

THE AFRICAN UNION

SPECIALIZED COMMITTEE





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**A Letter From Your Director...**

Dear Delegates,

It is my absolute pleasure to welcome you to UTMUN 2018! I am sure I speak for the entire dais when I say how excited we are to meet you all in February. Before we get started, allow me to introduce myself a little further. My name is Andrew Zhao, and I will be your Director for the African Union at UTMUN. I am currently in my second year at the University of Toronto, specializing in Political Science, and minoring in Philosophy and Asian Canadian Studies.

The dais and I have worked extremely hard to bring a diverse range of interesting topics to the African Union committee this year. All three topics are crucial topics that the Union needs to tackle in order to move forward with its stated goals of peace and security, sustainable development, and economic integration.

It is important to recognize that this background guide does not represent a complete and comprehensive description of these topics. This guide either glosses over or omits many aspects of the issues on our agenda. Therefore, it is absolutely crucial that you do your own independent research. Treat this background guide as a starting point for sources and general ideas.

As you will soon find out, these topics are all quite complicated, and will require you to challenge yourself to think critically about the issues facing the African continent. As a result, I am always available to you as a resource. Feel free to contact me by email at any time before the conference if you have any questions about the topics, the committee, or UTMUN itself.

Our dais values cooperation, compromise and consensus. When you get to committee in February, your goal is not to drown out the voices of your fellow delegates, but to take everyone's perspectives into consideration. It is important to realize the validity of all perspectives in the international community—that is the foundation of a healthy debate. Your aim should be finding common ground within the constraints of your country's distinct foreign policy.

As a final note, I would like to acknowledge that I have drawn from sources used in previous personal research for this background guide. Good luck with your research, do not hesitate to reach out at any time, and we cannot wait to meet you all in February.

Andrew Zhao
Director, African Union

**TOPIC ONE: THE SITUATION IN SOUTH SUDAN****Introduction:**

South Sudan, the world's youngest country, has recently descended into a civil war, leading to unimaginable violence and suffering. Shortly after South Sudan joined the United Nations (UN) in 2011, a political dispute between President Salva Kiir and Vice-President Riek Machar boiled over, turning into a full-blown violent conflict.¹ Both leaders have exploited ethnic divisions to mobilize support for themselves, leading to horrific reports of ethnic cleansing.² Shocking human rights abuses have been committed on a massive scale, and millions of South Sudanese have fled the country.³ The ensuing refugee crisis has surpassed Syria as the fastest-growing in the world.⁴ More than 3.9 million people have fled their homes, including 1.9 million internally displaced persons.⁵ Only six years after gaining independence, the fledgling state is collapsing, ranking first out of 178 countries on the 2017 Fragile States Index.⁶ Without significant international action to address this crisis, half the country will have either fled or died of starvation by December 2017.⁷

The African Union (AU) has an important stake in the conflict. The Union's goals of economic development and advancement are strongly linked with its wish to promote continental peace and stability.⁸ For obvious reasons, violent conflict greatly hinders development, and the war in South Sudan has set the country back many decades.⁹ The AU is already actively involved in diplomatic efforts to end the conflict, but these efforts have not yet borne results.¹⁰ The Union has a wide array of options available moving forward,

¹ "South Sudan profile - Timeline," *BBC News*, last modified 24 February 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14019202>.

² Katherine Noel and Alex de Waal, "Understanding the Roots of Conflict in South Sudan," *Council on Foreign Relations*, last modified 14 September 2016, <https://www.cfr.org/interview/understanding-roots-conflict-south-sudan>.

³ "S/2017/784: Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 2 June to 1 September 2017)," *United Nations*, 15 September 2017, <http://undocs.org/S/2017/784>.

⁴ Kate Almquist Knopf, "Salvaging South Sudan's Sovereignty (and Ending its Civil War)," *Council on Foreign Relations*, last modified 24 April 2017, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/salvaging-south-sudans-sovereignty-and-ending-its-civil-war>.

⁵ "S/2017/784: Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 2 June to 1 September 2017)."

⁶ Messner et. al, "2017 Fragile States Index: Factionalization and Group Grievance Fuel Rise in Instability," *The Fund for Peace*, 10 May 2017, <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/2017/05/14/fragile-states-index-2017-annual-report/951171705-fragile-states-index-annual-report-2017/>.

⁷ Knopf, "Salvaging South Sudan's Sovereignty (and Ending its Civil War)."

⁸ "Constitutive Act of the African Union," *African Union*, 11 July 2000, https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/32020-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf.

⁹ "South Sudan's outgoing UN chief says country "set back decades"," *Sudan Tribune*, 9 July 2014, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article51615>.

¹⁰ "S/PV.8071: Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan," *United Nations*, 17 October 2017, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.8071.



from peaceful mediation to military intervention, and it is up to delegates to chart a course towards peace.



Oxfam, What's the difference between Sudan and South Sudan?

A note on names: there are an incredible number of potentially confusing names associated with this conflict, so it may be prudent to clarify the main ones here. Prior to South Sudanese independence in 2011, “Sudan” refers to the what is today the area of Sudan and South Sudan. After independence, Sudan refers exclusively to the country of Sudan along its current borders, and South Sudan refers to the new country formed after 2011. Often, the terms “North” and “South” will be used to refer to the two areas. The Sudanese Civil Wars, often split into the First Sudanese Civil War (1955–1972) and the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005), were mainly struggles for Southern independence. The South Sudanese Civil War (2013–present) is a civil war in the new state of South Sudan, and the main focus of this topic. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), are the ruling party and standing army of South Sudan respectively. Despite not having the word “South” in their name, they are Southern Sudanese groups. Prior to 2011, they were a rebel group fighting for Southern independence. Collectively, they are known as SPLM/A. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) is the main rebel faction in South Sudan right now, headed by Riek Machar. They are opposed to the SPLM/A, which occupies the current government in South Sudan.



From Colonialism to Independence

South Sudan has a long history of colonialism and unrest. Decades of indirect rule and divisive colonial policies have left the region deeply unstable. Over the course of its history, the area has been influenced by three main actors: Egypt, Great Britain, and the country of Sudan, from which South Sudan broke away in 2011. The South Sudanese struggle for independence has been long, and for decades, the region has not known any period of extended and sustainable stability. Delegates must be mindful of the region's history—it is crucial for contextualizing and understanding the current conflict.

