THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR, 1975

DELEGATE BACKGROUND GUIDE

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A Letter From Your Director...

To the delegates in the JCC,

My name is Jovan Maric, and I would like to welcome you all to UTMUN 2017. I'm a 3rd year Computer Science student who has a passion for global affairs. This will be my 7th year being involved in MUN, having both participated and helped organize conferences to varying extents all throughout my high school and university careers. While I'm not making websites, modifying kernels, or designing mobile apps, you'll find me travelling across Canada to participate in conferences in cities like Kingston and Montreal. Having had a lot of experience as a delegate, it is my hope that I can apply my knowledge effectively as one of the three Crisis Directors in this ambitious Triple Joint Crisis.

Model UN teaches you many important skills, such as the ability to negotiate, to speak in front of large audiences, to research, and to write papers effectively. When I joined my school's Model UN club back in grade 9, I was incredibly nervous as a result of my poor public speaking ability. I quickly became more comfortable, and by the time I started attending conferences on behalf of the University of Toronto, I was an award winning delegate. Keeping my own experiences in mind, it is my hope that everyone makes a conscious effort to improve their own skills, whether it be the speeches or committing ideas to paper.

Given the time put into organizing this conference, on behalf of myself and the entire team, I hope you all have a fantastic time!

Regards,

Jovan Maric

General Overview

OTTOMAN ERA

Mount Lebanon is one of the provinces of modern day Lebanon, but it has existed as an administrative region for hundreds of years. In 1516 it was conquered by the Ottoman Empire, but was given semi-autonomous status due to the difficulty of administering such an isolated rural area from Istanbul. The unique administrative status that the province enjoyed made it a safe haven for many ethno-religious minority groups who may have faced persecution elsewhere within the empire, such as Druze, Maronites, and even Kurds. Over hundreds of years, the flow of various distinctive religious groups into Lebanon gave it its multi-sectarian character, creating a patchwork of identities living side by side. By the early 19th century, Mount Lebanon had an informal political structure based on a balance of power between the Maronites and Druze.[1] This balance was upset when Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt invaded and occupied the Ottoman province of Greater Syria (which included Lebanon) from 1831 to 1841.

Ibrahim Pasha established many policies which were aimed at overcoming the social divisions in Mount Lebanon, while actually having the opposite effect. For example, he attempted to disarm the entire population to avoid challenges to his rule, and was met with resistance from various Druze communities. In 1837, he attempted to temporarily arm certain Christian groups to use against the Druze communities, but when he asked for the weapons back in 1839 he was met with open rebellion. All of the religious communities of Mount Lebanon then united against Ibrahim and aided the Ottoman effort to expel the Egyptian occupation.[2]

Despite returning to Ottoman rule in 1841, Lebanon's balance of power had shifted drastically in favor of the Maronites. Unlike the more traditional and Islamic areas of the Ottoman Empire, Mount Lebanon began to take advantage of the opening of economic relations with Christian Europeans, and the sudden prosperity it enjoyed allowed for the advancement of Christian institutions and social endeavors. Many Muslims in the surrounding areas resented the freedom and success being enjoyed by these Christian Arabs, who were still technically a minority within Greater Syria. Violent altercations took place between Druzes and Maronites, escalating to the outbreak of civil war in 1860. Responding to atrocities committed by both sides, European powers became involved in what is sometimes considered a humanitarian effort to end the war. Led by France, this expeditionary force was sent to protect the Arab Christians of the Ottoman Empire, so after quelling the violence it established a unique administrative status for Mount Lebanon known as the Mutasarrifate. In this system, Lebanon would be governed by a Christian Ottoman, who would be advised by a council representing each of the region's religious sects, and legitimized by the support of various European powers.[3] This system actually worked very well to provide stability and prosperity in Mount Lebanon

1 William Cleveland , *A History of the Modern Middle East*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2005), p. 90.

2 Samir Khalaf, *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 81-85.

3 Cleveland, *Middle East*, p. 91.

until its end in 1914; but despite helping to quell tensions between the region's inhabitants, it provided a constant reaffirmation of the distinctions between them.

