

UTMUN



CRISIS IN THE SUEZ

NOVEMBER 1956

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A LETTER FROM YOUR DIRECTOR

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to UTMUN 2019! I know I speak for the entire dais when I say how excited we are to meet you all in February. Before we bombard you with information, a little bit about myself: my name is Victoria Vale, and I will be your Director for the Suez Crisis at UTMUN. I am currently a second-year at the University of Toronto double-majoring in International Relations and Political Science and minoring in History.

The dais and I have worked very hard to design a unique committee experience. In addition to tackling the historical Suez Crisis, you will be faced with additional crises throughout committee which could have theoretically occurred alongside the conflict. This committee will require the knowledge you gain through research, creativity, quick-thinking, and cooperation with your fellow delegates. I have included a more extensive explanation of how the committee will function on the following page.

It is important to recognize that this background guide does *not* contain a complete description of the committee's topics. The dais has provided you with broad historical context for the committee, but it is crucial that you supplement this information with your own research. It is up to you to learn more about the complexities of each topic, study the foreign policy you are representing, and develop possible solutions from that research. We have included a Research Guide at the end of this background guide as a helpful starting point.

Our dais values diplomacy, debate, and cooperation. Your goal in February should not be to overpower your fellow delegates; rather, you should be prepared to consider all sides brought forth in committee. The ability to listen to other perspectives and respond productively is one of the most important skills in debate, especially within the international community. Your aim in this committee should be to find viable solutions to the crises within the constraints of your nation's distinct interests and policies.

You will quickly realize that these topics are quite complicated. I am entirely confident that each of you is capable of tackling them, but if you have any questions, I am always available to you as a resource. Feel free to email me any time before the conference about the topics, research, the committee, or UTMUN itself.

The Suez Crisis staff and I are incredibly excited to meet you all in committee. Good luck with your research, do not hesitate to reach out at any time, and see you all in February!

Sincerely,
Victoria Vale

Director, Crisis in the Suez, November 1956
victoria.vale@mail.utoronto.ca

COMMITTEE STRUCTURE

As mentioned above, the Suez Crisis is designed to provide a unique experience for delegates. Though it is technically a Specialized Committee, it will incorporate several Crisis elements to produce a more immersive experience. As a result, our topics will run a little differently than what you may be used to.

When you arrive in committee in February, it will be immediately following the Israeli, French, and British invasion of Egypt. Your primary and most-pressing goal will be to address the conflict, manufacture a ceasefire (if in your best interests), and reopen the Suez Canal. As debate continues, we will announce other crises stemming from the topics in this background guide. It will be your job to respond to these crises as swiftly as possible, while still striving to establish long-lasting peace in the Suez. As a result, there will be no opening vote on which topic to discuss, and all topics will remain open in parallel until they are resolved. This flexible debate will allow delegates to address aspects of each topic in their solutions. Efficient solutions solving multiple crises are highly encouraged.

Rather than representing an entire state in the Council, you will each be assigned a figure, such as Prime Minister Eden of Great Britain. A full character list and brief bloc analysis has been published alongside this background guide.

To support the fast-paced nature of this committee, the Suez Crisis will permit coalition directives. These directives are collaborative delegate actions in response to crises that require at least seven sponsors to enact. Those of you who have prior experience in Crisis Committees will be familiar with personal directives, which you can submit individually. Coalition directives are the same as personal directives, except they require at least seven sponsors to submit. In this case, a delegate or group of delegates will write out an action and gather the required number of sponsors. The delegates may then submit the directive to the dais, which will then adapt the simulation in response. Using these directives will allow coalitions to take actions including but not limited to the creation of press releases, financially-backing other groups, requesting the deployment of their military, and establishing treaties. Though we will not outline each delegation's resources, it is imperative that you seriously consider whether your nation has the resources to fulfill your directive and whether it is realistic that they would put their limited resources toward that action. Do not forget, however, that the ultimate goal of this committee is to pass a resolution. In between crises, standard moderated and unmoderated debate about the content of a majority-pass resolution will be discussed. The committee is expected to conclude the conference with one resolution addressing all topics on the agenda.

It is essential that you adhere both to the positions of the figures you represent and the bounds of plausible action your country could and would feasibly take. It is vital not only to identify the historical policies of your nation and the opinions of your figure, but also to analyze the interests and stakes each party holds in the crisis. Compromise is inevitable, so it is

imperative that you recognize the most significant priorities of your nation, and the most severe risks which could result from an unfavourable solution.

