

# **9TH POLITBURO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA**

**SPECIALIZED COMMITTEE**



**Letter from the Director:**

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the 9<sup>th</sup> Politburo of the People's Republic of China where military leaders, propagandists, journalists, politicians, and economists have gathered to discuss the future of the PRC and its position in the global sphere. It is with great pleasure and excitement that we welcome you to the 2018 UTMUN Conference and our committee. My name is Liza Kanopatykaia and I will be serving as your Committee Director. I am currently a second-year student working on a double major in International Relations and Diaspora & Transnationalism Studies. I have been a Cold-War buff for many years; even more, I have been doing MUN since the 10<sup>th</sup> grade and even participated in UTMUN as a delegate. I am flanked by an experienced crisis team who will keep you on your toes throughout this committee. Our goal is to ensure that you have an authentic experience as a part of a dynamic historical event that shaped the nature of modern geopolitics. You will be encouraged to think critically, learn to respond quickly and effectively, and write resolutions that will foster collaboration between characters with different views.

You have likely studied the Cultural Revolution and its implications in some capacity throughout your high school career. Our goal here is to encourage you to think about the Revolution in the context of the Cold War and global political, social, and economic impacts. When examining the Revolution, there is a tendency to separate the domestic from the global context. By viewing the event through a global lens, our hope is that you will be able to see its impact on both domestic and international relations. We will examine the economic precursors that led to the cultural revolutions with our discussions of the implications of Five Year Plans. Furthermore, the social scene will be set with discussion centered around Great Leap Forward and the cult of personality issued by Mao's chairmanship. Finally, the military strategy and foreign policy will be discussed with relation to the Soviet Union and the United States.

This committee will veer slightly away from traditional MUN procedure. In addition to resolutions, you will be able to submit and vote on committee wide directives that will alter the course of the committee in real time. Dynamic crisis updates will keep you on your toes. Delegates will not have personal portfolio powers. We expect the committee will stray from historical accuracy. With this in mind, we encourage you all to bring an open minded, a quick wit and an anachronistic understanding of both domestic and foreign Chinese policy.

I wish you the best of luck with your research and I look forward to meeting all of you in February.

Best Regards,

**Liza Kanopatykaia**

**Director of the 9<sup>th</sup> Politburo of Communist China**



### **Introduction: The Birth of the Politburo**

The People's Republic of China (PRC) arose out of a bloody civil war between nationalist and communist factions that lasted from 1927 up until the inception of the PRC in 1949<sup>1</sup>. The war marked a major turning point in modern Chinese history, with the Communists gaining control of mainland China and establishing the PRC and forced the [Republic of China](#) (ROC) to retreat to Taiwan. The war represented an [ideological](#) split between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Nationalist Party of China (KMT). Conflict continued intermittently until late 1937, when the two parties came together to form the [Second United Front](#) to counter the [Imperial Japanese Army](#) threat and to prevent the country from crumbling<sup>2</sup>. On 1 August 1927, the Communist Party launched an [uprising](#) in [Nanchang](#) against the Nationalist government in [Wuhan](#). This conflict led to the creation of the [Red Army](#). The Red Army consisting of mutinous former National Revolutionary Army (NRA) soldiers as well as armed [peasants](#) established control over several areas in [southern China](#). KMT forces continued to attempt to suppress the rebellions<sup>3</sup>. Then, in September, Wang Jingwei was forced out of Wuhan. September also saw an unsuccessful armed rural insurrection, known as the [Autumn Harvest Uprising](#), led by [Mao Zedong](#). This marked the beginning of a ten-year armed struggle, known in mainland China as the "Ten-Year Civil War". Despite the intensified clashes between the CPC and KMT, countries such as the US and the Soviet Union attempted to prevent a disastrous civil war<sup>4</sup>. US President [Franklin D. Roosevelt](#) sent special envoy [Lauchlin Currie](#) to talk with KMT party leaders to express their concern regarding the hostility between the two parties, with Currie stating that the only ones to benefit from a civil war would be the Japanese. Japan capitalized on internal discord within China by invading during World War II (WWII). When Japan was defeated, the power vacuum in China enabled further Civil War between the KMT and the CPC<sup>5</sup>.

The CPC eventually won the Civil War in China. After the end of the Civil War, Mao claimed power and the Politburo system arose to accommodate the new regime<sup>6</sup>. The First National People's Congress, were held in 1953, and in 1954, the congress declared the state constitution and elected Mao as chairman of the People's Republic. Liu Shaoqi was elected chairman of the Standing Committee and Zhou Enlai was elected the premier of the State Council. This group of individuals oversees the [Communist Party of China](#). Power within the politburo is centralized in the [Politburo Standing Committee](#), a smaller group of Politburo members.

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<sup>1</sup> Maurice Meisner (1999). [Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic](#) (3rd ed.). Free Press

<sup>2</sup> Lew, Christopher R.; Leung, Pak-Wah, eds. (2013). *Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Civil War*. Lanham: Maryland : The Scarecrow Press, Inc.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Lynch, Michael (2010). *The Chinese Civil War 1945–49*. Osprey Publishing.

<sup>5</sup> Westad, Odd (2003). *Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946–1950*. Stanford University Press.

<sup>6</sup> Maurice Meisner. [Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic](#) (3rd ed.). Free Press



The Politburo is nominally elected by the [Central Committee](#). In practice, however, analysts believe that new members of the Politburo and its [Standing Committee](#) are chosen through a series of deliberations by current Politburo members and retired Politburo Standing Committee members. The power of the Politburo resides largely in the fact that its members generally simultaneously hold positions within the [People's Republic of China](#) state positions and with the control over personnel appointments that the Politburo and Secretariat have. In addition, some Politburo members hold powerful regional positions<sup>7</sup>.

Planning and ambition are key characteristics of socialist economies; the Politburo mapped out strategies known as Five Year Plans for economic development, foreign policy, and launching reforms. Five Year Plans are China's way of enforcing progress and the transition from a Soviet Style system to a socialist government with Chinese characteristics. Each plan is established for the entire country but contains different economic development guidelines for specific regions.

### **TOPIC ONE: THE NEXT FIVE YEAR PLAN**

#### **The First Five-Year Plan:**

China's Five-Year Plans are programs of social and economic development. The First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) was based on the Soviet model and heavily aided by the USSR both financially and technically. The First Five Year Plan was concurrent with the official transition to socialism. It was a period focused on industrialization, nationalization, collectivization of agriculture and political centralization. Prior to 1953, the Chinese economy was not modernized, consisted largely of peasantry, had issues with inflation, and included private business. The pressing issues of the early 1950s pertained to producing enough food for the Chinese population, domestic capital for investment, and purchasing Soviet technology. This was the reasoning behind the collectivization of agriculture, and preliminary collectivization was 90% complete by the end of 1956. The development of heavy industry such as steel, iron and machinery was prioritized over consumer goods. In addition to collectivization, nationalization occurred in banking, industry and trade, meaning that private businesses were practically obsolete in mainland China. Large industrial plans were initiated in former Manchuria and northwestern China and roads and railways were built, including a rail link across the Gobi Desert.