Centuries of overwhelming Egyptian influence have played a key role in shaping northern Sudan: today, Islam is the dominant religion in the North, Arabic is the official language of Sudan, and most Northern Sudanese self-identify as Arabs.¹¹ This influence never spread to southern Sudan—up until the nineteenth century, geographical barriers prevented much contact between North and South.¹² That changed when Egyptian control was extended to the southern Sudan, which fell under the jurisdiction of the northern capital of Khartoum, seat of the Egyptian occupation and modern-day capital of Sudan.¹³ During this period, Northern Arab slavers forced thousands of South Sudanese into slavery, fomenting fear, distrust, and resentment among Southerners.¹⁴

Eventually, Great Britain came to share power with the Egyptians, gaining complete control of Sudan in 1923.¹⁵ The British brought Christianity and English to southern Sudan, but otherwise neglected the southern provinces, leaving them undeveloped.¹⁶ A colonial policy of “separate governance” continued to exacerbate North-South tensions, essentially governing the two halves of Sudan independently from one another.¹⁷ A 1930 colonial directive went so far as to declare the Christian/animist English-speaking Southerners as completely distinct from the Muslim Arab Northerners.¹⁸ Delegates should be familiar with Sudan's colonial history. Knowledge of colonial history will allow delegates to grasp the causes of decades of violent regional conflict.

Gradually, administrative power was transferred away from the British and towards Sudanese nationalists, culminating in Sudanese independence in 1956.¹⁹ However, the government of the new Republic of the Sudan would prove exclusionary for many South

¹¹ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Sudan: a country study*, ed. LaVerle Bennette Berry (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), xxvi, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/cs/pdf/CS_Sudan.pdf.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 26–7.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 27.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 27–31.



Sudanese.²⁰ For example, the new Khartoum-based government barred English-speaking Southerners from joining the civil service by requiring civil servants to speak Arabic.²¹ As a result, many Southerners saw the new government as simply a transition from European colonialism to Arab colonialism.²² As the transition of power was taking place in 1955, a group of South Sudanese soldiers mutinied to protest being their reassignment to Northern commanders.²³ The mutineers were executed, and the event acted as the spark for two successive civil wars.²⁴ The Second Sudanese Civil War only concluded in 2005, 50 years after the Torit mutiny.²⁵ Both these wars were characterized by heavy casualties, unspeakable atrocities, and horrific human rights violations on all sides.²⁶ The effects of decades of colonialism and civil strife continue to have profound impacts on South Sudan today, and delegates must be mindful of this when addressing the crisis in South Sudan. If the history of regional tensions is ignored, delegates risk only addressing the surface of the problem, and neglecting the central questions of this topic.

Political Dispute and Renewed Fighting

The 2005 peace agreement ending the Sudanese Civil Wars set a timetable for a South Sudanese referendum on independence.²⁷ In 2011, 99 percent of South Sudanese who participated in that referendum voted favour of independence, creating the Republic of South Sudan.²⁸ In spite of optimistic projections for the new country, divisions within South Sudan would soon lead to a resumption of violence.

Many potential causes have been identified as leading to the current civil war, but the immediate cause is a political dispute. Since independence, South Sudan's government has been headed by President Salva Kiir, the leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A). The SPLM/A emerged as the primary Southern independence group during the Second Sudanese Civil War.²⁹ Today, it is both the ruling party and standing army of South Sudan. Kiir himself is a member of the Dinka, the largest

²⁰ Ibid., 29–31.

²¹ Ibid., 29–30.

²² Jok Madut Jok, *Sudan: Race, Religion, and Violence* (London, UK: OneWorld, 2016), 79.

²³ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Sudan: a country study*, 31.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ "SC/8306: Sudan Peace Agreement Signed 9 January Historic Opportunity, Security Council Told," 8 February 2005, accessed 19 July 2017, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8306.doc.htm>.

²⁶ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Sudan: a country study*, 48.

²⁷ Andrew S. Natsios, *Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur: What Everyone Needs to Know* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012), 171.

²⁸ Jeffrey Gettleman, "After Years of Struggle, South Sudan Becomes a New Nation," *The New York Times*, 9 July 2011, accessed 1 August 2017, <https://nyti.ms/2jCpHs4>.

²⁹ Natsios, *Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur: What Everyone Needs to Know*, 164.



ethnic group in South Sudan.³⁰ In a show of unity, he had invited Riek Machar, a Nuer, to serve as his Vice-President—the Nuer are the second-largest ethnic group in South Sudan, and the traditional rivals of the Dinka.³¹ While this could have been the first step in addressing long-running tribal grievances and creating solidarity within South Sudan, the relationship between the two soon soured.³²

Kiir and Machar disagreed on foreign and domestic policy, as well as who should lead the SPLM into the 2015 election.³³ In 2013, Machar and others within the party began to publicly criticize Kiir's performance in government.³⁴ Machar then announced his intention to challenge Kiir in the next election, leading Kiir to fire his cabinet and replace them with politicians loyal to himself.³⁵ Machar and the other dismissed politicians held a press conference, calling themselves the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO).³⁶ In an effort to consolidate power, Kiir froze certain public institutions and accused the opposition of planning a coup.³⁷ He disarmed Nuer members of the presidential guard, inserting an ethnic element into the dispute.³⁸ On Kiir's orders, many other members of the SPLM-IO were arrested, but Machar fled the country.³⁹ The capital of Juba was plunged into chaos and over 10 000 civilians were killed, starting the South Sudanese Civil War.⁴⁰ Both sides mobilized ethnic militias from past wars, and the mass murder of civilians along ethnic lines has been reported.⁴¹ Delegates should be familiar with the events that directly precipitated the war, especially the political dispute. The political situation must be addressed in any potential resolution to the conflict.

Causes of the Conflict

³⁰ Jennifer Williams, "The conflict in South Sudan, explained," *Vox*, last modified 9 January 2017, <https://www.vox.com/world/2016/12/8/13817072/south-sudan-crisis-explained-ethnic-cleansing-genocide>.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Alex de Waal and Abdul Mohammed, "Breakdown in South Sudan: What Went Wrong -- and How to Fix It," *Foreign Affairs*, 1 January 2014, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/sudan/2014-01-01/breakdown-south-sudan>.

³⁴ Øystein H. Rolandsen and M. W. Daly, "Independent South Sudan," in *A History of South Sudan: From Slavery to Independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 155.

³⁵ Johan Brosché and Kristine Höglund, "Crisis of governance in South Sudan: electoral politics and violence in the world's newest nation," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 54, no. 1 (2016): 76, accessed 19 July 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X15000828>.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ de Waal and Mohammed, "Breakdown in South Sudan: What Went Wrong -- and How to Fix It."

³⁸ Brosché and Höglund, "Crisis of governance in South Sudan: electoral politics and violence in the world's newest nation," 76.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Noel and de Waal, "Understanding the Roots of Conflict in South Sudan."



