soviets. However, he was far more concerned about the Pacific Theatre, and the fate of Germany was not at the top of his list of priorities.

Guiding Questions

1. What should happen to Germany? Should it be kept unified? Disbanded? Split into separate territories? Rebuilt?
2. What should happen to all of Hitler's supporters in government, military, and economy?
3. What is each side willing to concede in order to assure they get what they want when it comes to Germany?

Poland

Poland, much like Germany, was a larger concern for the U.S.S.R. and Britain than it was for America. The U.S.S.R. wanted to create a buffer zone across the continent. Poland was key to this, being the first line of attack for any future German invasions and offering the most direct route to Moscow. Also, the U.S.S.R. was interested in establishing communism across Europe to aid in its political support and saw Poland as integral to this cause. For this same reason, Britain was opposed to the U.S.S.R. exerting too much influence over Poland. They wanted self-determination and free elections in the country to hopefully prevent communism from taking root in the country and giving the U.S.S.R. even more power on the continent than it already had. Besides, with the planned dismantlement of Germany Britain was hoping for, it would have left even less between Britain and the Soviets in the event of an invasion into Western Europe. On this issue, Roosevelt sided with Churchill, hoping for more democracies and western-style democracies in Eastern Europe to prevent communism from advancing too far west; however, this was not a major concern of his.

Guiding Questions:

1. What should happen to Poland? Should it be given free elections? Should the U.S.S.R. maintain its occupation?
2. What should happen to Polish territories seized by the Germans? Should they be put back under Polish control?
3. What political system should be installed in Poland? Communist? Capitalist? Should it be given self-determination instead?

Japan

While the European theatre is certainly drawing to a close, the war in the Pacific is far from over. Currently the main actors in the area are the Japanese and the Americans, fighting a heavy mix of naval and air battles for control over volcanic islands dotted throughout the Pacific. Securing support from the Soviets in the Pacific Theatre is one of Roosevelt's main objectives at the conference; while America may be winning the war for small islands, they are aware that a full-scale invasion of Japan would cost millions of American lives. The British also have a stake in the region as they vie for control over the lost British and French colonies in Burma, Indochina, Malaya, Borneo, and elsewhere. Both the Americans and British see the Red Army as key to winning the war in the Pacific. Aside from this, the Declarations by the Four Nations on General Security made at the Third Moscow Conference declared that all Allied nations would maintain military operations until the unconditional surrender of all Axis powers, of which Japan is one. Ensuring that all sides keep their commitment to this declaration and help their allies in China especially is one of the main concerns of the American delegation and should be given high priority.

Guiding Questions:

1. How much support should the other Allies lend in the Pacific Theatre?
2. How should the power dynamic play out between the Allies in the Pacific? Should the Americans take the lead?
3. What approaches can be taken to ensure the unconditional surrender of Japan with the least number of casualties?

Eastern Europe

Eastern Europe is currently occupied by Soviet forces that liberated it from Nazi control. This includes Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Balkans. The main players in the area are the Soviets: not only do they see the area as a crucial buffer zone to prevent any future invasions by western powers but they also see it as within their sphere of influence and an important area for communism to spread to³². The Soviets are looking for acknowledgement of Soviet influence over the area, meaning it would

32 Knudtzon, Kendra. "Eastern Europe:1945-1989". <https://www.cs.hmc.edu/~kknudtzo/portfolio/papers/EastEurope.html>

be free of interference from the western Allies where they could use their influence as they see fit. An informal agreement of western recognition over the area came in the form of the Percentages Agreement between Churchill and Stalin, giving at least 50% Soviet influence in all Eastern European states except Greece where the British would control 90%³³. Churchill is looking for a formalization of these terms and assurances that they would get their promised influence, especially in Greece. America, on the other hand, is opposed to the idea of the Soviets spreading their ideology and are looking for free elections in many of the countries to possibly swing the countries in a more western-styled democratic and capitalist manner.

Guiding Questions:

1. How should influence amongst the Great Powers be divided in Eastern Europe? Should it be mainly Soviet? Is there a role for the western Allies in the affairs of the east?
2. What political systems should be installed in Eastern European countries? Communist? Capitalist? Should it be given self-determination instead?
3. To what extent should the informal Percentages Agreement be honoured?