Political centralization and national integration had to with the party and the government administration. In 1954, a power struggle occurred and led to the purge of Gao Gang, a member of the Political Bureau, and Rao Shushi, head of the Party Organization department as they were accused of attempting to seize control of the CCP. Further, Deng Xiaoping, the vice premier of the State Council and the Secretary General of the Party,

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<sup>7</sup> Todd, A. (2016). History for the IB Diploma Paper 3 The People's Republic of China (1949–2005). Cambridge University Press.



wanted to increase national integration through improving party organization, namely by recruiting intellectuals and “experts.” By 1956, they constituted 12% of party membership, with peasant membership decreasing to 69%. During this time, the Hundred Flowers Campaign occurred – a time when the CCP encouraged intellectual and cultural criticism and commentary on its politics and state of affairs. This led to the expression of dissent and criticism. Mao’s regime then targeted the very dissenters he had encouraged, persecuting them in the Anti-Rightist Campaign.<sup>8</sup>

The First Five-Year Plan resulted in a 9% growth of China’s economy. According to official figures, heavy industry rose by 200% and light industry rose by 70%, meaning that China could produce modern machinery independently for the first time. However, this focus on industrial development happened at the expense of agricultural production. The results of the First Five-Year Plan partially caused the Great Leap Forward seeing as some of Mao’s goals were to speed up economic progress, decrease the wage gap, and increase agricultural growth.<sup>9</sup>

### **The Great Leap Forward (1958-1960):**

#### **Background:**

The Great Leap Forward, 1958-1963, was Mao’s attempt to modernize economic and technical development quickly and with notable results. His goal was to rival America’s economy by 1988. It was an attempt to develop China’s agriculture and industry interpedently. Because the targets were not based on sound economic analysis, the targets and quotas were constantly set and reset. Mao aimed to “overtake all capitalist countries in a fairly short time, and become one of the richest, most advanced, and powerful countries in the world.” This economic overreach resulted in the Great Famine.

The justifications for the Great Leap Forward are based on the failures of the First Five-Year Plan. Mao, along with some other members of the CCP, believed the First Year Plan was not as successful as it could’ve been. They believed the Second Five-Year Plan would be more successful if the people had stronger belief in Maoist ideology and if available resources were used more efficiently to develop agriculture and industry.

The CCP believed in the linkage of ideology and economic development, since development processes were represented in political terms, and the impact of ideological

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<sup>8</sup> Worden, R. L., Savada, A. M., Dolan, R. E. & Library Of Congress. Federal Research Division. (1988) China: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress: For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O. [Pdf] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/87600493/>.

<sup>9</sup> Hsia, Ronald. “China’s Industrial Growth, 1953-1957.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 321, Jan. 1959, pp. 71–81. JSTOR [JSTOR], [www.jstor.org/stable/1030981?seq=6#page\\_scan\\_tab\\_contents](http://www.jstor.org/stable/1030981?seq=6#page_scan_tab_contents).



belief on socioeconomic development was highlighted. The CCP then intensified mobilization of the peasantry and increased ideological education, indoctrination, and propaganda campaigns. In an attempt to create a more responsive and connected political environment, they implemented a new *xiafang* (down to the countryside movement), in which individuals within the party would visit and exert manual labor at factories, communes, mines and public works project to attain a better understanding of these grass-roots conditions.

Mao wanted to move beyond the USSR-supported Five-Year Plan, because he was uncomfortable with a potential Chinese dependence on the USSR. He also believed the USSR's economic and technical assistance did not fulfill the nation's needs and his expectations. New methods were required in order for China to progress economically. The fundamental issue at this time pertained to agricultural production: Chinese agricultural production was insufficient for a growing population. There were two potential solutions to this: initiating a substantial program of agricultural modernization by diverting resources to industries directly involved with agricultural development or increasing agricultural output by utilizing traditional methods to the extreme. Mao did not want to commit trained workers to the agricultural sector of the economy because he wanted the focus to be on industry and manufacturing. Instead, Mao opted to ramp up agricultural industry by directing a huge amount of unskilled laborers to

### **Implementation:**

This new socioeconomic and political system was implemented through communes, mostly in the countryside and in some urban areas. By the end of 1958, 700 million people had been placed into 26,578 communes, with about 5000 families (or 22,000 people) in each commune. In one commune, twelve families formed a work team, and twelve work teams formed a brigade, and each brigade had a leader. Within communes, people gave up individual ownership of tools or farm animals as the commune as a collective owned everything and operated as a single unit. The communal nature constituted an attack on the institution of the family unit. They were planned as self-sufficient communities in terms of agriculture, small-scale industry, entertainment, education, nurseries, marketing, administration, and even security. This laborsaving structure was partially based on the assumption that communal living will lead to an increase in manpower availability for major public works projects like irrigation networks and hydroelectric dams. The epitome of the Great Leap Forward was the "backyard" production plants – small steel furnaces in villages and neighborhoods that were supposed to speed up the process of industrialization.<sup>10</sup>

The Great Leap Forward was successful at first but began to fail in 1959. Production targets were set at unrealistically high levels and were revised upward multiple times

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<sup>10</sup> Chan, Alfred L. Mao's Crusade: Politics and Policy Implementation in China's Great Leap Forward.




throughout the progression of the Great Leap. Heavy industry, particularly steel production, was prioritized, while light industry and agriculture fell behind. Most of the population, regardless of whether they were young, old, rural, or urban, were involved in the creation of steel and iron.<sup>11</sup>

In an attempt to achieve the high targets, the government used violence and propaganda. While many starved to death due to insufficient grain production, it is estimated that 2-3 million of the victims of the Great Leap Forward were executed or tortured to death for what were sometimes slight infractions. Civilians were beaten and hung for not working hard enough and physically mutilated for disobeying. While it is true that there were serious food shortages that led to starvation, starvation was also used as a method of coercion by the government. Access to grain was also used to control people and force them to obey the party – food distribution was dependent on merit and obedience, and sometimes commune members who were ill or disobedient wouldn't be provided any. As the moral fabric of society unfolded due to worsening living conditions, people resorted to unthinkable acts – stealing, abuse, poisoning, and even cannibalism.

Propaganda was also used to encourage people to work and produce more and to indoctrinate the population in Maoist ideology, but it wasn't as prominent as it was in the Cultural Revolution. The main slogan during the Great Leap Forward was “dare to think, dare to act,” which means Mao was encouraging the peasantry to follow his lead.<sup>12</sup>

Birth and Death Rate in China as a result of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural revolution (Allen, 2013)



<sup>11</sup> Peng, X. (1987). Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in Chinas Provinces. *Population and Development Review*, 13(4), 639-670. doi:10.2307/1973026

<sup>12</sup> Boyle, J. (2013, December 26). 11 slogans that changed China. Retrieved November 05, 2017, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-24923993>



**Resistance:**

Resistance to the Great Leap Forward was primarily led by Peng Du Huai. A senior figure in the CCP, a respected soldier, and a comrade of Mao's for 30 years, he held the position of Minister of Defence. He had always had his differences with Mao and was not afraid of Mao's authority, unlike many senior CCP officials. After visiting his home province and witnessing the realities of the Great Leap Forward, he sought to bring these realities to Mao's attention. In July 1959, he wrote a letter to Mao expressing several issues with the Great Leap and its effects. He also publicly criticized the policy a party conference at Lushan, Jiangxi Province, citing his concern with the effects the policy would have on modernizing the armed forces. He also took issue with policy creation and implementation, believing that realistic economic policy was needed and that rushed industrialization and collectivization were not viable policies. Mao was angered by this and Peng was denounced.<sup>13</sup> There were accusations that Peng was a Soviet spy and Mao appeared to threaten civil war against his opponents when he said "If the Chinese People's Liberation Army should follow Peng Dehuai, I will go to fight guerrilla war." Peng was out-maneuvered and lost support, and he was stripped of office, sent to exile, and later died in detention during the Cultural Revolution. He was removed from his position as Minister of Defense and replaced by Lin Biao, an individual whose views were more consistent with Mao's.<sup>14</sup>