INTERWAR YEARS

With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the provinces of Syria and Lebanon came under the control of a French mandate. France created the administrative area known as "Greater Lebanon" in 1920, by adding the Muslim-majority regions of Tripoli, Tyre, and Sidon, as well as the Biqa valley from Syria, and the Christian-dominant port city of Beirut. This was done to benefit the Maronites, who remained the dominant sect in Greater Lebanon, now with a large population of Muslims who did not want to live under Christian rulers. The Maronite Christian population wanted to turn Greater Lebanon westwards, to modernize the country and adopt a proto-European culture. On the other hand, the Muslim population, who made up the majority, wanted to identify as an Arab state and even to unite with Syria, which would marginalize the small Christian population in Mount Lebanon. Complicating the matter was the fact that the distribution of power in Lebanon reflected its multisectarian population, making it difficult for any single religious group to consolidate power and unilaterally orient the country either eastward or westward.[4]

In 1926, Lebanon became a constitutional Republic, still under the French mandate, and developed a political system designed to accommodate these competing interests, known as confessional politics. This system institutionalized what was already a tradition in Lebanese politics: each electoral district was represented by a local power holder known as a za'im, who was primarily focussed on serving the interests of his own base of power. Thus, rather than having political parties, Lebanon developed loyalist blocs that were organized along sectarian lines, further entrenching its religious divisions. This meant that state institutions, especially the army, tended not to be particularly strong or effective when compared to the z a'im.[5]

Significantly, many of these blocs ended up making use of private militias, if not for outright combat then at least to show their strength. Important examples of these include: Kamal Jumblatt, who was the hereditary representative of the Lebanese Druze community and the founder of the Progressive Socialist Party; Pierre Gemayel, who came from one of Lebanon's most influential Christian families and founded the Phalangist party; and Rashid Karami, a Sunni politician who served as Prime Minister of Lebanon eight times.

It is important to realize that this system was explicitly designed to not overcome sectarian differences, but rather to equalize the various sects and avoid the violent confrontations of the mid 19th century. Thus, each religious community was able to find some form of representation in Greater Lebanon's chamber, and the state was allowed to become stable and strong. However, Lebanon's identity crisis remained an issue.

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4 K halaf, *Violence in Lebanon*, p. 283-287. 5 Cleveland, *Middle East*, p. 334.

5 Cleveland, *Middle East*, p. 334.

POST WWII

Lebanon finally gained de facto independence in late 1946, but elections were allowed to be held as early as 1943. The elected President, a Maronite, appointed a Sunni Muslim as his Prime Minister; this was an essential tradition and it continued for some time, to help prevent either side from gaining dominance. Together they passed the National Pact, declaring that Lebanon was a unique and distinctive political entity and would not be absorbed into a greater Islamic state, but that it also had a clear Arab identity and a place in the Arab world. This pact also established the distribution of seats in the chamber based on a census taken in 1932; since the ratio of Christians to Muslims in Lebanon was six to five, there would be five Muslim deputies in the chamber for every six Christians.[6]

Beginning in the 1950s, Lebanon enjoyed a sort of economic and cultural golden age, centered around Beirut. At this time, other countries in the region were facing intense political upheaval and nationalist programs, and were suffering exoduses of entrepreneurs and traders. By contrast, Lebanon lowered trade restrictions, deregulated currency exchanges, and adopted Swiss-style banking laws, causing an influx of foreign capital. The country also became known for its lack of censorship and modern, Western-style tourist attractions. Similar in some ways to the role that a city like Dubai plays today, Beirut sat on the Eastern coast of the Mediterranean and acted as a bridge between the Middle East and the western world; both Europeans and Arabs could comfortably enjoy what the city had to offer. This helped Beirut slowly become one of the most secularized cities in the Arab world, and it attracted many Arab intellectuals and freethinkers. All of this contributed to Lebanon's international image as an example of the great democratic success that could be achieved by the neutralizing power of confessional politics.[7]

But the success enjoyed by the elites of Beirut belied a darker side of this era. The government seated in Beirut essentially ran a merchant republic, and it saw its purpose as supporting the big businesses which were drawing money into the country; it had a tendency to neglect many rural parts of the country, especially in the predominantly southern, Shiite region of Jabal Amel. The laissez-faire approach to the economy made the country attractive for foreign investors and bankers, but also undermined the power and wealth of Lebanon's lower merchant class. With the exception of the presidency of Fuad Shihab, very little money or effort was dedicated to social assistance programs or infrastructure development; the so called golden era only existed in the minds of a small section of Lebanese society. Even within Beirut, the suburbs of the southern and eastern edges of the city began transforming into slums, made up mainly of Palestinian refugees and peasant Shi'ite farmers who had been driven to more urban areas in search of work and shelter.[8]