Again, if you have any questions at any point before the conference, please do not hesitate to email me! We will briefly review the committee's structure during the first committee session as well.



THE SUEZ CANAL CRISIS

The Suez Crisis is regarded as a pivotal moment in world history. Beyond its implications for the Egyptian state, the crisis occurred in the midst of a global transition from imperial dominance to widespread decolonization and independence. The crisis exemplified the struggle between empires fighting to retain their influence over the world and former colonies striving to exercise truly free and sovereign governance.

It is essential that, in tackling the Suez Crisis, delegates consider not only the logistical and economic aspects of their solutions, but also the implications for the shifting international balance of power. Many of the stakes held in the conflict went beyond pure economics, as the prestige, reputation, and influence of the great powers were in question. Delegates must be sure to identify where each country's true priorities lie and which policies will best support those interests, while still successfully orchestrating the canal's reopening.

HISTORY OF THE SUEZ CANAL

The Suez Canal was opened in 1869 as a joint venture between Britain, France, and Egypt, who originally cooperated in its ownership and operation.¹ The canal created a maritime trade route eliminating the trade lock between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, allowing swifter and more efficient global trade and producing significant revenue for whichever power operated the route. The canal was built by the Franco-Egyptian Suez Canal Company of which, initially, 56% of the shares were held by the French and 44% were held by the viceroy of Egypt.² In 1882, however, the British government bought all Egyptian shares in the name of protecting the canal from Egyptian Civil War, making the Suez Canal Company a Franco-British operation.³

The canal was a vital asset for each country both economically and strategically, especially in their efforts to retain colonial influence over Middle Eastern trade. This trade route was a textbook example of the remaining economic influence held by the imperial powers over Egypt. Britain in particular had dominated Egyptian affairs since the early 1880s, as the British government was a significant shareholder in the Suez Canal Company. Winston Churchill went as far as describing the Suez as the "great imperial lifeline", illustrating the great value placed by both the British and French on control of the trade route.⁴

¹ Charles Gordon and William Fisher, "Suez Canal," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed November 9, 2018, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Suez-Canal>.

² Laurie Milner, "The Suez Crisis," BBC online, last updated March 3, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/suez_01.shtml.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Peter Boyce, "The Suez Dispute and the Death of Empire," Australian Institute of International Affairs, November 1, 2016, <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-suez-dispute-and-the-death-of-empire/>.

At the same time, however, nationalistic Arab sentiments had been building for over a century. With this Arab nationalism came increasing resentment for imperial influence in Egypt. In response to this strengthening opposition, the British — still largely dependent on the Suez Canal — agreed to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which tolerated British military forces stationed along the Canal Zone so long as they defended the interests of both states, such that, as explained by British Prime Minister Eden:

“ . . . this country [the United Kingdom] has a particular interest in guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the Suez Canal, inasmuch as it constitutes an artery of British communications., Further, Nahas Pasha said, referring to the necessity of safeguarding the independence of the territory of Egypt, that it was a piece of good fortune for Egypt to conclude an alliance with this country (United Kingdom), a Power strong on land, on sea, and in the air, which exerted a powerful influence in international affairs ... and whose; assistance in the sending of armed forces under the treaty would be unlimited.”⁵

NASSER'S RISE TO POWER

Although Egypt declared itself a sovereign state after World War II, Britain continued to have significant military presence and economic influence over the canal, further increasing tensions within the Egyptian protectorate. In January of 1952, several Egyptian authorities led Egyptian citizens in attacking British soldiers along the canal.⁶ This was a violation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, damaging the formerly-peaceful alliance between Egypt and Britain. The British threatened to occupy Cairo, prompting Egyptian leader King Farouk to dismiss Egyptian nationalists leaders like Nahas Pasha, which added more fuel to the spreading fire of Arab nationalism.⁷ Later that year, the Free Officers Movement military coup forced King Farouk to abdicate, criticizing his inability to defend Egypt against imperial powers and against Israel in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and instating Gamal Abdel Nasser as the new head of Egyptian government. Nasser quickly began pressuring the British to end their military presence along the Suez and went about intensifying Egypt's own military presence along the border with Israel.⁸

NASSER, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE SOVIET UNION

One of Nasser's primary objectives was to make the Egyptian state as strong as possible. He initially looked to the United States as a large-scale weapons supplier. Egypt had caught the attention of the United States as it looked to develop “pro-Western” ties within the Middle East, but Nasser's frequent and strong anti-Zionist speeches induced strong public and Congressional

⁵ “Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Commons Sitting on November 24, 1936,” Hansard, accessed November 5, 2018, <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1936/nov/24/anglo-egyptian-treaty>.