**Results:**

The Great Leap Forward was a disastrous failure and is also known as Mao's Great Famine. It suffered serious economic failure – the steel and iron made using backyard steel furnaces was worthless and bad quality, the production of grain for food notably declined from 1959-61, and industrial output fell as a result. In more detail, the results included a shortage of food and raw materials for industry, inadequate agriculture production, overproducing poorly made, worthless goods, deterioration of industrial plants due to mismanagement, exhaustion and demoralization of the peasantry through overwork, in addition to demoralization of intellectuals and party and government officials. It resulted in one of the largest man-made famines in history. While it's difficult to ascertain the number of deaths, some historians believe they were between 20-30 million, while others estimate that closer to 45 million people starved to death as a result of the policies<sup>15</sup>. It also led to international tensions due to disputes with the Soviet Union. The aforementioned failures led to a sense of disillusionment with Mao, casing him to resign from his position of Head of State in 1959, though he remained as the Party Chairman. The National People's Congress

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<sup>13</sup> Worden, R. L., Savada, A. M., Dolan, R. E. & Library Of Congress. Federal Research Division. (1988) China: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress: For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O. [Pdf] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/87600493/>

<sup>14</sup> Lawrence, Alan. "China Under Communism." Google Books.

<sup>15</sup> Dikötter, F. (2010, December 16). Mao's Great Leap to Famine. Retrieved November 03, 2017, from <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/opinion/16iht-eddikotter16.html>





elected Liu Shaoqi in his place, but Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaping, two other moderate CCP members, also played a role in the day-to-day running of the nation. In the late 1960s, the Great Leap Forward was abandoned and China returned to some capitalist aspects like small-scale business.

### **Second Five-Year Plan: 1958-1962:**

The Second Five-Year Plan was implemented from 1958-1962, meaning that half of it coincided with the Great Leap Forward. Five main tasks were associated with the Great Leap Forward. First, maintaining industrial development with a sustained focus on heavy industry, advancing technical improvement, and creating a more concrete foundation for socialist industrialization moving forward. Second, to persist with socialist reform, partially by extending collective/public ownership. Third, to develop industrial and agricultural production, handicrafts, transportation, and commerce on the bases of socialism and infrastructure development. Fourth, ensuring scientific research is conducive to the demands of a socialist economy and culture. Lastly, national defense must be strengthened, and the people's living conditions and cultural life must be improved on the foundation of agricultural and industrial growth.<sup>16</sup>

### **Reification Post Great Leap Forward:**

After many of the issues of the Great Leap Forward were identified, some adjustments were made, beginning in late 1961. Institutional and economic changes were necessary to prevent the tragedy of the Great Leap Forward from reoccurring. To do this, the number of urban and rural laborers employed by the Chinese government was reduced, and many rural laborers who worked in urban areas were sent back to the countryside. Several large industrial projects and water conservation projects (a traditional method that was exploited to increase agriculture output) were abandoned or cut back. Large amounts of grain were imported to sustain the population, and the government's grain procurement programs were reduced. Communes were reorganized to allow production brigades and teams more agency in administrative and economic planning. However, no famine relief operation was carried out seeing as the issue was too large and dispersed and would've caused serious stress to already limited state resources. While agricultural output experienced a slow recovery and available grain supply didn't return to pre- Great Leap Forward levels until the mid-1960s, mortality soon returned to normal levels and a fertility boom occurred in 1963, resolving some of the demographic issues of the Great Leap Forward.

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<sup>16</sup> Pan, L. (Ed.). (n.d.). The 2nd Five-Year Plan (1958-1962) (China). Retrieved November 7, 2017, from [http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-04/05/content\\_245706.htm](http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-04/05/content_245706.htm)

**Results:**

Agricultural output fluctuated notably during the Second Five-Year Plan because it was a plan that encompassed the disastrous Great Leap Forward then the “lean crop” in 1960 and the gradual recovery in 1961-62. According to official estimates, industrial output doubled, steel production increased, investment in capital construction rose by 15% as compared to the First Five Year plan, and there was a 30% increase in the average income of farmers and workers. However, several issues arise. The credibility of such results is questionable – keeping in mind that half of this period was concurrent with the Great Leap Forward, a period of grain shortages, a decrease in industrial output, and famine, is it reasonable that such economic development occurred? It is significant to note that the Great Leap Forward and the Anti-Rightist Movements caused serious economic imbalances and fiscal deficits, many assert that the Second Five-Year Plan was unofficially abandoned because the goals of the Great Leap Forward were pursued at the time, rather than goals outlined in the Second Five-Year Plan.<sup>17</sup>

**Politics of the Second Five-Year Plan:**

After 1961 and the ascendancy of Liu Shaoqi to the position of Head of State, there was a slight move to the right of the political spectrum. Because the party sought economic stability, more moderate figures like Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, and Bo Yibo implemented corrective measures discussed previously. To centralize and strengthen party discipline, the CCP returned to having six regional bureaus and encouraged populist-style leadership in all levels of government in an attempt to appeal to the general public. Less emphasis was placed on ideological indoctrination and more was placed on setting realistic targets for production, and in a slight restoration of capitalist tendencies, production authority was returned to factory managers. By 1965, China was performing better economically under the Secretary General Deng Xiaoping of the Central Committee’s Secretariat. However, Mao remained the Chairman of the Party and from 1962 onwards, sought to re-establish his leadership role, including launching the Socialist Education Movement in 1962-1965.<sup>18</sup> Mao felt that capitalist and antisocialist tendencies were beginning to appear in China, so he initiated a movement focused on restoring ideological purity, re-inciting revolutionary commitment into the CCP and government, and emphasizing the significance of class struggle. It was also known as the Four Cleanups Campaign as it aimed to cleanse politics, economics, organization and ideology. This was implemented by including manual labor in the school system and implementing a work-study program in the education. Intellectuals would also be involved in manual labor to get rid of their bourgeois influences. Internal disagreements ensued on implementation,

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<sup>17</sup> Onoue, E. (1963). Chinese Agriculture In The Second Five-Year Plan Period. *The Developing Economies*, 1(2), 184-201. doi:10.1111/j.1746-1049.1963.tb00637.x

<sup>18</sup> Todd, A. (2016). *History for the IB Diploma Paper 3 The People’s Republic of China (1949–2005)*. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from [https://books.google.ca/books?id=cQxQDQAAQBAJ&source=gb\\_s\\_navlinks\\_s](https://books.google.ca/books?id=cQxQDQAAQBAJ&source=gb_s_navlinks_s).



particularly between Mao and moderates Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. The Socialist Education Movement was accompanied with a movement to learn from the army. The Minister of National Defense, Lin Biao, was rising to the center of power, and he encouraged the PLA and CCP to further adopt Maoist ideology.<sup>19</sup>