While this was happening, the Arab world was also facing many changes. Under the inspiring leadership of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the ideology of pan-Arabism was quickly spread-

6 Rigby, A. "Lebanon: Patterns of Confessional Politics." *Parliamentary Affairs* 53.1 (2000): 170.

7 Cleveland, *Middle East*, p. 332-333.

8 Martin, D. "From spaces of exception to 'campscapes': Palestinian refugee camps and informal settlements in Beirut." *Political Geography* 44 (2015): 12-13.

ing and gaining popular support. It was particularly resonant with the Muslim population in Lebanon, many of whom felt left out from the country's sudden success. They instead felt that Lebanon was very quickly becoming overly Western and overly secularized, and was at risk of losing its Arab character. These fears were exacerbated during the Suez Crisis of 1956, in which Israel, the United Kingdom and France invaded Egypt in an attempt to overthrow Nasser. Despite calls for support from its Arab allies, Egypt received no support from the Lebanese government; in fact, Maronite President Camille Chamoun chose not to break off diplomatic ties with Britain and France, clearly showing which side he was on. Chamoun angered Nasser further by showing a willingness to join the Baghdad pact, which was seen as inherently anti-Arab. In both these cases, the Sunni Prime Minister took an opposing stance to Chamoun, and the country itself was similarly divided. Finally, in 1968 Egypt and Syria decided to unite under the common name of the "United Arab Republic", which reinvigorated many Lebanese Muslims' desire for joining a pan-Arab confederation or state.[9]

LEBANON'S RELATIONSHIP WITH PALESTINE

As a member of the Arab League, Lebanon contributed forces to the invasion of Israel on May 15, 1948. But during the Suez Crisis, and the Six-Day War of 1967, Lebanon chose not to get involved or take sides. However, this did not prevent thousands of Palestinian refugees from fleeing into Lebanon, the majority of whom were settled in refugee camps in the south. The United Nations intended for this to be a temporary measure, and planned on eventually working with Israel to repatriate Palestinian citizens into their former homelands. However, hundreds of thousands of European Jews had been uprooted from their lives through the experiences of the Second World War and the Holocaust, and were fleeing to Israel en masse. The Israeli government chose to settle many of these new immigrants in vacant Palestinian houses and farms; this effectively entrenched these lands into the Israeli economy and nation. Stuck in Lebanon (as well as Jordan and Syria), the refugees' temporary living arrangements evolved into what resembled villages but would more accurately be described as ghettos.

The Lebanese government imposed heavy restrictions on the mobility and employability of its Palestinian refugee population for several reasons. Shortages of arable land meant there was already enough competition for unskilled laborers, but there was also concern from Maronites that the integration of a largely Sunni Muslim refugee population would upset the delicate sectarian balance in the country. Furthermore, there were worries that helping Palestinians would incur the disfavor of Israel, so the refugees ended up stuck between a homeland they could not return to and a host government that, despite not wanting them, did not help them overcome their situation.[10]

It is within this context that many different Palestinian guerilla organizations began to emerge throughout the Middle East. Many young, disenfranchised Palestinians found an active purpose in these organizations, each of which had its own nuances. The Palestinian Liberation Organization

9 K halaf, *Violence in Lebanon*, p. 113.

10 Cleveland, *Middle East*, p. 356-358.

(PLO) was founded in 1964 under the guidance of the Arab League. While it was established as an umbrella group to provide oversight of the many Palestinian resistance groups, this changed with the complete failure of the Arab states to protect Palestinian interests in the Six-Day War of 1967. Palestinians began to realize that they would have to rely on themselves to get their homeland back, so the PLO evolved into an independent organization with the stated aim of reestablishing Palestinian nationhood. This reinvigorated the Palestinian sense of nationality and their desire for international recognition. In 1969, the chair of the PLO executive committee became Yasir Arafat, the leader of a Jordan-based guerilla organization called al-Fatah, and the PLO gradually began to function as a Palestinian government in exile.