⁶ Richard McDonough, “What Was the Suez Crisis?” Imperial War Museum, June 12, 2018, <https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/what-was-the-suez-crisis>.

⁷ Milner, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/suez_01.shtml.

⁸ “An Affair to Remember,” *The Economist* online, last modified July 27, 2006, <https://www.economist.com/special-report/2006/07/27/an-affair-to-remember>.

opposition to selling Egypt weapons.⁹ Furthermore, President Eisenhower strongly supported the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 between the U.S., France, and Britain.¹⁰ This treaty restricted the number of arms each state could sell in the Middle East and was intended to prevent the development of an arms race between the Arabs and Israelis, hopefully maintaining peace and stability in the region.¹¹ In response to the uncooperative United States, Nasser pursued a relationship with the Soviet Union, which was more than willing to supply weapons through Czechoslovakia and spread its influence.¹² This new relationship between the Soviets and Egyptians caused an uproar in the West, especially in Britain, who saw the expansion of Soviet influence as a direct threat to their oil reserves.¹³

In May of 1956, the United States and Britain withdrew all funding from Nasser's Aswan High Dam, which was considered vital to Egyptian industrialization and modernization.¹⁴ Despite both countries' interests in maintaining relations with the newly-independent Egypt, each revoked its funding in response to Nasser's growing ties with the Soviet Union, as well as American concerns that Egypt was not ready to manage such a large project.¹⁵ Nasser was furious, and thus this withdrawal of funding is often identified as the catalyst of the Suez Crisis.¹⁶

NATIONALIZATION OF THE CANAL

*"On July 26th 1956 Gamal Abdul Nasser, president of Egypt, addressed a huge crowd in the city of Alexandria. Broad-shouldered, handsome and passionate, Nasser stunned even this gathering of enthusiastic supporters with the vehemence of his diatribe against British imperialism. Britain had ruled Egypt, one way or another, from 1882 to 1922, when the protectorate gained nominal independence, and continued to influence Egyptian affairs thereafter, maintaining troops there and propping up the decadent monarchy overthrown by Nasser in 1952. In that speech in Alexandria, though, Nasser chose to delve back even further into history, in a long digression on the building of the Suez canal a century earlier. That gave him the chance to mention the name of the Frenchman who had built the canal, Ferdinand de Lesseps. This he did at least 13 times. "De Lesseps", it turned out, was the codeword for the Egyptian army to start the seizure, and nationalisation, of the canal."*¹⁷

⁹ "Suez Crisis: Summary, Location, Dates, Significance, & Facts," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed November 6, 2016, <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-suez-dispute-and-the-death-of-empire/>.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² "An Affair to Remember," <https://www.economist.com/special-report/2006/07/27/an-affair-to-remember>.

¹³ Milner, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/suez_01.shtml.

¹⁴ "An Affair to Remember," <https://www.economist.com/special-report/2006/07/27/an-affair-to-remember>.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

In July of 1956, in a strong display of nationalistic ambition against imperialism, Egypt's lack of shares in the Suez Canal Company, and the retraction of Western funding for the Aswan High Dam, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. He announced that the Suez Canal Company's assets had been frozen and that the British and French shareholders would be paid the value of their shares, giving Egypt complete control of the Suez.¹⁸ Nasser immediately closed the canal to Israeli shipping.¹⁹ He declared that he seized the canal as a means of funding the Aswan Dam Project, believing that "in only five years the tolls collected from ships passing through the Suez Canal would pay for the dam's construction; a key element of Egypt's planned industrialization".²⁰

EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO THE SEIZURE

The British and French were outraged, as each was highly dependent on the trade route, especially for access to oil from the Persian Gulf. Despite Nasser's offer of "full economic compensation for the Company," the British and French Governments, long suspicious of Nasser's opposition to the continuation of their political influence in the region, were outraged by the nationalization.²¹ Nasser likewise remained resentful of European imperialistic "efforts to perpetuate their colonial domination", making any attempts at diplomacy unsuccessful.²² Realizing this, Britain and France secretly prepared for military action, looking to regain control of the canal and, if possible, depose Nasser. They found a ready ally in Israel, whose hostility toward Egypt had been exacerbated by Nasser's blockage of the Straits of Tīrān and the numerous skirmishes between Egyptian and Israeli troops along the border.²³