### **Third Five-Year Plan: 1966-1970**

The Third-Five Year Plan had 3 main objectives with a focus on national defense. The first objective was to develop agriculture and resolve issues regarding sustenance, clothing, and other basic needs. The second was to strengthen national defense and focus on technological advance. The third objective focused on enhancing infrastructure, ensuring production was at a high quality, variety, and quantity, building a self-reliant economy, and developing transportation, culture, education, and scientific research. Doing so would aid in achieving agricultural output goals and strengthening national defense. This focus on national defense and preparation for conflict was due to fears of a war occurring, so development was emphasized on what the government believed would be the most important frontlines: national defense, science and technology, and industrial and transportation infrastructure. The Third Plan was due to be implemented by 1963, but because China's economy was too dislocated after the Great Leap Forward, so it began in 1965 instead. It is significant to note that the Third Five-Year Plan coincided with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.<sup>20</sup>

### **Results:**

While official figures boast substantial industrial and agricultural development, Western predictions of success are far less optimistic. Because 8 years had passed since the creation of a five-year plan, the population had increased by close to 100 million, meaning there were that many more mouths to be fed, basic needs to be tended to, and jobs to be created.

### **Politics of the Third Five-Year Plan:**

This was a time when China wanted to enhance its political status and military power, and the nuclear explosions of October 1964 and May 1965 were a result of this. While China remained economically backwards and largely agrarian, the nuclear tests threatened both highly industrialized countries and non-industrialized communities. The Party began blaming past economic difficulty partially on the withdrawal of Soviet experts working in China and the lack of supply of technical equipment to China. This was used as a justification for a self-reliant China. It outlined the goals of the Socialist Education Movement – reviving class struggle, beginning the Cultural Revolution, and encouraging the

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<sup>19</sup> MacFarquhar, R. (1983). The Origins of the Cultural Revolution. Retrieved November 2, 2017, from [https://books.google.ca/books?id=d9K8X9kKF1cC&dq=great leap forward&lr=&source=gbs\\_navlinks\\_s](https://books.google.ca/books?id=d9K8X9kKF1cC&dq=great+leap+forward&lr=&source=gbs_navlinks_s)

<sup>20</sup> Rui, Z. (2005). Changes in Five-Year Plans' Economic Focus (China). Retrieved November 7, 2017, from <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Nov/148163.htm>



study of Mao's thinking. It also emphasized the great strides that have been made in terms of agricultural and industrial production, the lack of foreign debt, and the focus on national defense. One central task for 1966 was deemed to be continuing the socialist education movement. It's significant to note that agricultural output was placed as a higher priority than industrial output. Another main focus was the idea of placing politics in command, the notion that ideological and political work is the most important, and to achieve this, the CCP's leadership must be strengthened, politics should be preeminent, and Mao's thinking should be revered. The international class struggle was highlighted, especially the potential of war due to US imperialism with regards to the Vietnam War and support for worldwide revolutionary struggles.<sup>21</sup>

### **Moving Forward**

Delegates, the third Five-Year Plan is coming to a close and it is your task to begin the drafting of a new doctrine to guide the People's Republic of China. Draw on the lessons of the past to inform a new strategy for the future. You must balance domestic issues and the PRC's standing in the international community. Should the next plan invest more resources into maintaining control of national ideology or should the Politburo redirect focus towards a more militarized state? Should agriculture still be a priority? These questions should guide you towards a committed plan for the young nation as it enters the 1970s.

## **TOPIC TWO: CULTURAL REVOLUTION**

### **Introduction:**

The Cultural Revolution was launched in 1966 by Mao in order to assert and preserve his authority over the Chinese Government and to redirect China from straying from the path of true communist values. This came after the failure of the Great Leap Forward and was aided by the frustrations of the population as well as the impatience of youth advocates. Mao had come to feel that, much like the Soviet Union, the leadership of China was progressing in a revisionist direction; this is to say that China was interpreting communism rather than staying true to its original Marxist roots. Mao's goal was to purge the remnants of capitalist ideology and traditional elements from Chinese society and the Party. He called this the "Four Olds": Old Customs, Old Culture, Old Habits, and Old Idea were to be purged from society and were indoctrinated in Mao's Little red Book<sup>22</sup>. One way Mao was able to accomplish this massive purge was by mobilizing the Chinese youth into what became known as the Red Guards. Mao closed schools and universities and the state-sanctioned youth militias soon formed autonomously. Mao gathered a group of radicals, including his wife Jiang Qing and defense minister Lin Biao, to help him attack

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<sup>21</sup> Welcoming 1966 — The First Year of China's Third Five-Year Plan. (1966, January 1). Peking Review. Retrieved November 3, 2017, from <http://massline.org/PekingReview/PR1966/PR1966-01a.htm>


<sup>22</sup> Jiaqi Yan, Gao Gao, Danny Wynn Ye Kwok, Turbulent decade: a history of the cultural revolution, Honolulu Univ. of Hawaii Press 1996



current party leadership and reassert his authority<sup>23</sup>. During this early phase of the Cultural Revolution (1966-68), President Liu Shaoqi and other Communist leaders were removed from power. With different factions of the Red Guard movement battling for dominance, many Chinese cities reached the brink of anarchy by September 1967, when Mao had Lin send army troops in to restore order<sup>24</sup>. The army soon forced many urban members of the Red Guards into rural areas, where the movement declined<sup>25</sup>. Amid the chaos, the Chinese economy plummeted, with industrial production for 1968 dropping 12 percent below that of 1966<sup>26</sup>.

## The Chinese economy under communism

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Source: Chow, 1993

### Public Mobilization and The Red Guards:

The first students to mobilize themselves under the name of the Red Guards were elementary school students who responded to a play which they saw, believing it to be anti-communist. “Hai Rui Dismissed from Office” is a tragedy in which an honest official carries the complaints of the people to the emperor at the expense of his career. It portrays Hai as an efficient magistrate who requests an audience with the emperor. Hai then criticizes the Emperor directly for tolerating the corruption and abuses perpetuated by other officials in the imperial government. The emperor is so offended by Hai's criticism that he dismisses Hai from office. Hai is restored to office after the emperor dies<sup>27</sup>. After the play's initial performance, critics began to interpret it as an allegory for Peng Dehuai's

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> MacFarquhar, R. (1983). *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution*. Retrieved November 2, 2017.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Chirantan, Chatterjee. “The Economics of China” Lecture, Indian School of Business.

<sup>27</sup> Chen, Xiaomei (2002). *Acting the Right Part: Political Theatre and Popular Drama in Contemporary China*. University of Hawaii Press.



criticism of Mao during the 1959 Lushan Conference, in which Peng's criticism of Mao's Great Leap Forward led Mao to purge Peng. This play led to the purging of dozens of officials from Mao's cabinet. The students, however, wrote posters as constructive criticism of their universities' administrations, accusing them of harbouring intellectual elitism and bourgeoisie tendencies<sup>28</sup>.