The United Nations

The United Nations had already had a basic framework drawn up at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944. It had been first established in the Four Nations Declaration on General Security in 1943 that an international collective security organization interested in fostering international peace was needed, and at Dumbarton Oaks four principles had been laid out: to maintain international peace and security and provide a forum for peaceful means of international conflict resolution; to develop and foster friendly relations among states and purport international peace; to achieve international cooperation in economic, social, and other humanitarian issues; to create a forum in which nations could harmonize their actions³⁴. The issues of a security council, the role of Great Power Politics, and the power of the veto have yet to be secured, and as a result are one of the most hotly contested topics at the conference³⁵. America is interested in the establishment of the organization mainly to spread global U.S. hegemony – the inclusion of key American allies in Britain and China on the security council confirms this³⁶. Their view of the veto is far less powerful than that which the Soviets had in mind, and they are looking to create a forum in which their interests can be legitimized and spread worldwide. The British are fighting for a place for France on the Security Council, not wanting to be completely outnumbered in Europe should the Americans withdraw their support. They see getting France a role on the international

33 Resis, Albert. "The Churchill-Stalin Secret "Percentages" Agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944". *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 83, No. 2 (Apr., 1978), pp. 368-387

34United Nations. "1944-1945: Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta." United Nations. United Nations. Accessed November 11, 2019. www.un.org/en/sections/history-united-nations-charter/1944-1945-dumbarton-oaks-and-ymalta/index.html.

35 Office of the Historian "The Formation of the United Nations, 1945". Office of the Historian. Accessed November 11, 2019. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/un>

36 Khan Academy. "The United Nations". Khan Academy. <https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/us-history/rise-to-world-power/us-wwii/a/the-united-nations>

stage as crucial to their own security and interests, and therefore place a high priority on it. The Soviets are interested in a more powerful veto system that would negate the numbers advantage America has on the Security Council. This would give them power to immediately shut down any operation that runs counter to their interests and would put them on equal footing with the Americans³⁷. Also up for debate are the questions of which nations would be allowed to join the organization, what the prerequisites would be for membership, and what authority it would have over the rights of nations.

Guiding Questions:

1. Who should be a member of the United Nations? What should they have to do to ensure membership? Should there be any prerequisites?
2. Who should be a member of the Security Council? What power would they have and how would this change over time?
3. What power should the veto have? Should it completely shut down a motion? Should it act similarly to a regular vote? Should it be able to be overruled?
4. What authority should the United Nations have over the rights of nations? Should it be able to directly affect sovereignty?
5. What framework will be in place to allow for change and development in the organization over time?

37 Bourantonis, Dimitris. 2005. "The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform". *Routledge*.

Points to Remember

Allies and Loyalty

This conference – and in fact much of the War in general – was not as it is often portrayed: Britain and the United States as stalwart allies working with their mortal enemies in the U.S.S.R. for the greater good. All three sides at this conference were willing to put their allegiances and loyalties aside if it meant furthering the interests of their own country. Churchill and Roosevelt signed the Atlantic Charter stating their joint values and demonstrated their friendship over the years; Churchill also met often with Stalin in secret and signed documents such as the Percentages Agreement to try and establish Britain in the event of American withdrawal. This conference was not as bipolar as it may appear on the surface, and the multipolarity means that each side wanted to achieve different things which were not always in line with each other. Do not fall into the trap of set allegiances – rather, analyze each event as it is and decide what the best course of action is for your respective nation.

War and Diplomacy

While this committee is said during the largest war in history, the focus is not intended to be military. This was primarily a great diplomatic achievement for all three sides, as they were each able to negotiate terms without having to resort to strong arming. To completely deny the role of the military would be foolish, but there are roles that even military advisors can play in diplomacy. This committee is primarily about using the military advantages of your respective nation as a means of assuring diplomatic gains, as well as a negotiating tool.

Leaders and Subordinates

This committee presents a challenge in terms of hierarchy and decision-making. Technically speaking, Roosevelt and Churchill do have the authority to make decisions on behalf of their country, but their approach would have to be a lot more democratic – delegates in the British and American camps have a great degree more influence over the decisions that are made (and more autonomy over their own decisions) than those in the Soviet camp. For those in the Soviet camp, and Stalin in particular, while you may have the historical ability to dictate everything that every member of your staff does, consensus and advice from your subordinates often leads to much more effective decision-making. Giving your staff the ability to make decisions and influence the decision-making process will likely not only lead to better gains by the Soviet side but also a stronger united force, as well as opening up the opportunities for cross-talks between your delegates and delegates from other camps that would be impossible if your staff lacked authority.

Characters

An extensive character guide will be released closer to the conference! For now, continue your research on the Yalta conference itself and each delegation's respective objectives. Best of luck!

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