PLANS TO INVADE

The United States attempted to act as a diplomatic mediator of the British-French-Egyptian dispute. On September 9th, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposed the creation of a Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA), which would organize joint operation of the canal by "an international consortium of 18 of the world's leading maritime nations".²⁴ This plan would have given Britain, France, and Egypt equal shares in the canal which, amid tensions that had been rising for decades, was not a satisfying solution for any of the parties, and thus was rejected. Nasser still refused to allow the imperial powers any control over Egypt, and Britain especially saw Egypt's takeover of the canal as a "threat to its economic interests and prestige".²⁵ Considering it vital to counter Nasser, Britain and France held a series of secret military consultations with Israel, which also considered Nasser a serious threat to its territorial

¹⁸ Milner, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/suez_01.shtml.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ "Suez Crisis: National Army Museum," <https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/suez-crisis>.

²¹ "The Suez Crisis, 1956," <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez>.

²² Ibid.

²³ "Suez Crisis: Summary, Location, Dates, Significance, & Facts," <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-suez-dispute-and-the-death-of-empire/>.

²⁴ "The Suez Crisis, 1956," <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez>.

²⁵ Richard McDonough, <https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/what-was-the-suez-crisis>.

security. On October 24th, the three states signed the *Protocol of Sevres*, which outlined their plan to jointly invade Egypt and overthrow President Nasser.²⁶ The plan was signed by Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office of Great Britain Patrick Dean, Foreign Minister of France Christian Pineau, and Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion of Israel. An outline of the agreement is as follows:

“Article 2 describes the Anglo-French appeals to the belligerents to stop fighting and to withdraw their forces to a distance of ten miles from the canal . . . Egypt alone is asked to accept the temporary occupation of key positions on the canal by the Anglo-French forces . . . If the appeals were not accepted within 12 hours, Anglo-French forces would intervene to enforce compliance. Article 3 says that if Egypt failed to comply, the Anglo-French attack on the Egyptian forces would be launched in the early hours in the morning on 31 October. Article 4 notes the intention of the Israeli government to occupy the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba and the islands of Tiran and Sanafir in order to ensure freedom of navigation. In article 5 Israel promises not to attack Jordan during the period of hostilities against Egypt and Britain promises not to help Jordan if she attacks Israel. The purpose of this provision was to minimize the risk of a military clash between Israel and Britain on the Jordanian front. Article 5 embodied Britain’s agreement to Israel’s request that in the event of a Jordanian attack on Israel, the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty would not come into force [and] Article 6 requires all three governments to keep the provisions of the accord strictly secret.”²⁷

INVASION OF THE SUEZ (DAY ZERO)

It is now November 2nd, 1956. On October 29th, Israel invaded the Gaza Strip and captured the Sinai Peninsula. On October 31st, Britain and France began Operation Musketeer, an air-borne bombing campaign around the canal zone.²⁸ The Israelis initially faced more Egyptian opposition forces in the Sinai, but following the British and French invasion Nasser ordered his troops to disengage in the Sinai and protect the Suez Canal. Nasser responded to the invasion by sinking 40 ships in the canal and closing it to all shipping.²⁹

As of last night (November 1st), the British and French have destroyed the majority of the Egyptian Air Force. Israel has captured the Sinai, and Britain and France have seized much of the canal zone. Their troops are moving towards Port Said, which they will likely use as a strategic base to take the rest of the area.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Avi Shlaim,

<http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ssfc0005/The%20Protocol%20of%20Sevres%201956%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20War%20Plot.html>.

²⁸ “Sinai Peninsula: The Years of Conflict,” <https://www.nytimes.com/1982/04/26/world/sinai-peninsula-the-years-of-conflict.html>.

²⁹ Richard McDonough, <https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/what-was-the-suez-crisis>.

Nasser has been heard over the radio declaring the invasion a “people’s war”.³⁰ Egyptian troops have been ordered to abandon their uniforms and don civilian clothes, and there have been reports of weapons being distributed to Egyptian civilians.³¹ This not only has the potential to strengthen the Egyptian military, but it also presents the British and French with a striking dilemma: attack Egyptian civilians and risk facing domestic and international condemnation, or hesitate and risk losing the lives of their soldiers to deceptively non-combatant snipers.