At first, the Red Guards were denounced as counter-revolutionaries and radicals by their school administrations and fellow students; this forced them to meet secretly. However, Mao soon found out about the secret meetings and broadcast messages of support, declaring that the ideas of the Red Guards required political legitimacy; similar groups soon began to pop up throughout China. The movement grew to such proportions that the Communist Party of China's work teams soon had to be sent in to control it on behalf of Zhang Chunqiao, the head of China's Propaganda department<sup>29</sup>. Rival Red Guard led by the sons and daughters of cadres were formed by these work teams to deflect attacks from those in positions of power towards bourgeois elements in society, mainly intellectuals. These Party-backed rebel groups also attacked students with 'bad' class backgrounds (these included the children of former landlords and capitalists). The Red Guard attacks soon escalated to destructions of the Four Olds<sup>30</sup>.

Old books and art were destroyed, museums were ransacked, and streets were renamed with new revolutionary names and adorned with pictures and the sayings of Mao. Many famous temples, shrines, and other heritage sites in Beijing were attacked. The property of individuals was also gone after by Red Guard members as well if considered to represent one of the Four Olds. Commonly religious texts and figures would be confiscated and burned. Other times items of historic importance would be left, but defaced, with examples such as Qin Dynasty scrolls having their writings partially removed and stone and wood carvings having the faces and words carved out of them<sup>31</sup>. Re-education came alongside the destruction of previous culture and history, throughout the Cultural Revolution schools were a target of Red Guard groups to teach both the new ideas of the Cultural Revolution. Millions of people were persecuted in the violent struggles that ensued across the country, and suffered a wide range of abuses including public humiliation, arbitrary imprisonment, torture, hard labor, sustained harassment, seizure of property and sometimes execution. A large segment of the population was forcibly displaced, most notably the transfer of urban youth to rural regions during the Down to the Countryside

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<sup>28</sup> Ma, Alexander (2016, May 16) "These Vintage Propaganda Posters Show A Past China Wants To Ignore" Huffington Post, <[https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/china-vintage-cultural-revolution-posters\\_us\\_5739f4f1e4b060aa781acf74](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/china-vintage-cultural-revolution-posters_us_5739f4f1e4b060aa781acf74)>

<sup>29</sup> Jiaqi Yan, Gao Gao, Danny Wynn Ye Kwok, *Turbulent decade: a history of the cultural revolution*, Honolulu Univ. of Hawaii Press 1996.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Xing Lu (2004). *Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication*. University of South Carolina Press.



Movement after which the Red Guards died down in severity<sup>32</sup>. However, the massive destruction of Chinese history and culture remained a staple in the motivations of counter-movements and public uprisings.

### **Cult of Personality and Media Mobilization:**



### **Praise of Chairman Mao and his “little red book” (Ma, 2016)**

One of the most visible features of the Cultural Revolution was the cult of Mao Zedong. This personality cult was fuelled by the fanaticism of the Red Guards, pro-Mao propaganda and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) control of information. During this period the Chairman was depicted as an ideological visionary, a political genius, a guardian of his people and a kindly and benevolent leader<sup>33</sup>. Mao’s achievements were exaggerated and glorified, while his shortcomings were suppressed or concealed. The failings and brutalities of Mao-era China were concealed or explained away and blamed on others. The hero worship of socialist leaders is not a feature of Marxist theory. Karl Marx himself despised the “cult of the individual”, while in Soviet Russia the Stalin personality cult was criticized after his death. Personality cults were “healthy”, Mao said, provided they worshipped great leaders rather than false ones. “There are two types of personality cults,” Mao said at a party conference in 1958. “One is the correct type. Worshipping Marx, Engels,

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<sup>32</sup> Peng, X. (1987). Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in Chinas Provinces. *Population and Development Review*, 13(4), 639-670. doi:10.2307/1973026.

<sup>33</sup> MacFarquhar, R. (1983). *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution*. Retrieved November 2, 2017.





Lenin and Stalin is correct because truth is held in their hands. The other type is incorrect... The second type opposes worshipping other people but demands that others worship him.”<sup>34</sup>.

Through his cult of personality, Mao set the scene for the revolution. He “cleansed” powerful officials of questionable loyalty who were based in Beijing. His approach was less than transparent, achieving this purge through newspaper articles, internal meetings, and skillfully employing his network of political allies. After the publishing of Hai Rui Dismissed from Office, in February 1965 he secretly commissioned his wife Jiang Qing and Shanghai propagandist Yao Wenyuan to publish an article criticizing it. Yao boldly alleged that Hai Rui was really an allegory attacking Mao; that is, Mao was the corrupt emperor and Peng Dehuai was the honest civil servant<sup>35</sup>. Yao's article put Beijing Mayor Peng Zhen on the defensive. Peng, a powerful official and Wu Han's direct superior, was the head of the "Five Man Group", a committee commissioned by Mao to study the potential for a cultural revolution. Peng Zhen, aware that he would be implicated if Wu indeed wrote an "anti-Mao" play, wished to contain Yao's influence. Yao's article was initially only published in select local newspapers. Peng forbade its publication in the nationally distributed People's Daily and other major newspapers under his control, instructing them to write exclusively about "academic discussion", and not pay heed to Yao's petty politics<sup>36</sup>.



(“The journey in the sea depends on the helmsman: To resist imperialist aggressions we must establish a mighty navy.” Ma, 2016)

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<sup>34</sup> Jiaqi Yan, Gao Gao, Danny Wynn Ye Kwok, *Turbulent decade: a history of the cultural revolution*, Honolulu Univ. of Hawaii Press 1996.

<sup>35</sup> Xing Lu (2004). [Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication](#). University of South Carolina Press.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.



After his confrontation with Liu Shaoqi over the direction of the Socialist Education Movement, Mao began to prepare the ground for a showdown with his perceived enemies in China. These enemies were to be found in all positions of authority – among senior party officials, and among Mao’s long-time revolutionary comrades. Mao chose a circuitous way of achieving his objectives. He encouraged a radical attack on the party bureaucracy under the pretext of a struggle with revisionism in the ruling circles. The campaign had been in planning since at least February 1965, though the opening shots were fired in November when Shanghai-based radicals, incited by Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, criticized Wu Han, a prominent historian and deputy mayor of Beijing, for revisionism. In the struggle that followed, the mayor of Beijing, Peng Zhen, tried to protect Wu Han but lost the battle to Mao whose real target was the party leadership<sup>37</sup>. Peng Zhen was the first to find that nobody was safe when Mao orchestrated a full-scale purge of the Beijing Party Committee (including Peng) in May 1966<sup>38</sup>. But as the movement, now called the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, gained momentum, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping also felt the heat.

### **Moving Forward:**

Delegates, you must assess the success, continuation and necessity of the Cultural Revolution. Bearing in mind the internal politics of the Politburo, you are tasked with identifying new strategies to implement the “Four News”. How are propaganda tactics centralizing power to the state? What is the economic cost of the revolution and is the outcome worth the cost? How can a unified nation’s ideology be used to bolster national defense or industry in the future? It is up to 9<sup>th</sup> Politburo to draft a new doctrine for the Cultural Revolution.