While a political dispute was the immediate cause of the war, experts blame multiple structural problems within South Sudan for the country's quick relapse into violence. Prior to the civil war, Kiir and Machar often stood on opposing sides of political issues, representing larger and more fundamental fractures within the SPLM.⁴² Even during the Second Sudanese Civil War, the SPLM suffered from violent infighting along ethnic lines.⁴³ Although the coalition survived, it was dysfunctional.⁴⁴ For much of the 1980s, the SPLM was just an army, with no social agenda outside of independence and freedom from northern oppression.⁴⁵ As African experts Alex de Waal and Abdul Mohammed wrote in *Foreign Affairs*, "The SPLM never functioned as a real party—or even as a liberation movement ... It never developed party institutions, discipline, or a social agenda."⁴⁶ During the Second Sudanese Civil War, the SPLM never instituted reforms within the territory it controlled, and relied heavily on foreign assistance for the provision of welfare and foreign policy expertise.⁴⁷ This translated into weak political institutions post-independence, as well as a penchant for infighting in the party itself, culminating in the dispute between Kiir and Machar.⁴⁸

The current conflict was not originally motivated by ethnic tensions, but rather by political disagreements. However, the exploitation of ethnic grievances by Kiir and Machar have made this war especially horrific. Kiir and Machar chose to mobilize along ethnic lines because it was quick and convenient, and this gets at some underlying truths about South Sudanese society.⁴⁹ While SPLM leaders have at times spoken about creating an equitable South Sudan, this has never materialized.⁵⁰ A strong national identity never developed in South Sudan, partly due to far-reaching effects of colonialism and oppression.⁵¹ From its start, the SPLM relied on racial and ethnic solidarity to build its movement.⁵² This unsustainable practice exploded when the SPLM split along ethnic lines in the 1990s.⁵³ During that decade, most of the fighting was South-on-South, killing thousands and damaging any prospect of South Sudanese unity.⁵⁴ These divisions were never healed, and when the conflict reignited in 2013, South Sudanese leaders and the South Sudanese military reverted to these ethnic divisions by default, rather than trying to build support

⁴² de Waal and Mohammed, "Breakdown in South Sudan: What Went Wrong -- and How to Fix It."

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Noel and de Waal, "Understanding the Roots of Conflict in South Sudan."

⁵⁰ de Waal and Mohammed, "Breakdown in South Sudan: What Went Wrong -- and How to Fix It."

⁵¹ Rolandsen and Daly, "Independent South Sudan," 158.

⁵² de Waal and Mohammed, "Breakdown in South Sudan: What Went Wrong -- and How to Fix It."

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.



around a political platform.⁵⁵ Appealing to ethnic divisions was the easiest and most effective means to mobilize support; the structure for ethnic mobilization had already existed within the country for many decades.⁵⁶

Further, the SPLA was structurally problematic. In many ways a legacy of past wars, the SPLA was never well organized or professionalized.⁵⁷ At the conclusion of the Second Sudanese Civil War, the SPLA was but one of many fighting forces in South Sudan.⁵⁸ Wanting to avoid infighting and another civil war, the newly-appointed Kiir merged the SPLA with other groups and militias, offering their commanders positions in the military and the government.⁵⁹ This swelled the SPLA to well over 200 000 members, creating a major financial obstacle to any potential army reform.⁶⁰ The government was forced to devote 55% of its budget to military spending, over 80% of which went to salaries alone.⁶¹ As well, many militia commanders were given commands in the SPLA, ballooning the number of generals in the army to 745 by 2011—41 more than the United States' four military branches put together.⁶² Thus, the SPLA was only nominally a collective fighting force, as militias still remained loyal to their commanders.⁶³ As de Waal and Mohammed write in *Foreign Affairs*,

*The army was little more than a coalition of ethnic units tied together by cash handouts. Successive efforts to establish a centralized roster of soldiers were thwarted. Too often, disarmament operations became ethnically selective, leaving disarmed communities open to attack by their neighbors.*⁶⁴

All of this created a system of warlordism, despite members of the SPLA being one fighting unit under one flag.⁶⁵ This haphazard organization of ethnic militias within the SPLA, combined with a lack of discipline, made it easy for the Kiir and Machar to mobilize along ethnic lines on the eve of the civil war in 2011. This is by no means an exhaustive list of the various causes of the South Sudanese Civil War. Understanding the many causes of the South Sudanese Civil War.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Alex de Waal, "No Money, No Peace," *Foreign Policy*, 2 December 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/02/no-money-no-peace-south-sudan/>.

⁶³ Noel and de Waal, "Understanding the Roots of Conflict in South Sudan."

⁶⁴ de Waal and Mohammed, "Breakdown in South Sudan: What Went Wrong -- and How to Fix It."

⁶⁵ Ibid.



Issues to Address

While the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) was signed in 2015, it soon fell apart, resuming the war.⁶⁶ The agreement failed because it was based on three false premises.⁶⁷ First, that bitter political rivals could reconcile their differences; second, that the crashing economy would make it materially worthwhile for any of the parties to engage in a renewed power-sharing agreement; third, that the capital of Juba could be safeguarded by two unreconciled armies who had fought each other.⁶⁸ Officially, it is still the mechanism by which many in the international community would like to see peace restored in South Sudan. Unfortunately, ongoing international efforts to restore ARCSS' provisions have so far shown little progress.⁶⁹ ARCSS faces considerable challenges: some of the original provisions could be considered unrealistic, and circumstances have changed greatly since 2015, rendering certain provisions obsolete.⁷⁰ Delegates will have to decide how to adjust ARCSS in order to ensure implementation and peace moving forward.

Meanwhile, the situation on the ground in South Sudan remains desperate. The most recent Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan describes “a high level of sexual violence, as well as extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention and ill-treatment, road ambushes, and intercommunal violence.”⁷¹ While most accusations of human rights violations have been made against Kiir's SPLA, many have also been made against opposition groups.⁷² Aid delivery to the country has been greatly restricted, with the government deliberately blocking access to certain areas in order to starve out any perceived grassroots support for the rebels.⁷³ Reported incidents of humanitarian access restrictions rose over the months of June and July, and many aid workers and organizations have been victims of violence, break-ins, looting, and threats.⁷⁴ Delegates must address the

⁶⁶ Michael O'Hanlon et al., “South Sudan: The untold story from independence to civil war,” *Brookings Institution*, 4 October 2016, accessed 10 September 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/20161004_south_sudan_transcript.pdf.