Earlier today (November 2nd), the United Nations General Assembly passed the United States’ proposal for Resolution 997 by a vote of 64 in favour to 5 opposed (Britain, France, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand) with 6 abstentions.³² The resolution calls for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of all states’ forces from the canal zone, an arms embargo, and the re-opening of the Suez Canal, which is currently still blocked by Egyptian forces.³³ Neither side has shown any sign of compliance, however, and there is still fighting throughout the region.

Secretary of External Affairs of Canada Lester B. Pearson is currently working with the United Nations to design a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). Pearson intends for the UNEF to be deployed as soon as a ceasefire is achieved to “supervise the withdrawal of the three occupying forces and, after the withdrawal was completed, to act as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces to provide impartial supervision of the ceasefire”.³⁴ The proposal, however, has not yet been completed, presented to, or accepted by the United Nations. Notably, none of the permanent members of the Security Council (Britain, the United States, France, the Soviet Union, and China) are intended members of the UNEF.³⁵

U.S. AND SOVIET RESPONSES TO THE INVASION

At this time, the Cold War is in full swing, with tensions between the United States and Soviet Union at a constant high. On October 23rd, revolts broke out in Hungary against communist rule.³⁶ The revolts were quickly crushed by the Soviet Red Army.³⁷ President Eisenhower was reportedly looking to publicly condemn the Soviet intervention in Hungary but, in the face of the full-blown invasion of Egypt by his European allies, is unable to do so without appearing hypocritical.³⁸ The US cannot criticize Soviet imperialist activities in Eastern Europe while France and Great Britain are fighting to preserve empire in the Middle East. As one of the

³⁰ “The Suez Crisis, 1956,” <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez>.

³¹ Ibid.

³² “First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) - Background (Summary),” the United Nations, accessed November 6, 2018, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unef1backgr1.html>.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Suez Crisis and the United Nations Emergency Force I: 1956,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed November 6, 2018, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Suez-Crisis>.

³⁶ “United States,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed November 11, 2018, <https://www.britannica.com/place/United-States/The-Red-Scare#ref613204>.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

two major superpowers, it will be crucial to consider any pressures exerted by the United States against either side of the conflict, especially if they choose to act on their frustrations with allies France and Britain.

As the other major superpower of the time period, any Soviet reactions to the invasion will be an essential consideration of every proposed solution. As previously mentioned, the Soviet Union has been supplying weapons to Egypt through Czechoslovakia for months in an effort to gain the favour of Arab nationalists like Nasser, establish a foothold in the Middle East, and further expand its influence by building their own anti-imperial credentials.³⁹ In this crisis, the Soviet Union and Egypt are essentially allies. Keeping these motivations and the military and nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union in mind, delegates should seriously consider how their directives and resolution will be received by both superpowers. Through their actions, delegates may inadvertently harm the reputation of the United States and bolster the reputation of the Soviets in other decolonizing parts of the world, potentially allowing the Soviet Union to gain crucial footholds in the Third World.

(SOME) POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS FOR THE CRISIS

Given the vast number of historical factors and strategic interests at play in the Suez Crisis, there are a variety of directions the conflict can take. The first option is to continue pursuing a ceasefire in the region, which some would identify as the quickest way to achieve peace in the region. Given the high tensions between the warring parties and their failure to immediately comply with the UN's call for a ceasefire, it is unlikely that the Israelis, French, British, or Egyptians will agree to the ceasefire under its current terms. This does not mean, however, that pursuing a ceasefire is a lost cause. It is possible that altering the terms of the ceasefire could make it more favourable to some or all of the parties. It is up to the delegates to determine which steps must be taken to achieve a successful ceasefire. Will it involve one side admitting defeat and agreeing to a ceasefire to save their dignity and their people? Will coercion be required to force the hands of the warring parties? Will the involvement of other outside powers, such as the United States or Soviet Union, be required? Though a lasting ceasefire is likely to be one of the most difficult outcomes to successfully construct, it should be seriously considered by all delegates, as it could potentially mean peace for all involved in the conflict.