One of the PLO's problems was that in trying to establish bases of operation, guerilla groups under the PLO directly challenged the domestic authority of their host countries, often operating as if at an extrajudicial level. The vast majority of refugees fled to Jordan and Lebanon, and it was in these countries that they began establishing home bases, and launching military attacks against Israel. This was problematic due to the Israeli tradition of intentionally responding disproportionately to any military attacks against it, as an attempt to show its strength. Many of the farmers in the south of Lebanon were fleeing northwards explicitly because they were becoming collateral damage of Israeli retaliation.[11]

The King of Jordan was unwilling to tolerate the presence of the PLO in his country. During the "Black September" of 1970, after months of violence between PLO and Hashemite forces, he ordered his military to throw its full force indiscriminately against the Palestinian-held areas of Jordan. This caused massive military and civilian casualties within the refugee camps, as well as an exodus of thousands of PLO fighters to Lebanon.

By contrast, the Lebanese military was a fairly weak and ineffective institution, so it was not able to act against the PLO presence in the south of Lebanon. The Cairo Agreement of 1969 was negotiated between Arafat and Lebanese army commanders, who accepted that the PLO's presence would have to be tolerated; the agreement placed Lebanon's refugee camps under PLO jurisdiction and administration, and gave the PLO the legal right to launch attacks on Israel from Lebanon. While the Lebanese government nominally maintained sovereignty over the land occupied by the refugee camps, this region became a de facto pseudo state run by Arafat and the PLO as the base of their operations.[12]

EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE CIVIL WAR

In 1958, Lebanon was under the presidency of Camille Chamoun. He was considered unpopular amongst Muslims due to how strongly he favored French and Maronite interests.[13] There were conspiracies that he was attempting to circumnavigate the law in order to get a second term in office, and one of the journalists most critical of him was assassinated in May. This caused wide-

11 Ibid, p. 354.

12 N/A. "Lebanon, the Palestinians and the PLO: A Profile." *Race & Class* 24.4 (1983): 330-332.

13 Cleveland, *Middle East*, p. 336.

spread anti-government demonstrations and general strikes, which escalated into violence between pro-government and anti-government militia forces. The rebellion was mostly led by the Sunni and Druze communities, under Rashid Karami and Kamal Jumblatt respectively, though the nature of the conflict was not entirely sectarian at this point. Their forces were able to successfully wrest the cities of Tripoli and Sidon away from the central government's control, a pattern which would reemerge in later conflicts. The phalangist militia fought under Pierre Gemayel in support of the government, but when President Chamoun asked the army to step in and put down the rebellion, the leader of the army (Fuad Shehab) refused to get involved. Shehab understood that the army did not have any sense of national, Lebanese loyalty; by picking either side he would alienate half of his own troops, so he chose to stay neutral.

After three months, the crisis was ended by the intervention of American marines, who reestablished order and allowed the presidency to peacefully transition from Chamoun to Shehab. In light of the fact that Iraq had just undergone a revolution to replace their monarchy with a socialist, Soviet-friendly state, President Eisenhower wanted to quell the unrest in Lebanon before any Communist influences could establish a foothold.[14]

The tensions in Lebanon did not end in 1958, however. In the early 1970s, the massive economic growth rates that had become the norm began to slow down. The extent of Lebanon's wealth inequality, as well as the levels of corruption and cronyism that it was built upon, quickly became apparent. Combined with the factors discussed above, including the activities of the PLO in the south, the reinvigoration of pan-Arabist ideas, and the general trends of sectarian division, this led to a sudden increase in labor unrests, strikes, and students protests, mirroring the events of 1958. Of course, counter protests also emerged, and the friction between the two sides began to heat up.

At the same time, populist preachers like Musa al-Sadr were working in Lebanon to encourage and protect the historically disadvantaged Shi'a communities. Due to their relegation to rural work, the Shi'a sect did not get involved heavily in the protests of 1958, as they were not politically connected enough to have a voice. However, they gained representation in 1974 with the creation of "The Movement of the Dispossessed," a social justice movement which had the support of members of Parliament. This was significant as the Shi'a sect had very serious grievances to air, and it contributed heavily to the outcry against the Maronites in power. In the beginning of 1975, this group also gained its own military wing, known as Amal.[15]

One of the most consistent demands of protesters was the abolishment of the confessional political system, in favor of normal democratic procedures. This was voiced most clearly by Jumblatt, who created the Lebanese National Movement in 1969. This group was a loose coalition of Muslim politicians who believed that the Shi'a and Sunni confessions had outgrown the Maronites in population size. They demanded that a new census be performed in order to redistribute the seats in parliament, and also stated their support for the Palestinian guerillas in the south.