⁶⁷ Noel and de Waal, “Understanding the Roots of Conflict in South Sudan.”

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ “S/2017/784: Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 2 June to 1 September 2017).”

⁷⁰ Aly Verjee, “South Sudan's High Level Revitalization Forum: Identifying Conditions for Success,” *United States Institute of Peace Peace Brief*, No. 228 (2017): 2–3, accessed 6 September 2017, <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB228-South-Sudan-s-High-Level-Revitalization-Forum.pdf>.

⁷¹ “S/2017/784: Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 2 June to 1 September 2017).”

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ “S/2016/70: Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council.”

⁷⁴ S/2016/70, “Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” 22 January 2016, accessed 19 July 2017, <http://undocs.org/S/2016/70>.



delivery of adequate aid to the region, and ensure that humanitarians can reach areas in need.

As stated previously, this conflict was not originally ethnic, but ethnic tensions have been exploited to mobilize for both sides. Essentially, the current war is a political conflict which has been turned ethnic by the country's leaders.⁷⁵ As the conflict developed, old grievances and hatreds rose to the fore, and now must be addressed.⁷⁶ This not only mandates dealing with traditional rivalries, but also the horrific violence of past conflicts. Thus, the AU must be involved in providing some mechanism for healing, reconciliation, and justice. Delegates must address these issues if there is to be a sustainable long-term peace in South Sudan.

Finally, the political situation must be addressed. Delegates must consider the roles of Kiir, Machar, and other rebel leaders in South Sudan. If South Sudan is to have a sustainable peace, what role should these figures play, if any? Some argue that Kiir and Machar must step aside in order for South Sudan to reset politically.⁷⁷ Further, delegates must address the political institutions of South Sudan. As evident from the events leading up to the current conflict, South Sudan's political system is unstable and weak. Thus, delegates must address this, while respecting the country's sovereignty and not overstepping the AU's role on the continent.

Regarding the role of the AU, delegates must agree on what measures the Union should take to address this conflict. Under the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the Union asserts its right "to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity."⁷⁸ Thus, the Assembly of the African Union—which delegates will be simulating—has the right to intervene in South Sudan, if it determines that the circumstances are grave enough. On the other hand, delegates may feel that the continent is best served if the Union plays a diplomatic role only. As seen in other countries, intervention may not always be beneficial, and blowback can be catastrophic. International coordination and cooperation is another issue that the AU must address. The UN, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—a regional organization of which South Sudan is apart—and numerous NGOs are all scrambling to resolve this crisis.⁷⁹ Sometimes these efforts are at cross purposes, and one organization can undermine the

⁷⁵ O'Hanlon et al., "South Sudan: The untold story from independence to civil war."

⁷⁶ Noel and de Waal, "Understanding the Roots of Conflict in South Sudan."

⁷⁷ Andrew S. Natsios, "Lords of the Tribes: The Real Roots of the Conflict in South Sudan," *Foreign Affairs*, last modified 9 July 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/sudan/2015-07-09/lords-tribes>.

⁷⁸ "Constitutive Act of the African Union."

⁷⁹ "S/PV.8030: Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan," 24 August 2017, accessed 2 September 2017, <http://undocs.org/S/PV.8030>.



legitimacy of another's operations.⁸⁰ Delegates will have to decide where the AU fits in this picture.

Together, delegates must chart a way forward for the Union in order to restore peace and security to the region. The crisis in South Sudan is incredibly complex, and will require all delegates to think outside the box and try creative and possibly unconventional solutions.

Guiding Questions

1. What should the AU do to resolve the political dispute? What should South Sudan's political future look like? How can the peace process be revived and concluded?
2. How should the AU address the ethnic element of this conflict?
3. How should the AU address the dire humanitarian situation?
4. How can reconciliation and justice be achieved in South Sudan? Would holding Kiir, Machar, and other leaders accountable for potential violations of international law help or hinder the reconciliation process?
5. To what extent should the AU play a role in this conflict, and what means should the AU employ? Should the AU intervene, hold itself to a strictly diplomatic role, or act in some other capacity?

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⁸⁰ Ibid.



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TOPIC TWO: IMPROVING FOOD SECURITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Introduction

Following the introduction of the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015, food security remains a key item on the global development agenda. With these new goals, the UN aims to achieve a truly ambitious target: zero hunger by 2030.⁸¹ For many years, there was reason for optimism, with levels of hunger decreasing consistently year-to-year.⁸² However, in the 2017 issue of the *State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI)*, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) reported an increase in the number of chronically malnourished people worldwide, from an estimated 777 million to 815 million.⁸³ The report sent “a clear warning signal that the ambition of a world without hunger and malnutrition by 2030 will be challenging.”⁸⁴ These developments pose a threat to the UN’s goal of a food-secure world.

So, what is food security, and why is it so important? According to the 1996 World Food Summit, “food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”⁸⁵ Nowhere is it more important than in Sub-Saharan Africa. The FAO’s Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) estimates that 27.4 percent of Africans suffer from severe food insecurity—almost quadruple any other region—compared to 9.3 percent worldwide.⁸⁶ In fact, food insecurity is rising in Africa.⁸⁷ This is especially the case in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the FIES figure has risen an alarming three percentage points from 2014 to 2016.⁸⁸ Food security is a key building block for development, and crucial to the advancement of the African continent as a whole. Thus, it is crucial that delegates tackle this issue in order to achieve the Union’s goals of improving human rights, accelerating sustainable development, and achieving socioeconomic integration.⁸⁹

⁸¹ “Sustainable Development Goal 2,” *Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform*, accessed 10 November 2017, <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg2>.

⁸² FAO et al., *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017: Building Resilience for Peace and Food Security* (Rome: FAO, 2017), ii.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ FAO, “Food Security: Policy Brief No. 2,” 2006, <http://www.fao.org/forestry/13128-0e6f36f27e0091055bec28ebe830f46b3.pdf>.

⁸⁶ FAO et al., *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017*, 10.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 10–11.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 11.

⁸⁹ “Constitutive Act of the African Union,” *African Union*, 11 July 2000, https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/32020-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf.



The Four Pillars of Food Security

According to the FAO, there are four pillars necessary in achieving food security: availability, access, utilization, and stability.⁹⁰ All four must be achieved in order for food security to be present.