On the other hand, delegates could allow (and possibly aid) the escalation of the conflict in favour of one side. Based on its current direction, it is unlikely that the conflict will quickly resolve itself, meaning that the crisis will continue to escalate without an armistice. It is possible that one side could triumph over the other, and the winner of the conflict would determine the future of the Suez Canal, including its ownership, management, and functioning. It is also possible, however, that the conflict could end in a stalemate between the two blocs. Not only would this long period of violence cause the deaths of thousands and the destruction of much

³⁹ "An Affair to Remember," <https://www.economist.com/special-report/2006/07/27/an-affair-to-remember>.


of the region (and likely cause damage to the economically-vital canal as well), but a stalemate could allow outside powers, like the United States and the Soviet Union, to become more involved in the region. Furthermore, proceeding with actions condemned by the international community could have severe implications for a state's standing on the international stage, a factor which is unwise to ignore. Though this direction creates a potentially significant advantage over the other powers for the victor bloc, it also has the potential for major consequences including lives lost, huge sums of money spent, bargaining power forfeited, international reputation damaged, and possibly the strengthening of the United States or the Soviet Union. Delegates should seriously consider these risks when analyzing their country's interests in escalating the crisis.

It is important to remember that the major goal of every country involved is the reopening of the canal. The reopening of the Suez Canal is vital to protecting American and Western European access to oil in the Middle East, especially considering that almost all of Europe's oil comes through that trade route. Despite Egypt's blockading of the canal in response to the invasion, it is also in Egypt's best interests to reopen the (nationalized) canal as soon as possible, as its revenues are still vital for replacing the financial aid retracted by Britain and the United States for the Aswan Dam and other industrialization projects. Reopening the canal will be no easy feat, as each side wants to reopen the canal on very different terms. While European powers want to regain some control over the canal, Nasser still fully intends on retaining total control of the canal. Delegates must work to reopen the canal by whatever means possible in accordance with their national interests, and must weigh the pros and cons of reopening the canal and/or supporting one side of the conflict. They must also ensure their solutions are conducive to short-term and long-lasting peace, hopefully preventing the outbreak of conflict in the region for future decades.

It is also essential for delegates to consider the shifting balance of power on the global stage up to this point, and take into account how the Suez Crisis could impact that balance. The invasion marks a clash between old imperial powers and increasingly-independent post-colonial states, and thus will have significant influence over whether the current power dynamics remain the same or drastically change. Will Europe continue to extend its informal influence over these nominally "independent" former colonies? Will these former colonies truly break free and rise to the level of global powers, weakening the global foothold of old imperial states and tarnishing their reputations? Will the superpower United States and Soviet Union seize more power, or will the United Nations' role in the international community be reinforced? All of these questions will be answered by the delegates as they pursue solution(s) to the crisis. Throughout the conference, delegates should not only focus on the Suez Crisis itself, but should also keep in mind the underlying power dynamics which will be shaped by their resolution.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

1. Who “should” have control over the vital Suez Canal? Do the people of Egypt have a right to it, as President Nasser believes, or should it be governed by the international community?
2. Why is the United Nations concerned by the Suez Crisis? What international “rules” did Britain, France, and Israel break that would prompt interference by the United Nations?
3. What stakes does each state involved hold in the crisis - materially, ideologically, historically, and considering power dynamics on a global scale? What about technically-uninvolved states that are not represented within the committee? What actions or responses might they have to your decisions?
4. How will shifting power dynamics between former colonial powers and emerging global superpowers affect the crisis, and your country’s place in the 20th century world?
5. What terms need to be achieved on either side for peace to be achieved? Which priorities of each state need to be addressed by the terms of a ceasefire to achieve short-term peace? Do these differ from the terms required for long-lasting peace?
6. What kinds of resources does your country have that it could reasonably utilize during this crisis? Think about your relations with other nations, or with other parts of your colonial empires.
7. Is this situation solely caused by recent triggering events, or are there more long term causes that have prompted countries to respond in the way that they did?
8. What steps can be taken to ensure conflict does not break out in the region again?



PAN-ARABISM, NASSERISM, AND THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION

The ideologies and interests that prompted the Suez Crisis were reflected beyond the Egyptian case, with Western powers fighting to retain their imperial influences across the world while colonies and former colonies alike struggled to become truly independent. It is essential for delegates to consider how leaders like Nasser and crises like the Suez had regional and international implications. Though the Suez Crisis occurred in Egypt, the struggles between former empires and fledgling nation states were observed by all members of the international community. The ideologies and potential successes of leaders like Nasser had the power to both inspire some actors and frighten others. Delegates must consider how seemingly-independent crises and their resolutions establish a precedent for similar future cases, and must be conscious of the example their actions provide for observers across the globe.