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14 Khalaf, *Violence in Lebanon*, p. 7.

15 Nasr, Salim, and Diane James. "Roots of the Shi'i Movement." *MERIP Reports* 133 (1985): 11-12.

Contrastingly, the Maronites wanted to maintain the status quo. They opposed the continued toleration of the Palestinians as they believed this would shift the balance of power in favor of the Muslims. They had also been using Palestinians for cheap labor, so it was in their interests to keep the refugees impoverished and disorganized. With the support of the Phalangists (Gemayel), Tigers (Chamoun), and other Christian militias, they began arming themselves in preparation to fight the PLO as the King of Jordan had done in 1970. This triggered an arms race amongst the various sects, until every group and sect was prepared for all out war.[16]

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16 Cleveland, *Middle East*, p. 383-384.



Committee 1: MARONITES

Photo: CNN

Welcome delegates!

We are very excited to share such an absolutely amazing experience with all of you, as each and every one of you gains greater insight into the inner workings of Model United Nations and the topic presented within your committee. UTMUN is not only an experience in which you can improve your communication and public speaking skills, but also an opportunity to gain greater knowledge of international issues both past and present. As you prepare for the conference, remember to critically analyze your research as well as the individual you will be portraying. We would like to recommend all of you collaborate and work together throughout the duration of the conference, as doing so is critical for the success of a common task. The sharing of ideas, thoughts and personal views can only make a group stronger. Welcome delegates to UTMUN 2017, we hope all of you have a positive and enlightening experience.

Good luck to you all!

JCC Maronites Team

Committee Overview

The Maronite Catholics constitute Lebanon's most important Christian sect, in addition to playing a critical role within the Lebanese Civil War of 1975.[1] The Maronites had an uncompromising position in which they believed co

nfessionalism to be critical for the political future of Lebanon, and supported the continued maintenance of the confessional system as the dominant political representation within Lebanon.[1] ,[2] As stated by Sami E. Baroudi and Paul Tabar, the political role of the Maronite community has been greatly influenced by the political and social standing of the church within the community, the church's relations with secular and spiritual leaders, as well as the confessional power balance. As you will be conducting further research on the individual you have been assigned as well as their position within the context of the Lebanese Civil War of 1975, consider the following guiding topics: (1) Removing the Palestinians from Lebanese Territory and (2) Ensuring a political future for Lebanon that is in the interest of the Maronite Faction.

The National Pact, an agreement (made in the summer of 1943) that molded the basis of modern Lebanese political system as a multi-confessional state, has ensured the allocation of the top three public office positions (the Troika) according to religious lines.Thus, the role of presidency must be assumed by an active Maronite Christian, and the government itself ever since was under Maronite Christians' influence.[4] The favor of Christians in the parliamentary structure were further reinforced by the French colonial powers, spanning from 1920 to 1943. However, such pro-western, right wing governance was protested by many pan-Arab organizations and the general left-wing Muslim population. The demographic advantage started its shift towards the Muslim population when around a hundred thousand Palestinians refugees migrated to Lebanon in between 1948 to 1967 exoduses (push factor being the establishment of the state of Israel). A further shock in the dynamics of the Lebanese political paradigm occurred after the threat of civil war between the Muslims and Maronites (1958 Lebanon Crisis), followed by the Cold War, where the leftist stance of Maronites was contested by the pan-Arab groups siding with the pro-Soviet Arab nations.[5]

After waves of migration of Palestinians into Lebanon, and after the Ein al-Rummaneh clash between Palestinians and Phalangist militiamen in April 1975, tensions between Lebanese confessional groups broke into violence. The Phalange Party was to remain a leading force in the Christian war effort, and the Christian view was that the coalition of Palestinians and Lebanese Muslims had tipped the balance of coexistence based on the National Pact, to which both sides committed in 1943[4] . The Christian interpretation of the war is a battle for their community's survival as a political force in Lebanon, as it was a last-ditch fight for the defence of Christian culture in the Middle East. It was unacceptab le to consider existing as dhimmi subject to Muslim rule because if Lebanon were to become a Muslim country, non-Muslims would be regarded as second-class subjects, and thus the Maronite faction would defend their existence against opposed threats.