Availability refers to the “physical availability of food,” and is “determined by the level of food production, stock levels and net trade.”⁹¹ This pillar focuses on making sure that enough food is being produced, and that the food being produced is sufficient for fulfilling a nutritious diet.⁹²

Access refers to “economic and physical access to food.”⁹³ This highlights that a sufficient volume of food on a national or international level is insufficient if people do not have access to it on a household level. This pillar focuses on economic dimensions, such as “incomes, expenditure, markets and prices.”⁹⁴

Utilization refers to “food utilization,” describing the way that people’s bodies take in and make use of food.⁹⁵ This aspect focuses on sufficient personal nutrition, through “good care and feeding practices, food preparation, diversity of the diet and intra-household distribution of food.”⁹⁶

Stability refers to “stability of the other three dimensions over time,” which gives food security a temporal aspect.⁹⁷ Having sufficient nutritional food one day does not make some food secure if they are do not have regular access to sufficient nutritious food. If someone is periodically food insecure, their health can deteriorate as a result, and thus cannot be considered truly food secure. This pillar is affected greatly by “adverse weather conditions, political instability, or economic factors (unemployment, rising food prices).”

For the most part, this background guide will focus on availability, access, and stability. Utilization is much more focused on micro processes than the other pillars, and can be the subject of discussion around education and training. This guide will omit those discussions in order to focus on macro processes which often touch on agricultural policy. Still, it is crucial for delegates to address the other three pillars (i.e. availability, access, and

⁹⁰ FAO, “An Introduction to the Basic Concepts of Food Security,” *Food Security Information for Action Practical Guides*, 2008, <http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/al936e/al936e00.pdf>.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.


⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.



stability) in any potential resolution. Ignoring any one of these dimensions of food security would be equivalent to not addressing the whole topic.

Fig. 1. Regional yield per hectare compared to maximum attainable yield, by region



Food Security in a Sub-Saharan Context

While food security remains a problem everywhere in the world, it is especially pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa. The prevalence of undernourishment is projected to rise slightly to 22.7% in 2016, higher than any other major region.⁹⁸ The FIES figure for Sub-Saharan Africa is also the highest of all surveyed regions, at 31.0%, representing 306.7 million severely food insecure people in the region.⁹⁹ Prevalence of child stunting was also the highest out of all major regions, at 34.2%.

Why is Sub-Saharan Africa so much worse off than the rest of the world? Sub-Saharan Africa is just as suitable as other regions for agriculture (i.e. taking into account factors such as soil quality, sunlight, climate, etc.). When biophysical potential is compared across regions, Sub-Saharan Africa is just as capable of producing high agricultural yields as Europe or North America.¹⁰⁰ The problem lies with reaching that potential. When comparing actual yields across regions, Sub-Saharan Africa comes in last when comparing regional yield per hectare with maximum attainable yield, i.e. how well the region is taking advantage of its agricultural potential (see Fig. 1).¹⁰¹ It would seem that African agriculture has not modernized with the rest of the world (see Fig. 2).¹⁰² In regions like where percent yields are low, it is likely that most citizens work in agriculture on small subsistence

⁹⁸ FAO et al., *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017*, 6.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 9.


¹⁰⁰ Paul McMahon, *Feeding Frenzy: The New Politics of Food* (London: Profile Books, 2013), 64.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.



Fig. 2. Cereal yield per hectare, by region and time period



farms.¹⁰³ In fact, these subsistence farms (also called smallholder farms) are the predominant form of agriculture in Africa.¹⁰⁴ 33 million small farms exist on the continent, roughly 80% of all African farms.¹⁰⁵ These farms' main purpose is to feed its owners, usually a family; combined with poor access to markets, this makes subsistence farming often inefficient and unresponsive to market forces.¹⁰⁶ Improving agricultural processes and improving yield in the region is related to availability, the first pillar of food security. Thus, delegates should address the future of African agriculture—should smallholders continue to be the main drivers of farming and food production? If so, how will they adapt and adjust to new challenges? If not, how will the continent transition away from subsistence farming, and what will the end goal be?

Recently, conflict and unrest in the region has had a profound impact on food security.¹⁰⁷ Conflict clearly undermines stability, the fourth pillar of food security. As *SOFI 2017* explains, "conflict negatively affects almost every aspect of agriculture and food systems, from production, harvesting, processing and transport to input supply, financing, and marketing." Land and livestock can be destroyed, and trade routes and markets can be difficult to access in conflict zones.¹⁰⁸ This negatively impacts the availability of food, driving food prices up and making food inaccessible for consumers.¹⁰⁹ This is especially

¹⁰³ Ibid., 36.

¹⁰⁴ FAO, "The special challenge for sub-Saharan Africa," *High Level Expert Forum - How to Feed the World in 2050*, 13 October 2009, http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/docs/Issues_papers/HLEF2050_Africa.pdf.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Steffen Abele and Klaus Froberg, introduction to *Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Central and Eastern Europe 22* (2003): ii.

¹⁰⁷ FAO et al., *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017*, vi.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 44.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 46.



true in South Sudan, where a famine has been declared and nearly six million people are food insecure.¹¹⁰ Countries impacted by conflict also tend to be the least able to survive the shocks of conflict with regards to food. On average, 56% of the population in conflict-torn countries live in rural areas, where agriculture is essential to maintaining a stable and sufficient quality of life; extremely fragile countries were also economically reliant on agriculture, with 37% of their GDP on average devoted to agriculture.¹¹¹ This instability has been combined with droughts and floods to further decrease availability and access.¹¹² Additionally, *SOFI 2017* reported that economic downturns throughout the continent have “drained ... revenues, affecting both food availability through reduced import capacity and food access through reduced fiscal space to protect poor households against rising domestic food prices.”¹¹³ Delegates must keep in mind that conflict and food security are closely tied, and that countries suffering from conflict present a unique and pressing challenge to regional food security which must specifically be addressed.

Barriers to Food Security

One of the barriers to improved food security in Sub-Saharan Africa is agricultural technology. One of the challenges with African agriculture is the diverse range of climates and environments agriculture takes place in.¹¹⁴ This diversity makes it hard to apply new or existing yield-boosting technologies on a massive scale.¹¹⁵ As well, increases in yield from implementing new high-yield crop varieties have been less pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa.¹¹⁶ The FAO attributes this to the “inadequacies of input and output markets and extension services and poor infrastructure.”¹¹⁷ Input markets are the markets on which farmers buy supplies, seed, etc.; output markets are where farmers sell their product; extension services concern the application of scientific research and technologies to agriculture, e.g. the education of and delivery of information to farmers.¹¹⁸ Inadequate markets and poor infrastructure has led to the “low use of irrigation, fertilizers, advanced seeds and pesticides.”¹¹⁹ In Sub-Saharan Africa, average fertilizer consumption was only 13 kg per hectare, vastly lower than the Middle East and North Africa (73 kg per hectare), and

¹¹⁰ “South Sudan Emergency Dashboard: August 2017,” *World Food Programme*, August 2017, http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ep/wfp292806.pdf?_ga=2.38844195.1679638274.1510432449-2032376306.1509067903.