PAN-ARABISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Pan-Arabism is an ideology which was formed around the time of World War I. The ideology is strongly associated with Arab nationalism, which espouses that all Arabs belong to a single nation.⁴⁰ Pan-Arab sentiments support the unification of the Arab World, largely the Middle East (West Asia) and North Africa. It is also often associated with strong opposition to Western influence in Arab states and support for socialist principles, and sought to function through Arab alliances and economic cooperation.⁴¹ Up until the 1950s, Pan-Arabism was mostly concentrated in Syria, Palestine, and Jordan, and was notably absent from Egyptian politics, which favoured a specifically-Egyptian nationalism.⁴²

It is interesting to note that not all Western states were opposed to Pan-Arab sentiments. British Foreign Minister Eden called for Arab unity during the 1940s in an effort to further stabilize the region.⁴³ The League of Arab States was formed in 1945 as a regional organization dedicated to developing Arab economies, resolving disputes, and cooperating to achieve political goals.⁴⁴

THE SPREAD OF NASSERISM

It was only with the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser that Arab nationalism became the foundation of Egyptian policy, giving way to the adoption of "Nasserism". Nasser's strong resentment for imperial control over the Middle East was reflected by his support of Pan-Arabism

⁴⁰ Fouad Ajami, "The End of Pan-Arabism," *Foreign Affairs* online, Winter 1978/1979 issue, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/1978-12-01/end-pan-arabism>.

⁴¹ "The Two 'isms' of the Middle East," *Al Jazeera* online, February 4, 2008, <https://www.aljazeera.com/focus/arabunity/2008/02/200852518534468346.html>.

⁴² Peter Mansfield, "Nasser and Nasserism," *International Journal*, The Arab States and Israel, 28, no. 4 (Autumn 1973): 674.

⁴³ Milner, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/suez_01.shtml.

⁴⁴ Ajami, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/1978-12-01/end-pan-arabism>.

and regional unity as he sought to strengthen the Arab states, especially Egypt, and force out Western influences.⁴⁵ Nasserism is an adaptation of Pan-Arabism reflecting Nasser's specific ideologies including Arab nationalism, socialism, and anti-imperialism.⁴⁶ Leading up to the Suez Crisis, Nasserism was one of the most widely-accepted ideologies in the Arab World. While in power, Nasser often encouraged and funded the anti-imperialist efforts of Nasserist groups, as they aided the Egyptian president in spreading revolutionary Arab nationalism throughout the Middle East and North Africa.⁴⁷

THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION

The Algerian Revolution began around the same time as the Suez Crisis, when members of the Algerian Liberation Front (FLN), a socialist political party, revolted against their French colonizer.⁴⁸ The Algerian War of Independence was a domestic conflict with continental implications, as it was part of broader efforts to decolonize the African continent. Following over one hundred years of perceived humiliation, atrocities, and colonial oppression of Algeria by the French Empire, growing nationalistic and anti-colonial sentiments among Algerians primarily instigated the FLN's revolts.⁴⁹ The Algerians were further inspired by Egypt's successful 1952 revolution, which had overthrown its British-backed monarchy, an effect which was even further amplified by the rise of anti-imperialist Arab nationalist Egyptian President Nasser. Nasserism and the principles of the Algerian revolutionaries shared their strong anti-imperialist cores and the foundations of Pan-Arabism, linking both states' interests.⁵⁰

NASSER AND THE REVOLUTION

Nasser has been known to keep a close eye on regional developments in the Arab World as a means of bolstering Egyptian standing, spreading Egyptian influence, strengthening his Arab allies, and countering Western imperialist powers present in Middle East. Leading up to this committee session, the Algerian Revolution has reportedly been of particular interest to Nasser, given the proximity of Algeria to Egypt and Nasser's overall interests in expanding Pan-Arabism and ousting Western powers from the region.⁵¹ Nasser's vocal support of the Algerian

⁴⁵ Mansfield, 675.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Fatima Al-Wahaidy, "Overview of Egypt-Algeria Relations: 65 Years of Diplomatic Ties," *Egypt Today*, August 2, 2017. <http://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/15197/Overview-of-Egypt-Algeria-relations-65-years-of-diplomatic-ties>.

⁴⁸ Pierre Asselin, "The Algerian Revolution and the Communist Bloc," Cold War International History Project, February 10, 2015, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-algerian-revolution-and-the-communist-bloc>.

⁴⁹ Al-Wahaidy, <http://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/15197/Overview-of-Egypt-Algeria-relations-65-years-of-diplomatic-ties>.