### **TOPIC THREE: SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS**

By the end of the 1960s, significant tensions surfaced between Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Since the inception of the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union had provided both economic and military support. In WWII, China resisted Nazi-allied Japan and sided with the Great Alliance; in the aftermath, China continued to side with the USSR not only due to a sense of post-war inertia but also due to socio-economic reasons. For one, China and the USSR aligned on the political spectrum as both nations’ majorities respected and followed Marx’s teachings despite certain revisionist tendencies. Economically, the Soviet Union was the first country to extend the hand of aid to People’s China after the failure of the Great Leap Forward<sup>39</sup>. However, by 1962, the once robust Sino-Soviet alliance had cracked up, revealing serious conflicts beneath the façade of Communist solidarity. This split was a remarkable development in a Cold War context. This split was so inexplicable that both sides blamed it on the other side’s betrayal of Marxism;

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<sup>37</sup> [MacFarquhar, Roderick](#) and Schoenhals, Michael. (2006) Mao’s Last Revolution. [Harvard University Press](#)

<sup>38</sup> Jiaqi Yan, Gao Gao, Danny Wynn Ye Kwok, Turbulent decade: a history of the cultural revolution, Honolulu Univ. of Hawaii Press 1996

<sup>39</sup> Goh, E. (2001). Competing Images and American Official Reconsiderations of China Policy, 1961—1968. The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, 10(1/2), 53-92. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23613033>



but it went deeper than that. It was influenced by key personalities, related to the domestic environments of the Soviet Union and China, and was affected by cultural contexts of policy making<sup>40</sup>.

### **Sino-Soviet Diplomacy:**

Between 1958 and 1962, Khrushchev's disastrous handling of the Soviet relationship with China had seriously exacerbated the tensions in the alliance. He had angered Mao Zedong with his inconsiderate proposition to build a joint submarine flotilla and a military radio station on China's soil. He had supported India in the 1959 Sino-Indian border war. In 1960, he had hastily withdrawn Soviet experts from China in a fit of rage. He had rallied his allies in Europe to criticize China in international forums. He had pulled out of a deal to deliver a prototype atomic bomb to the Chinese, and had desperately tried to stall the Chinese nuclear weapons program. Khrushchev's difficulties had their root in a curious intellectual handicap. Soviet policymakers, Khrushchev among them, believed Marxism to be a scientific truth based on immutable and self-evident principles. As a Marxist, Khrushchev struggled against imperialism, aided national liberation movements, and strengthened the unity of the socialist camp. By definition, his policies could not be opportunistic, adventurist, or chauvinistic. By claiming a monopoly on absolute truth in politics, he overlooked the possibility that someone else might challenge his views using the same all-embracing and yet ambiguous Marxist banner. In September 1963, the Chinese began publishing a series of polemical articles detailing Soviet violations of Marxism. The Soviets responded with a similar campaign. However, in October 1964, Khrushchev was overthrown by his Kremlin comrades, who were fed up with his erratic leadership and unnerving bureaucratic shakeups<sup>41</sup>.

The key figures in the new leadership arrangement – First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin – both had very little experience in foreign affairs but sought to repair Sino-Soviet relations. Brezhnev's and Kosygin's rediscovered enthusiasm for China was not shared by the wider foreign-policy community, certainly not by the experienced diplomats and China specialists in the Foreign Ministry who tended to be far more reserved about the prospect of a rapprochement with their eastern neighbour. It was thus with high hopes that Brezhnev and Kosygin welcomed a Chinese delegation, headed by Zhou Enlai, for talks in Moscow in early November 1964. He came to the talks prepared to struggle against revisionism<sup>42</sup>. At a Kremlin reception on November 7, 1964, the Soviet defense minister, Rodion Malinovskii, evidently intoxicated, proposed to a member of the Chinese delegation, Marshal He Long, that they get rid of Mao Zedong just as the Soviets had thrown out Khrushchev. Then, he said, Sino-Soviet relations would

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Garver, J. (1993). The Chinese Communist Party and the Collapse of Soviet Communism. *The China Quarterly*, (133), 1-26. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/654237>

<sup>42</sup> Erulkar, E. (1989). The Sino-Soviet Rapprochement. *Harvard International Review*, 11(4), 52-56. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42760130>



necessarily improve. Some members of the 9<sup>th</sup> Politburo saw the pragmatic value of a strategic relationship with the USSR, even if it flew in the face of Mao's ideological teachings<sup>43</sup>.

### **Cultural Revolution and Sino-Soviet Militarism:**

From the beginning, there was a clear anti-Soviet angle to the Cultural Revolution, since Mao made an explicit connection between Soviet "capitalist restoration" and Chinese revisionism. Radicals singled out Soviet-style revisionists in China as Moscow's allies who tried to help the USSR "climb on China's back" so as to again make China a "colony or semi-colony." But Moscow did not play any practical role in the power struggle; Soviet leaders, in fact, did not know what to make of events in China nor with whom to sympathize. By late 1965, the Chinese problem had lost its urgency for Moscow: rapprochement was nowhere in sight, but a turn for the worse was also not expected<sup>44</sup>.

The Soviets began shoring up support with neighbors of the PRC. Soviet relations with Hanoi had improved substantially compared with those of the Khrushchev era (thanks, no doubt, to the persuasive power of Soviet aid). North Korea was not to be left behind: Kim Il Sung's visit to Vladivostok for talks with Brezhnev in the spring of 1966 laid the groundwork for better relations between Moscow and Pyongyang. In January 1966, the Soviet Union and Mongolia signed a treaty, permitting the stationing of Soviet military forces in that country. The same month Kosygin mediated the Indo-Pakistani conflict in a bid to gain influence with both countries. The 9<sup>th</sup> Politburo should eye these relationships warily and be concerned with the strategic encirclement<sup>45</sup>. How can you reduce the influence the USSR has on neighbors of the PRC?

The Cultural Revolution dealt a major blow to the domestic opinion of the USSR in the People's Republic. The revolutionary mobs besieged the Soviet embassy for days at a time. Plans were in the making to burn it down, but in August 1967, Zhou Enlai personally persuaded the leader of the Red Guards besieging the embassy, a pig-tailed girl of sixteen, to call off the attack. To the Soviets, it was not clear whether they faced un-sanctioned mob violence or state policy. Moreover, reports were trickling in to Moscow about the buildup of Chinese forces along the Sino-Soviet frontier, the construction of roads leading to the border, and militant propaganda among the troops. Faced with these threatening developments, the Soviet Politburo decided to upgrade defense capabilities in the East. A resolution was passed on February 4, 1967, to station troops in Mongolia, strengthen the

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<sup>43</sup> Mustafa, Z. (1969). THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER PROBLEM. *Pakistan Horizon*, 22(4), 321-331. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41394679>

<sup>44</sup> Erulkar, E. (1989). The Sino-Soviet Rapprochement. *Harvard International Review*, 11(4), 52-56. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42760130>

<sup>45</sup> Pfaltzgraff, R. (1980). China, Soviet Strategy, and American Policy. *International Security*, 5(2), 24-48. doi:10.2307/2538443



Soviet forces in the Far East and Eastern Kazakhstan, and build protected command centers<sup>46</sup>.

The timing of these decisions is telling because they came in the immediate aftermath of Red Guard violence around the Soviet Embassy. Due to Sino-Soviet militarism, many near-clashes occurred between Russian and Chinese troops. The Sino-Soviet border conflict was a seven-month undeclared military conflict between the Soviet Union and China at the height of the Sino-Soviet split in 1969<sup>47</sup>. The most serious of these border clashes, which brought the two communist-led countries to the brink of war, occurred in March 1969 near Zhenbao Island on the Ussuri River. Both sides called emergency war meetings. Extremist hawks on both sides of the conflict began advocating for annihilation and use of nuclear weapons. While the clash on the Ussuri River did not result in any major military conflict, tensions are high for both nations.