¹¹¹ FAO et al., *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017*, 44.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, vi.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ FAO, “The special challenge for sub-Saharan Africa.”

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*


¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ “Agricultural Extension,” *Agriculture for Impact*, accessed 9 November 2017, <http://ag4impact.org/sid/socio-economic-intensification/building-human-capital/agricultural-extension/>.

¹¹⁹ FAO, “The special challenge for sub-Saharan Africa.”



Fig. 3. Average annual investment (2005–2007) in agriculture per country, with data from selected low- and middle-income countries (number of countries with data is first number in brackets) and Sub-Saharan African countries (number of countries with data is second number in brackets), by source



East Asia and the Pacific (190 kg per hectare).¹²⁰ Additionally, the FAO reported that “only 4 percent of arable land in sub-Saharan Africa is irrigated, compared to about 20 percent globally and 38 percent in Asia.”¹²¹ Although there is also great need for increased levels of agricultural research on the continent, investment in agricultural research has not been significant.¹²² Between 1981 and 2000, agricultural research and development spending grew on average only 0.6% year-to-year, and actually decreased during the 1990s.¹²³

Lack of investment in Sub-Saharan African agriculture is another hurdle for regional food security. According to the FAO, Sub-Saharan African agriculture is “grossly undercapitalized”—the region has the lowest amount of agricultural investment per capita in the world.¹²⁴ This is a product of two things: insufficient investment and recent growth in the region’s rural population.¹²⁵ According to Gary R. Blumenthal, former Special Assistant to President George H. W. Bush on Agricultural Trade and Food Assistance, many

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.



additional factors exist which ward off investment in agriculture.¹²⁶ These include high risks, near-universal government intervention, complex and muddled property rights, difficulty recovering capital, and local animosity towards any form of foreign agricultural investment.¹²⁷ Existing investment is also highly dependent on on-farm private investment (often by farmers themselves), while public investment and foreign investment all remain low. (see Fig. 3).¹²⁸ Insufficient investment in agriculture is extremely detrimental to food availability, food access, and therefore food security.¹²⁹ The majority of the world's poor and food-insecure depend directly and indirectly on agriculture for their survival and their livelihoods.¹³⁰

Moving Forward

Institutional reform will be key in improving agricultural processes, and in improving regional food security. The diversity of climates and environments in Sub-Saharan Africa present challenges to food production, availability, and access.¹³¹ This is contrasted by the decentralized and bottom-up processes in most Sub-Saharan African countries today.¹³² National institutions must be facilitators in constructing participatory food policies where all stakeholders are involved.¹³³ They must also be active in building and strengthening markets.¹³⁴ Cooperation between national institutions and international organizations such as the FAO, World Food Programme (WFP), and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Political stability and peace are also important in improving food security. National and regional institutions have a stabilizing role to play, which if successful, will hopefully draw more investment in agriculture. In extreme cases of instability, economic and social policies will have to be crafted to address the specific case of conflict zones.¹³⁵ It is now up to delegates to chart a path forwards for the world's least food-secure region.

¹²⁶ Gary R. Blumenthal, "Investors' Perspectives," in *The Global Farms Race: Land Grabs, Agricultural Investment, and the Scramble for Food Security*, ed. Michael Kugelman and Susan L. Levenstein (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2013), 100.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 105.

¹²⁸ Sarah K. Lowder, Brian Carisma, and Jakob Skoet, *Who Invests in Agriculture and How Much? An Empirical Review of the Relative Size of Various Investments in Agriculture in Low- and Middle- Income Countries* (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2012), 14–5.

¹²⁹ FAO, "The special challenge for sub-Saharan Africa."

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ FAO, "The special challenge for sub-Saharan Africa."

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ FAO et al., *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017*, 74.

**Guiding Questions:**

1. What are the barriers to improving food security in Sub-Saharan Africa?
2. What is the future of Sub-Saharan African agriculture? What can be done to increase crop yield and agricultural efficiency in the region, and thus improve food availability?
3. How can the AU help increase investment in agriculture throughout the region?
4. How can the AU work to ensure food security in multiple conflict zones throughout the region?

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<http://www.fao.org/forestry/13128-0e6f36f27e0091055bec28ebe830f46b3.pdf>.

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TOPIC THREE: ADDRESSING PIRACY OFF THE AFRICAN COASTS

Introduction

For the past decade, piracy off the coasts of Africa have been a major topic on the international security agenda. However, the issue seems to have slipped off the international community's priority list in recent years, due to the perception that piracy has been solved.¹³⁶ In November 2016, Japan ended its counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden, and NATO ended a similar mission in the region, describing it as one of its most successful missions ever.¹³⁷ This all took place as Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) warned against security complacency in the region in their 2016 issue of the *State of Maritime Piracy* report.¹³⁸

Piracy remains a critical security risk to Africa; any perception that piracy has met its demise is inaccurate. In March 2017, after five years without hijackings, pirates took over a Comoros-flagged oil tanker off the coast of Somalia.¹³⁹ While the crew was freed, the incident was soon followed up with more hijackings.¹⁴⁰ This signaled a potential resurgence in regional piracy around the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden.¹⁴¹ OBP has reported an increase in the economic cost of piracy off both the East and West African coasts.¹⁴² Kidnappings have also increased in West Africa from 13 in 2015 to 18 in 2016.¹⁴³ One fifth of the world's piracy incidents now take place in the area, making it the most dangerous region in the world for seafarers.¹⁴⁴

This resurgence in piracy shows that past approaches have not achieved lasting results. Pirates have not disappeared, they have simply been placated by armed security operations in the region.¹⁴⁵ This resurgence of piracy, like past surges in piracy, finds its roots in a variety of complex causes, including economic and political factors.¹⁴⁶ In order to craft lasting solutions, delegates must address these causes and eliminate the rationale for people to choose to participate in piracy. Since piracy incurs so many economic costs on the

¹³⁶ Tomi Oladipo, "Is Africa facing a new wave of piracy?," *BBC News*, 15 May 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39849352>.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² "The State of Maritime Piracy 2016: Assessing the Economic and Human Cost," *Oceans Beyond Piracy*, accessed 9 November 2017, <http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/reports/sop/summary>.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Oladipo, "Is Africa facing a new wave of piracy?"