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

Committee 2: SECULAR

Photo: CNN

Welcome delegates!

I would like to welcome you to UTMUN 2017 and my committee, Joint Crisis: Secular. Whether you are a novice or an experienced delegate, my staff and I will do our best to make sure you have a fun and exciting conference.

My name is Asic Chen and I've been involved in UTMUN for the past two years, leading to my position this year as your director. I'm very excited to create a dynamic crisis simulation for all of you and our team has been working very hard to transport you back to the Lebanese Civil War and immerse you in the complex regional and personal politics of the post-colonial Middle East.

While there was no single formal "secular" party in Lebanon in 1975, the characters in this committee were all real people, belonging to various secular organizations. Although they had opposing viewpoints on some matters, their greatest objective was to further their cause, the prosperity of their nation, or their ideology. As a committee we will be able to take action as a single unit, though you hold more individual portfolio powers than most other delegates in the JCC, due to your roles as the heads of various independent organizations. I hope you have great fun bringing these distinct personalities alive and working toward the secularization and modernization of post-colonial Lebanon!

Best,

Asic Chen

FINDING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

Lebanon, with its geographical proximity, has always been a part of the Palestinian struggle. Ever since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Palestinian refugees, many of them members of violent Palestinian liberation movements, have been pouring through the border into Lebanon. After the Black September events in Jordan (1970-1971), the Palestinian Liberation Organization has been using Lebanon as both a political sanctuary and a base to launch attacks on Israel and other Jewish targets. In order to achieve peace and stability in Lebanon, the Palestinian refugees and militants must be relocated and mollified, which can only be achieved by a peaceful solution to the Palestinian conflict with Israel.

ESTABLISHING A MODERN, SECULAR STATE IN LEBANON

Lebanon has always been extremely diverse in religion, ethnicity, and political ideology. The formation of the state of Israel and the subsequent arrival of over 300,000 Palestinian refugees over the years greatly shifted the demography of Lebanon. The Cold War heightened ideological tension in the 1960s, as the Maronite Christians mainly sided with the West while the communists, socialist, nationalist, and pan-Arab leaned toward the Soviet camp.

This committee, comprising of representatives from different religious and ethnic sects, aims to established a secular, unified Lebanese state that is not divided along religious or ethnic lines.

GENERAL QUESTIONS:

Should the committee support a potential Syrian presence in Lebanon?

What should be done about the Palestinian conflict?

How can we ensure equal representation of secular parties in the Lebanese partitioned government?

CHARACTERS BRIEFINGS:

1. George Hawi, Lebanese Communist Party

You are a prominent Lebanese politician with nationalist ideals, as well as an atheist with a Greek Orthodox background. A senior member of the Lebanese Communist Party, you support the Palestinian cause and works tirelessly towards a stronger and more independent Lebanon.

2. Elias Atallah, Lebanese Communist Party

You are a member of the Lebanese Communist Party. Yet unlike the majority of the party, you are fiercely against the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. In fact, you are more of a Lebanese nationalist than a communist. Your objective is to employ resources available in the left-wing camp to build towards an independent Lebanese state.

3. Ibrahim Kulaylat, Independent Nasserist Movement

In 1957, you founded the Independent Nasserist Movement, a militia consisting of Sun-

ni, Shia, and Christian fighters, to oppose the pro-Western policies of President Camille Chamoun. In the years leading up to the 1975, you are an anti-establishment, left-wing politician, as well as an advocator for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and a close ally of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).

4. Yasser Arafat, Fatah

You are the founder of Fatah, the largest faction of the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLO). After becoming Chairman of the PLO in 1969, you have allied the PLO with Communist and Socialist forces in Lebanon on the onset of the civil war, hoping to bring independence to Palestine with the help of left-wing forces. You also count on Syrian support to further the interest of the PLO.

5. George Habash, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

Born into an Eastern Orthodox Palestinian family, you have instead followed left-wing ideals and founded the secular Popular Front for the Liberation for Palestine, the second largest faction in the PLO. After fleeing Jordan and relocating to Lebanon in 1971, you have been experienced failing health and diminishing control in the PLO. Outraged by the PLO's ratification of a resolution that leans towards the "two-state solution", you have resolved to lead the PFLP away from the PLO and fight for the Palestinian state independently.