⁵⁰ Mansfield, 680.

⁵¹ Ibid.


revolutionaries in the FLN, in fact, is one of France's driving factors in joining the joint-invasion of Egypt and attempting to remove Nasser from power.⁵²



⁵² Vivian Ibrahim, "Algeria and Egypt: A tale of two histories," November 24, 2009. Egypt Independent. <https://www.egyptindependent.com/algeria-and-egypt-tale-two-histories>.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

1. What are the interests of France and Egypt in Algeria? How do these aims interact with the goals of Algerian revolutionaries?
2. What does Pan-Arabism and Nasserism mean for the survival of the state of Israel?
3. What factors made the ideological relationship between Pan-Arabism and anti-imperial sentiments a reality? How has this relationship shaped Algerian-Egyptian relations and interests?
4. Where do French priorities lie, both domestically and internationally? What would it take for those priorities to shift, or for France to abandon certain interests?
5. Remember that France considers Algeria to be a core part of the French nation, a province of European France like Normandy or Burgundy. How should the French or other European powers respond to potential foreign financial or military interference within their borders?
6. Should the European powers be concerned about counteracting the spread of ideological contagion? What do revolutionary or decolonization movements in Africa mean for the wider proposition of European empire, in the Middle East, Asia, Oceania, and elsewhere?
7. What causes the distinction between cases of Western support for Arab unity (i.e. Eden in the 1940s) and cases of Western opposition to the strengthening of Arab states? How does this interact with the global and regional balance of power?



ADVICE FOR RESEARCH AND PREPARATION

Though this background guide gives a short overview of our committee's topics, it is crucial for delegates to conduct their own thorough research to garner a true understanding of the crises. This includes specifics about both the situations you are tackling and the figures and states you will represent.

Since much of debate will be based on fictional crises, all of which would have been plausible considering historical circumstances, do not get bogged down in the specific events following November 2nd, 1956. Researching the true history of how the Suez Crisis ended could be helpful in ensuring your solutions make sense in historical context, but do not feel too constrained by actual history — none of us can say for certain whether small changes to historical events could have produced wildly different futures.

What our dais values most in terms of realistic-ness is how accurately you represent your figure's stances and your country's interests. It is absolutely essential that you identify the main stakes and priorities of your nation based on your figure's perspective and stick to that position when crises emerge. The best way to prepare for this committee is to fully understand the interests of your country and what you are and are not willing to bargain for in pursuit of those goals. That knowledge, paired with a solid understanding of the historical situation leading up to November 2nd, 1956, should give you the skills necessary to succeed in committee. Do not forget to also look into your country's relationships with other powers as well, especially the American and Soviet superpowers and other emerging nations across the Middle East and North Africa. This includes any defined alliances, but also looking at countries with shared common interests.

Finally, remember that the ultimate goal of our committee is to produce a resolution that will pass with a simple majority. Ideally, the resolution should not only tackle the short-term aspects of the crisis, but should also create the foundations for long-lasting peace. Remember to balance both national motives and cooperative interests as you research and brainstorm. Below are some tips for your preparation:

First, get an understanding of the historical context and Suez Crisis. Before you begin researching your figure and country's stance on the crisis, do some broad research. Read a summary or watch a video about British colonialism in Egypt, for example. Establish a timeline of important events leading up to the crisis, and make sure you understand the context of our first committee session (November 2nd, 1956!).

Embody your figure and country's interests, and understand who your allies are. The fictional nature of much of our committee will require you to improvise. However, it is essential that all of your directives reflect the historical stances of your figure and country. You must be fluent in your stances to creatively tackle the crises you'll face. Moreover, though you do not want to

restrict your diplomatic options by only cooperating with formal allies, knowing which other delegates have similar interests to you will likely make finding support for your directives much simpler. Be sure to use the character guide as a resource!

Make sure you understand our committee structure, the topics, your role, etc... and if you don't, ask! If you have questions at any point of this process, please do not hesitate to ask. If you have questions during your research, email the Director (victoria.vale@mail.utoronto.ca). If you have questions during committee, reach out to anyone on the dais, and we will help! Our main job is to support you and make sure you succeed, so feel absolutely free to reach out if you need to. Whether this is your first conference or your tenth, no question is a stupid question! Our dais truly wants to make sure you have the best experience at UTMUN possible.

Below we've included citations for a few helpful sources. Feel free to use them as starting points for your research.

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