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Watcharapong Ratisukpimol, "Understanding the Root Causes of Modern Maritime Piracy," *University of Colorado at Boulder*, November 2010, https://www.colorado.edu/Economics/papers/Wps-10/wp10-11/Watcharapong_JobMarketPaper.pdf.



continent, this is an urgent issue for the AU. All members have a stake in this issue, not just coastal countries. Landlocked countries on the continent depend on the trade routes and imports of coastal countries, and are directly affected by changes in their economies.¹⁴⁷ To secure stable economic development on the continent, delegates must urgently address the security of African waters.

Causes of Piracy

Piracy is linked to economic disparities, political instability, and the breakdown of state capacities. Among other factors, piracy is a result of economic hardship.¹⁴⁸ Empirical research has shown that poor economic and political conditions are associated with increases in piracy.¹⁴⁹ Higher income per-capita and lower unemployment (i.e. better economic conditions) are associated with fewer pirates, and more political freedom is also associated with lower levels of piracy.¹⁵⁰ Some argue that wages can be seen as an opportunity cost for participating in piracy, and that when wages go down, piracy tends to increase.¹⁵¹ In simple terms, these arguments frame participants in piracy as having a choice to make by weighing economic costs, benefits, and tradeoffs. If one is to accept this argument, eliminating piracy should be addressed through eliminating the economic advantages of engaging in piracy. Research supports the idea that tackling underlying causes and motives through tools such as economic policy will be effective in curbing piracy.¹⁵² If piracy is no longer seen as an attractive and advantageous economic option, pirates will stop engaging in piracy. The economic causes of piracy cannot be emphasized enough. The way that modern pirates operate reflect the economic incentives which pushed them to engage in piracy in the first place. As research on the topic has described,

Most pirate operations are organized and disciplined. They usually do not unnecessarily harm vessels or hostages as this would weaken their bargaining position and reduce profits. They keep records of income and expenses, even employing timesheets and payroll records. They divide labor to enjoy the benefits of specialization and comparative advantage.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁷ J. Paul Dunne, "'Order at sea' and landlocked countries in Africa," *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, 2 February 2015, <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2015/order-sea-and-landlocked-countries-africa>.

¹⁴⁸ Alexander Knorr, "Economic Factors for Piracy: The Effect of Commodity Price Shocks," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38, no. 8 (2015): 672, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1042267>.


¹⁴⁹ Ratisukpimol, "Understanding the Root Causes of Modern Maritime Piracy."

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Knorr, "Economic Factors for Piracy," 671.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Thomas Keating, "The Political Economy of Somali Piracy," *SAIS Review* 33, no. 1 (2013): 188, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/511228/pdf>.



In fact, for some Somali communities, piracy has brought benefits to local economies.¹⁵⁴ Money from piracy has been invested in public goods such as electricity, housing, and transportation.¹⁵⁵ Thus, it seems logical that the current resurgence in piracy around the Gulf of Aden may be linked to economic conditions: some have argued that high levels of food insecurity in Somalia are causing an increase in piracy.¹⁵⁶ Recent pirate attacks have increasingly targeted ships carrying food and oil, as three million Somalis suffer from food insecurity and the country endures a famine.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ Nico Colombant "Somalia's Piracy has major global costs, but also incentives," VOA, 9 February 2012, <https://www.voanews.com/a/somalias-piracy-has-major-global-costs-but-also-incentives-139129494/151848.html>.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ "Somalia drought fuelling piracy - US Africa command head," BBC News, 24 April 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39692080>.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.



Oceans Beyond Piracy, *Mapping of Attacks in West Africa*.

Piracy also has roots in the breakdown of state functions. Modern piracy around the Horn of Africa originally began as “defensive piracy,” with participants forming a volunteer coast guard to protect fisheries from illegal fishing.¹⁵⁸ Foreign ships would often enter Somali waters and illegally exploit its fisheries without a license from the government, despite the fisheries being within the sovereign waters of Somalia.¹⁵⁹ The volunteer coastguard arose from the Somali government’s inability to enforce the exclusivity of their sovereign waters. These volunteer coastguards would attempt to scare off, reason with, or levy unofficial taxes on these foreign ships.¹⁶⁰ However, this on its own had not yet involved into the kidnapping, ransoming, and cargo seizing that has come to characterize Somali piracy.¹⁶¹ It was a combination of frustration, a lack of economic opportunity, and increased shipping volume in the Gulf of Aden which amounted to the perfect conditions for the rise of modern Somali piracy.¹⁶² This same scenario played out in West Africa as well, where fisheries were exploited by unlicensed foreign ships.¹⁶³ In West Africa, the state was unable to enforce fishing rights within their own waters due to bribery and

¹⁵⁸ Thomas Keating, “The Political Economy of Somali Piracy,” 186.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid., 187–8.

¹⁶³ Richard Valdmanis and Simon Akman, “Illegal fishing plunders and strains West Africa,” *Reuters*, 15 March 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-westafrica-fishing/illegal-fishing-plunders-and-strains-west-africa-idUSBRE82E0HD20120315>.



corruption.¹⁶⁴ Often foreign ships would pay soldier and fisheries officers to turn a blind eye to illegal foreign fishing.¹⁶⁵ In both cases, the enabling environment of a failing and weak state clearly plays a large role in the development of African piracy, and its continuation to this day.¹⁶⁶

Moving Forward

In response to resurgent piracy and food insecurity in Somalia, the African Development Bank has pledged USD 1.1 billion to address famine and drought in Somalia and surrounding countries, and the AU has also pledged USD 100 000 to Somalia as a gesture of solidarity.¹⁶⁷ However, piracy continues to evolve along the African coasts, and delegates must address some specific challenges.

Increasingly, some observers feel that the motivations from piracy have moved away from protecting fisheries and local economies to funding criminal networks.¹⁶⁸ There have also been reports of cooperation between pirates and religious extremist groups such as al-Shabaab.¹⁶⁹ The same has been the case in West Africa, where there is speculation that piracy is linked to extremist groups such as al-Qaeda and Boko Haram.¹⁷⁰

African pirates are also adjusting their methods and tactics. Kidnappings are on the rise, and increasingly appear to be the preferred tactic of pirates.¹⁷¹ In West Africa, kidnapping has been partially a response to increased enforcement.¹⁷² Seizing oil from a tanker is more logistically taxing, requiring several vessels and more time.¹⁷³ Kidnapping is much quicker, making it easier to avoid the local authorities.¹⁷⁴ The fall of oil prices has also made kidnapping more economically advantageous for West African pirates who had seized oil from cargo ships.¹⁷⁵

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Thomas Keating, "The Political Economy of Somali Piracy," 187–8.