6. Ahmed Beydoun, Socialist Lebanon

You are a founding member of Socialist Lebanon, which later merged into the Communist Action Organization in Lebanon. You are a Lebanese nationalist that long for a nationalist, socialist Lebanese state.

7. Waddah Sharara, Socialist Lebanon

Like Ahmed Beydoun, you are a founding member of Socialist Lebanon. You will work closely with Beydoun to forge a nationalist, socialist Lebanese state.

8. Assem Qanso, Lebanese Ba'ath Party

You are the leader of the Lebanese Ba'ath Party, a regional chapter of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party based in Syria. You are very much pro-Syria.

9. Muhsin Ibrahim, Communist Action Organization in Lebanon (pro-PFLP)

You are a senior member of the Communist Action Organization in Lebanon and an ally of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, with whom you share a leftist ideology and Palestinian nationalist sentiments.

10. Ali Eid, Young Alawite Movement and the Arab Democratic Party (pro-Syria)

You are a distinguished leader of the Alawite community in Lebanon and founder of the Arab Democratic Party. Having received a Western education in Beirut and the United States, you believe that all minorities are entitled to the same rights in a free country. Founding the Young Alawite Movement in 1972, you have allied yourself with the Syrian President, Hafez Al-Assad, to battle innate discrimination against the Alawites in the Lebanese political system.

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Welcome delegates!

My name is Jovan Maric, and I would like to welcome you all to UTMUN 2017. I'm a 3rd year Computer Science student who has a passion for global affairs. This will be my 7th year being involved in MUN, having both participated and helped organize conferences to varying extents all throughout my high school and university careers. While I'm not making websites, modifying kernels, or designing mobile apps, you'll find me travelling across Canada to participate in conferences in cities like Kingston and Montreal. Having had a lot of experience as a delegate, it is my hope that I can apply my knowledge effectively as one of the three Crisis Directors in this ambitious Triple Joint Crisis.

Model UN teaches you many important skills, such as the ability to negotiate, to speak in front of large audiences, to research, and to write papers effectively. When I joined my school's Model UN club back in grade 9, I was incredibly nervous as a result of my poor public speaking ability. I quickly became more comfortable, and by the time I started attending conferences on behalf of the University of Toronto, I was an award winning delegate. Keeping my own experiences in mind, it is my hope that everyone makes a conscious effort to improve their own skills, whether it be the speeches or committing ideas to paper.

Given the time put into organizing this conference, on behalf of myself and the entire team, I hope you all have a fantastic time!

Regards,

Jovan Maric

AMAL MOVEMENT

In 1974, a movement and political party was founded under the name: Harakat al-Mahrumin – The Movement of the Deprived. It was cofounded by Musa al-Sadr and Hussein el-Husseini in 1974 as a means to unite the Lebanese regardless of differences such as religion or political view[1]. In 1975, the Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya, or AMAL was formed as a military wing for the Movement of the Deprived by Musa al-Sadr, and the two together became known as the Amal Movement.

Historically, the Shi'ites were marginalized and did not contribute much to the political landscape in Lebanon. For example, they were "excluded from discussions regarding the formation of the Lebanese state in 1943".[2]

Despite having established a militia, and despite Amal becoming known as the most important Shi'a militia in later years, Musa al-Sadr refused to involve it in the fighting during the early stages of the Lebanese Civil War. This is in part due to the fact that Amal was not founded as a pro-Shi'a group, but rather as a secular organization with the purpose of reforming the Lebanese political system.

Rather than engage in conflict with the other factions, Amal initially chose to support the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Lebanese National Movement. The Amal movement is also partial to the possibility of a Syrian military intervention.

The military strength of Amal is sizable, with numbers being estimated at 15,000.[3] While this is nowhere near the size of the Lebanese Armed Forces, members of the LAF come from a variety of religious backgrounds, leading some members to defect to a variety of militias. This is preventing the LAF from intervening in a meaningful way, and thus places more emphasis on the capacities of militias such as Amal.