By the end of the 1960s, a trigonal interstate relationship emerged between the USSR, the US and the PRC. The military and ideological struggle between the USSR and the Western world was marked by the nuclear arms race and fears of the spread of communist/capitalist ideologies on behalf of each country<sup>48</sup>. At the height of the Cold War, the US was firmly pitted against both the USSR and the PRC. But as Sino-Soviet tensions emerged, the communist bond weakened and the West became disillusioned with the People's Republic of China as a steadfast ally of the USSR. Could the US become a potential ally to balance the threat of the USSR? Can the PRC even reconcile a PRC-US alliance with the anti-capitalist teachings of the Cultural Revolution? Or is it better to mend the relationships with the USSR.

### **Moving Forward:**

Delegates, you have inherited a perilous military situation. The very recent clash on the Ussuri River has heightened fears of Soviet military incursions. Some of you seek to deescalate tensions, while others call for an immediate military response. The USSR has strengthened its alliances with your neighbors over the past decade. Is war inevitable, or can tactful diplomacy mend an alliance with the USSR and reinvigorate a mutually beneficial partnership? Can the US be trusted? Would they expose any diplomatic overtures to the USSR and further escalate the situation? Your actions will define the future of Sino-Soviet relations for the next decade, and perhaps the remainder of the century.

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<sup>46</sup> Mustafa, Z. (1969). THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER PROBLEM. *Pakistan Horizon*, 22(4), 321-331. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41394679>

<sup>47</sup> Segal, G. (1984). Sino-Soviet Relations: The Road to Détente. *The World Today*, 40(5), 205-212. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395611>

<sup>48</sup> Pfaltzgraff, R. (1980). China, Soviet Strategy, and American Policy. *International Security*, 5(2), 24-48. doi:10.2307/2538443

**Research Guide:**

In researching for any MUN conference, you are expected to utilize and digest scholarly sources, historical analyses, and primary sources which will help your research. Your first step can be visiting your school librarian and accessing all the valuable online data bases your school possesses; these may include but are certainly not limited to JSTOR, EBSCOHOST, Britannica, etc. Paper sources are also extraordinarily useful; your school library will have a plethora of books that provide a compact general overview of the topics we will discuss (it is beneficial to start with the big picture and narrow down your research as you progress).

Once you understand the big picture, it is time to narrow down your research. Utilize the background guide and the citations we have provided to gather specific information about topics we have outlined alongside your own personal research through your library or online data base. **Footnotes are king!** A useful trick is to utilize the footnotes section of online encyclopaedias such as Wikipedia; while you *may not* cite Wikipedia as a source, the footnotes will lead you to academic sources which you are encouraged to cite in your position papers.

When researching your character, take into account the specific role which I have laid out in the character description. Take note of specific allegiances, memberships in party-affiliated committees and structures which your character may be part of. Furthermore, make sure you understand the ideology of your character; if they are a conservative communist acting in favour of classic Marxism, then that is what you should be advocating. This will make for dynamic debate as you, the delegates, dive into the personalities of your characters and imitate the factional division that truly existed in the 9<sup>th</sup> Politburo.

Lastly, *if you have any questions, please feel free to email me.* I have been studying the Cold War for many years and have written many papers of the subject so I can provide you with character-specific research materials and more specific tips and tricks.

**Guiding Questions:**

1. Place the committee within the period of 1969-71: what else was going on in the world? In the USSR? In America?
2. What were the divergent ideologies present within the committee? What side is your character on?
3. Consider the great purges that took place on part of Mao; why has your character remained?
4. What caused divergent political interests between China and USSR? What were the implications of these divergent interests on the two countries' relationship?





5. How have public protests, backlash, and support shaped the goals of the party? Take note of aims of Red Guards and opposing groups and how those aims influence your portfolio (role).
6. What role did journalism and propaganda play in the support/backlash towards your portfolio?
7. What was the role of diplomacy in shaping China's Cultural Revolution (CR)? Did diplomacy work? How did other countries (like the USSR) react to the CR?
8. What was the role of economic policy in the Cultural Revolution? How did it form? Who formed it?
9. How did the Red Guards succeed in their mission? How did they fail? What were the implications of counter-groups?
10. How did Sino-Soviet relations decline throughout the revolution? Why?
11. How did inner party conflict between members and factions influence the CR?

### **Character List:**

#### **1. Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Party Central Committee and member of the Politburo Standing Committee**

**Biography and Role:** A Chinese communist revolutionary, poet, political theorist and founding father of the People's Republic of China. He served as Chairman of the Communist Party of China from its establishment in 1949 until his death in 1976. Mao solidified his control through land reforms, a psychological victory in the Korean War, and through campaigns against landlords, people he termed "counter-revolutionaries", and other perceived enemies of the state. In 1957 he launched a campaign known as the Great Leap Forward that aimed to rapidly transform China's economy from an agrarian economy to an industrial one. The Great Leap Forward led to the deadliest famine in history and the deaths of more than 15 million people. In 1966, he initiated the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, a program to remove "counter-revolutionary" elements of Chinese society. Mao is the symbol of communist China and its leader. His role consists of being a supporter and patriot of the revolution; he has the ability to mobilize people at whim due to his cult of personality.

#### **2. Leonid Brezhnev**

**Biography and Role:** As the leader of the Soviet Union, Brezhnev's conservatism and carefulness to reach decisions by consensus with the rest of the Politburo resulted in sustained political stability within the country. However, his hostility towards reform and active cultivation of cronyism ushered in a period of pervasive corruption and socioeconomic decline. His role in the committee is meant to be that of a conservative voice on behalf of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, as a former military commander in the Soviet Afghan war, he is well-versed in military strategy and Sino-Soviet relations.





**3. Alexei Kosygin: Member of the CPSU Politburo**

Biography and Role: in 1964, Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev became Premier and First Secretary respectively. Kosygin, along with Brezhnev and Nikolai Podgorny, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, was a member of the newly established collective leadership. Kosygin became one of two major power players within the Soviet hierarchy, the other being Brezhnev, and was able to initiate the failed 1965 economic reform, usually referred to simply as the Kosygin reform. This reform, along with his more open stance on solving the Prague Spring (1968), made Kosygin one of the most liberal members of the top leadership. He is a radical voice which is in favour of Russian reconstructionism and was therefore an important voice in Soviet foreign affairs with other communist powers abroad.

**4. Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Party Central Committee and member of the Politburo Standing Committee**

Biography and Role: a Marshal of the People's Republic of China who was pivotal in the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, especially in Northeast China. Lin was the general who commanded the decisive Liaoshen and Pingjin Campaigns, in which he co-led the Manchurian Field Army to victory and led the People's Liberation Army into Beijing. He ranked third among the Ten Marshals. Zhu De and Peng Dehuai were considered senior to Lin. Lin became instrumental in creating the foundations for Mao Zedong's cult of personality in the early 1960s, and was rewarded for his service in the Cultural Revolution by being named Mao's designated successor as the sole Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China.

**5. Zhou Enlai, First Premier of the People's republic of China**

Biography and Role: Zhou served along with Chairman Mao Zedong and was instrumental in the Communist Party's rise to power, and later in consolidating its control, forming foreign policy, and developing the Chinese economy. A skilled and able diplomat, Zhou served as the Chinese foreign minister from 1949 to 1958.