¹⁶⁷ "International Partners Visit Drought-Hit Horn of Africa, Pledge Support," *African Union*, 15 June 2017, <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20170615/international-partners-visit-drought-hit-horn-africa-pledge-support>.

¹⁶⁸ Magnus Boding Hansen, "The Somali pirates are back (SPOILER ALERT: they never really left)," *IRIN*, 19 July 2017, <https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2017/07/19/somali-pirates-are-back-spoiler-alert-they-never-really-left>.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Gerald E. Ezirim and Freedom C. Onuoha, "'Terrorism' and Transnational Organised Crime in West Africa," *Al Jazeera*, 24 June 2013, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/06/2013624102946689517.html>.

¹⁷¹ "Piracy continues to decrease while focus shifts to maritime kidnapping," *Fox News*, 7 July 2017, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/07/07/piracy-continues-to-decrease-while-focus-shifts-to-maritime-kidnapping.html>.

¹⁷² Kayla Ruble, "West Africa's Pirates are Changing Tactics Because of Cheap Oil," *Vice News*, 3 May 2016, <https://news.vice.com/article/west-africas-pirates-are-changing-tactics-because-of-cheap-oil>.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.



43 of the AU's 54 members recently signed a new agreement on "piracy, illegal fishing and maritime security," which was particularly momentous given the binding nature of the new charter.¹⁷⁶ While this signals a political will to cooperate on policy among Union members, delegates must still work together to address the underlying root causes of piracy if it is to be ended for good.¹⁷⁷

Guiding Questions:

1. What has led to the resurgence of piracy in waters surrounding the continent?
2. What are the economic causes of piracy? What are the economic effects of piracy? How can these economic concerns be addressed?
3. What political factors have led to the recent resurgence of piracy?
4. How can the root causes of piracy be addressed permanently? Which issues have to be addressed in order to make sure peoples are not forced to choose piracy as an option?

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¹⁷⁶ "African Union Adopts Charter on Piracy, Illegal Fishing," *Punch*, 15 October 2016, accessed 17 July 2017, <http://punchng.com/african-union-adopts-charter-piracy-illegal-fishing/>.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.



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Research Guide

Although this background guide provides an overview of the topics, it is crucial for delegates to do their own independent research. Below are some tips for conducting quality research, and making sure that you are well-prepared for the conference.

To start, get a feel for the topic. Before jumping in to your research, it is always a good idea to just look around, and familiarize yourself with the basic elements of the topic. A great way to do this is usually to head to YouTube and search for the main focus (or foci) of your topic (e.g. “South Sudan,” “food security,” or “piracy Africa”). Usually there are videos that do a good job of introducing complex issues with simple language and visual aids. After that, you can put the same search term(s) into the Google and browse around on some introductory articles.

Use credible sources. This is oft-repeated advice, but it is so important that it is worth repeating again. The credibility of your sources is incredibly important. The most useful information you will find will be from UN reports, or reports and analysis from reputable NGOs. It is always a good idea to quickly search up the name of the source you are using. Otherwise, you risk looking foolish in committee when other delegates (or god forbid, the chair!) points out that your information is faulty. As an additional note, if you have trouble accessing any of the sources in this background guide (e.g. *Foreign Affairs* magazine), please reach out to the Director.

Know what you stand for... the best you can. As a delegate at the AU, you will be representing the interests and positions of your country’s foreign policy, not your personal opinion. You should be the expert on your country’s position for every topic. Unfortunately, sometimes this information is hard to find, and maybe even impossible to find. Try your best to be true to your country’s policy, but when there are gaps that need to be filled, do your best to extrapolate from what you already know about your country’s policy. For example, if I cannot find any information about Burkina Faso’s position on food security, I would look at its level of food insecurity, its agricultural production, past policies, etc.

Understand what progress has been made. Often, delegates will understand a topic inside and out, but fail to read up on what work has already been done on the issue. Make sure you know about relevant AU actions, UN actions, and NGO work on the topics. If you neglect your research in this area, you will end up creating initiatives and writing resolutions that are redundant.

Never be afraid to ask questions. This applies not only to research, but to your entire Model UN experience as well. If you are struggling before the conference, feel free to reach out to the Director. If you are struggling at the conference, come up to the dais and talk to us. It does not matter if this is your first conference or your last conference, every member



of the dais is here to help you, make sure you succeed, and make your experience at UTMUN the best it possibly can be.

I've included the citations for a few key sources for each topic. Feel free to use these as starting points for each topic.

The Situation in South Sudan

Noel, Katherine and Alex de Waal. "Understanding the Roots of Conflict in South Sudan."

Council on Foreign Relations. Last modified 14 September 2016.

<https://www.cfr.org/interview/understanding-roots-conflict-south-sudan>.

Good interview with an expert on the conflict and the continent as a whole.

O'Hanlon, Michael, Brian Adebaba, Hilde Johnson, and Princeton Lyman. "South Sudan: The untold story from independence to civil war." *Brookings Institution*. 4 October 2017.

<https://www.brookings.edu/events/south-sudan-the-untold-story-from-independence-to-civil-war/>.

The presentation and discussion in the video on this page provide tons of excellent insight into South Sudan. Transcript and audio are also available on the site.

Williams, Jennifer. "The conflict in South Sudan, explained." Vox. Last modified 9 January 2017. <https://www.vox.com/world/2016/12/8/13817072/south-sudan-crisis-ethnic-cleansing-genocide>.

The video and accompanying article do a good job of breaking down the basics of South Sudan.

Improving Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa

FAO. "An Introduction to the Basic Concepts of Food Security." Food Security Information for Action Practical Guides. 2008.

<http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/al936e/al936e00.pdf>.

This is an introduction to the basic dimensions of food security.

FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017: Building Resilience for Peace and Food Security*. Rome: FAO, 2017.

This is the UN's latest annual report on global food security. Obviously, you should not read all of it, but there are many valuable pieces of information here. It is available online.

**Addressing Piracy off the African Coasts**

Keating, Thomas. "The Political Economy of Somali Piracy." *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 33, no. 1 (2013): 185–191. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/511228/pdf>.

This article from an academic journal details economic and political arguments explaining the rise of Somali piracy.

Oladipo, Tomi. "Is Africa facing a new wave of piracy?," BBC News, 15 May 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39849352>.

This BBC article describes the recent resurgence of piracy in Africa.

"The State of Maritime Piracy 2016: Assessing the Economic and Human Cost." *Oceans Beyond Piracy*. Accessed 9 November 2017. <http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/reports/sop/>.

This is the latest issue of OBP's State of Maritime Piracy Report. It provides comprehensive information about piracy around the world.