CHARACTER PROFILES

Abbas al-Musawi – A Lebanese Shi'a cleric. Historically not in Lebanon until 1978, but is being brought into the picture a few years earlier for this committee. Is significant for founding Hezbollah, a collection of violent extremists bent on fighting for the Shi'a people, in 1982 in order to expel the Israelis from southern Lebanon.[4] Musawi's main concern is protecting the Shi'a peoples from the Israelis, the Sunnis, and the Christians, by any means

1 Encyclopedia of World, ed. "Musa Al-Sadr Facts." http://biography.yourdictionary.com/musa-al-sadr.

2 Siklawi, Rami. "The Dynamics of the Amal Movement in Lebanon 1975-90." Arab Studies Quarterly, Winter 2012, 4-26.

3 Note: Not entirely historically accurate. Sources usually peg the number between 10,000-14,000. For the sake of this committee, however, 15,000 will be used as the estimate.

4 The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, ed. "Abbās Al-Mūsawī." https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abbas-al-Musawi.

necessary.

Ragheb Harb – An anti-Israeli imam. Leader of the southern Shi'ite resistance. As a cleric, is significant and revered in religious communities. Laid the foundation that led to the formation of Hezbollah.

Musa al-Sadr – Co-founder of the Amal Movement. Is religious and willing to defend Shi'a interests, but would prefer to work towards a secular, inclusive resolution to the Civil War.[5] Is willing to withdraw support (and thus nullify a faction's benefits from his influence) from any movement that resorts to excessive uses of force.

Hussein el-Husseini – Co-founder of the Amal Movement. A skilled and respected politician working closely with Musa al-Sadr. Worked closely with Sadr to establish the political dimension of Amal.[6] Prefers secular approaches to the resolution of the Civil War, and fiercely defends the tenants of the democratic process.

Melkite Archbishop Grégoire Haddad – A Greek Catholic Archbishop with strong ties to Musa al-Sadr.[7] Despite warnings from the Vatican, aims to work with the Amal movement to promote positive dialogue between the Christian and Muslim communities.

Nabih Berri – A lawyer with a strong working relationship with Musa al-Sadr. While his role within the Amal movement is not a significant one, his convictions and willingness to defend the Shi'a people from the imminent Israeli threat have paved the way for a significant influence boost. Aims to support the Shi'a people to the best of his ability by gaining influence within the Amal movement.

Sheikh Said Shaaban – A Sunni and religious leader calling for Sharia law in Lebanon. An outspoken member of the Lebanese Islamic Group, who believes that force is more efficient than diplomacy. Is sympathetic to Shi'a hardships in Lebanon, most likely because of his belief that Sunnis and Shi'ites should be united.[8] Aims to resolve the conflict through the use of force in order to implement Sharia law.

Fathi Yakan – A Sunni Islamist whose main goal is to remove the "Maronite hegemony" over Lebanon.[9] Advocates for Sharia law, claiming that Christians and Muslims would both be protected under its tenants. More broadly, believes in unity in the Arab world, and is sympathetic to interventions from nations such as Syria.

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5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Emmaüs International, ed. "GRÉGOIRE HADDAD: DISPARITION D'UN REBELLE." http://www.emmaus-international.org/fr/actualites/1483-deces-gregoire-haddad.html.

8 Al-Maaref, ed. "Sheikh Ragheb Harb Biography." http://english.almaaref.org/essaydetails.php?eid=3450&cid=396.

9 Rabil, Robert G. "Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyah and Fathi Yakan: The Pioneer of Sunni Islamic Activism in Lebanon." Religion, National Identity, and Confessional Politics in Lebanon, 2011, 31-39.

Muhammad Baydoun – A mathematics professor at the Lebanese University who is sympathetic to the Amal Movement. A moderate politician who is reluctant to use excessive displays of force. Prefers to use diplomacy as a means to resolve the conflict.

Naim Qassem – A Shi'i cleric working with the Amal movement. Advocates for a proactive approach to the conflict by means of activism and resistance.[10] Operates a Muslim students' union. Is predisposed to be sympathetic to Abbas al-Musawi's political views, but, for the time being, aims to either push Amal into taking a more active stance regarding the war or else work with more radical individuals to push his own agenda.

10 Sousa, David. "Three Phases of Resistance: How Hezbollah Pushed Israel Out of Lebanon." April 28, 2014. http://www.e-ir.info/2014/04/28/three-phases-of-resistance-how-hezbollah-pushed-israel-out-of-lebanon/.

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