Advocating peaceful coexistence with the West after the stalemated Korean War, he participated in the 1954 Geneva Conference. He helped devise policies regarding the bitter disputes with the U.S., Taiwan, the Soviet Union, India and Vietnam. He acted as a sober voice in the committee where he advocated for peaceful resolution. However, beneath the surface, he advocated for Mao's policies and supported him; he was instrumental in developing the economics of 5 Year Plans.

**6. Chen Boda, secretary to Chariman Mao**

Biography and Role: member of the Chinese Communist Party, a secretary to Mao Zedong and a prominent member of the leadership during the Cultural Revolution, chairing the Cultural Revolution Group. He was crucial to the progress of the Cultural



Revolution and worked with other member of the committee to ensure proper progression of the revolution.

**7. Kang Sheng, member of the Politburo Standing Committee**

Biography and Role: a [Communist Party of China](#) (CPC) official best known for having overseen the work of the CPC's internal security and intelligence apparatus during the early 1940s and again at the height of the [Cultural Revolution](#) in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A member of the CPC from the early 1920s, he spent time in Moscow during the early 1930s, where he learned the methods of the [NKVD](#) and became a supporter of [Wang Ming](#) for leadership of the CPC. After returning to China in the late 1930s, Kang Sheng switched his allegiance to [Mao Zedong](#) and became a close associate of Mao during the [Anti-Japanese War](#), the [Chinese Civil War](#) and after. He acts as a quiet voice within the committee but runs most of the intelligence services within China; he was, therefore, instrumental in propaganda during the Cultural Revolution and had an understanding of the workings of the Soviet Union intelligence services.

**8. Ye Qun**

The wife of [Lin Biao](#), the Vice-Chairman of China who controlled China's military power. She was mostly known for taking care of politics for her husband. She was a supporter of Mao and any policy that was put forth by him or her husband; it was for this reason that she was understood as an important voice in the committee.

**9. Ye Jianying**

Biography and Role: a [Chinese communist](#) general, [Marshal](#) of the [People's Liberation Army](#). He had no active political role until 1976 when he was appointed the head of state. However, he had an active military role and led several conspiracy operations to purge and overthrow certain members of the cabinet.

**10. Liu Bocheng**

Biography and Role: a [Chinese Communist](#) military commander and [Marshal](#) of the [People's Liberation Army](#). Officially, Liu was recognised as a revolutionary, military strategist and theoretician, and one of the founders of the People's Liberation Army. Liu's nicknames, *Chinese Mars* and *The One-eyed Dragon*, also reflect his character and military achievement. He is instrumental in crafting military strategy and plays a vital role due to his vast experience.

**11. Jiang Qing**

Biography and Role: also known as Madame Mao, was a Chinese [Communist Revolutionary](#), Chinese actress, and major political figure during the [Cultural Revolution](#). Jiang Qing served as Mao's personal secretary in the 1940s and was head of the Film Section of the Communist Party's Propaganda Department in the 1950s. She



served as an important emissary for Mao in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. In 1966 she was appointed deputy director of the [Central Cultural Revolution Group](#). She collaborated with [Lin Biao](#) to advance Mao's unique brand of Communist ideology as well as Mao's [cult of personality](#). At the height of the Cultural Revolution, Jiang Qing held significant influence in the affairs of state, particularly in the realm of culture and the arts, and was idolized in propaganda posters as the "Great Flagbearer of the [Proletarian](#) Revolution".

#### 12. Zhu De

Biography and Role: a Chinese [general](#), [warlord](#), [politician](#), [revolutionary](#) and one of the pioneers of the [Communist Party of China](#). He was a more conservative voice in the party than most due to his poor upbringing and genuine belief in classical Marxism. He despised any and all restructured versions of communism and supported the mission of the Red Guards.

#### 13. Xu Shiyou: Vice Minister of National Defense

Biography and Role: a general in the Chinese [People's Liberation Army](#), he was instrumental in orchestrating provincial revolutionary movements including the Red Guards movement to the rural areas of China.

#### 14. Chen Xilian

Biography and Role: In an unlikely variation of roles, Chen was a counter-revolutionary voice within the Politburo and was against the Red Guards mission. This landed him in hot water several times as he was attacked by the Red Guards numerous times, meddled in the positioning of political figures within party structure, and denounced members such as Lin Biao due to their radical revolutionary policies.

#### 15. Li Xiannian

Biography and Role: Considered one of the most influential architects of China's economic policy, Li was instrumental in post-Great Leap Forward economic policy. Despite losing his job as Finance Minister during the [Cultural Revolution](#), he nonetheless enjoyed Zhou Enlai's protection and was the only civilian official to serve with the premier throughout that entire tumultuous period.

#### 16. Li Zuopeng

Biography and Role: As a general in the Liberation Army, he was an ally of [Lin Biao](#), he lost his position after Lin Biao's fall.

#### 17. Wu Faxian

Biography and Role: As a former soldier of [Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army](#) and member of [Communist Party of China](#), he was a supporter of the classical



communist way of thinking. Wu was a subordinate of Lin Biao, in 1965 he became the commander of People's Liberation Army Air Force.

**18. Zhang Chunqiao: Director of Propaganda for the CPC**

Biography and Role: a prominent journalist in Shanghai in charge of the *Liberation Daily* newspaper. He met [Jiang Qing](#) in Shanghai and helped to launch the [Cultural Revolution](#). Zhang also initially served as one of the leaders of the [Cultural Revolution Group](#), in charge of carrying out the Cultural Revolution around China.

**19. Qiu Huizuo**

Biography and Role: a supporter of Lin Biao, he helped consolidate her power and persecute enemies of the regime. Qiu was labelled a counter-revolutionary element and targeted by the rebels in the GLD.

**20. Yao Wenyuan**

Biography and Role: He began his career in [Shanghai](#) as a literary critic, where he became known for his sharp attacks against colleagues, such as in June 1957 against the newspaper [Wenhuibao](#). Since that time, he began to closely collaborate with leftist Shanghai politicians, including the head of the city's Propaganda Department, [Zhang Chunqiao](#). His article "On the New Historical Beijing Opera 'Hai Rui Dismissed from Office'", launched the [Cultural Revolution](#). In April 1969 he joined the Politburo of the [Central Committee](#) of the [Communist Party of China](#), working on official propaganda. A member of "Proletarian writers for purity" he was the editor of "Liberation Daily" Shanghai's main newspaper.

**21. Dong Biwu: Vice President of China**

Biography and Role: An old-school communist and friend of Mao, Dong was instrumental in supporting Mao and his policies.

**22. Xie Fuzhi: Minister of Public Security**

Biography and Role: was a [Communist Party of China](#) military commander, [political commissar](#), and [national security](#) specialist. Xie was known for his efficiency and his loyalty to [Mao Zedong](#), and during the [Cultural Revolution](#) he played a key role in hunting down the Chairman's enemies in his capacity as [Minister of Public Security](#). Xie gave a speech in the summer of 1966, in his capacity as Minister of Public Security, that essentially gave *carte blanche* to the [Red Guards](#) to confiscate and kill their opponents. Xie, unlike other [People's Liberation Army](#) (PLA) Generals, was fond of the Red Guards and sought to develop them as a parallel army, a special security force. The [Gang of Four](#), Xie's allies, had similar ideas about creating a paramilitary force to balance the power of the PLA.



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