COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
SPECIALIZED COMMITTEE

TMUN
2018

Dear Delegates,

It is with great excitement and pleasure that I welcome you to UTMUN 2018! My name is Mohid Malik, and I am your director for the Coalition Provisional Authority on the Reconstruction of Iraq. I alongside with my vice-director A.J. Davidson, my two crisis analysts John Zabbal and Omar Kittaneh, as well as my moderator Danna Aranda all extend our warmest welcome to you for a very exciting weekend of robust debate! I am currently a third-year student at the University of Toronto specialising in Political Science with a minor in History. This conference will mark my second year of being involved with UTMUN. I have also attended numerous conferences in cities all across Europe during my time as a high school student. My passion for MUN has been a significant part of my life for many years and I look forward to showcasing that passion through assisting you before and during the conference. My goal is to ensure that everyone leaves the conference feeling more confident in themselves with regards to public speaking. I am also hoping that everyone will not only grow as intellectuals, but more importantly, as people.

The Coalition Provisional Authority committee will be discussing three topics that are of the utmost importance in helping facilitate the transition of Iraq from a war-torn country to a secure, economically stable, and democratic state. The first topic that you will be focusing on is the policy of de-Ba'athification. The second topic of the conference is on the establishment of the interim government and the running of subsequent elections. The third topic is on the economic reconstruction of the country with a focus on rebuilding the damaged infrastructure. Each of the topics is presented as a series of policies that the CPA will pursue to promote security, economic growth, and democracy. The following background guide will provide you with the information you need to start thinking about clauses and about your country's stance on these issues. As the name suggests, this is just a guide, so make sure to conduct your own research on these issues, with careful attention to the policies of the character you will be representing.

As this is the CPA, the issues being discussed are those that are not entirely relevant today, as this organization is no longer in operation. The CPA dealt with immensely controversial issues, which meant that debate was extensive, and the characters pursued varying objectives. It is important to realise the need for cooperation and collaboration with other delegates to ensure that your views find their way into the resolutions. These are difficult issues, which were not entirely resolved during the CPA's operation, but hopefully, through your dedication and hard work, we will enjoy fruitful debate and explore possible solutions to these challenging issues.

I wish you the best of luck in your preparations, and I look forward to meeting all of you!

Mohid Malik, Director of the Coalition Provisional Authority on the Reconstruction of Iraq
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Introduction: A Brief Overview of Instability in Iraq & the Start of the CPA

Amnesty International and the UNHCR issued multiple reports detailing the gross violations of human rights by Saddam and his Baathist Party. The violations committed by Saddam Hussein are made evident in both domestic and foreign violations. Whether domestic or foreign, these violations had continued for decades into the Baathist rule and fuelled instability throughout the region. Although these violations targeted all strata of society, particular ethnic groups were targeted more frequently than others. Most notably, the Kurdish population of Northern Iraq faced decades of brutal violence, including the 1988 Al-Anfal Campaign, which in a few months killed 50-100 thousand Kurdish civilians.

This campaign began in response to the growing demand for self-determination by the Kurdish population, an issue that remains pervasive to this day. Genocides like the Al-Anfal campaign were plentiful throughout his leadership, but what made this particular act more infamous was Saddam's use of chemical weapons. Although the U.S. did not take decisive action at that time, these types of brutal attacks provided justification for the invasion in 2003. Moreover, the sectarian violence that Saddam fuelled by disproportionately attacking certain ethnic groups complicated the peace-building process. Nonetheless, in 2003 the Kurdish population was granted autonomy within Iraq following the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime.

The first explicit military involvement made by the United States, which led a UN-Sanctioned Coalition force, was during the 1990 Gulf War. This war exemplifies the brutal and violent foreign policy manoeuvres conducted by Saddam Hussein in order to procure private objectives. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait began due to a dispute between the two states over oil production. This conflict marked the beginning of the spread of Saddam's violent in the Middle East, and it brought multiple states in the region together against Saddam. The vast majority of the violence committed during this war was against Kuwait, but Saddam also attacked Israel and Saudi Arabia for differing reasons. It is clear that whether one examines the domestic violations of human rights through the use of chemical weapons on Iraqi citizens (mainly ethnic minorities) or the violations that occurred through Saddam's brutal foreign policy pursuits, violence defined his regime. This violence created immense instability in the entire region and following the September 11th Attacks and the possibility of Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the foreign intervention led by the United States became increasingly likely. The wars that remained in the Middle East were now given a more global nuance with the fears of WMD possession. The possibility of an even larger-scale attack, initiated by a regime that throughout its history has conducted itself with gross human rights violations and violence, became likely. Such fears prompted international action through the invasion of Iraq and subsequent overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

The multi-ethnic status of Iraq has historically provided the origins of internal violence and discord. Throughout Saddam Hussein's reign, Kurds and religious minorities were at the forefront of the violence in Iraq. The legacy of ethnic violence prompted the need to establish friendly relations among the differing ethnic and religious groups in Iraq, which became a priority of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Sectarian violence has long plagued Iraq, and the economic well-being of the country is based on unequal distribution of resources to the varying ethnic and religious groups. The Kurds in particular have long pursued a path towards realising their right to self-determination. Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the possibility of an independent Kurdish state grew immensely. However, Kirkuk, where the Kurdish population is the greatest, is home to massive amount of oil and gas reserves. Thus, a multi-ethnic state with great economic resources creates a situation of exacerbated conflict. Although the demographic complexity of Iraq did not entirely cause the initial military conflicts, they did play a prominent role. As Map 1 shows, the Sunni/Shia divide is entirely geographical, with the Sunni population (although making up an overall minority in Iraq) dominating the northern region, and the Shia's being most prevalent in the South. Moreover, Iraq has the fifth largest proven oil reserves of any country. The presence of this valuable resource complicates not only the importance of the implementation of effective Iraqi government, (as resource-rich states can often encourage rogue governments to take control), but it adds an additional dimension on the speculation of foreign presence in Iraq. It may be important to consider the presence of these oil reserves in relation to the presence of the prevailing ethnic/religious group(s).

The CPA was funded by the United States Department of Defence and was set-up in the immediate post-invasion of Iraq. The purpose of the CPA was to stabilise the country and to begin the movement towards democracy, economic stability and security. Although the CPA sought these initiatives, consensus was difficult to reach on the implementation and preservation of these goals. The CPA was in operation for fourteen months, from May 2003 – June 2004, and was intended to lay the political and economic foundations that subsequent Iraqi governments would expand upon. The CPA is structured to operate as a primarily civilian organisation; however, it was dominated by military personnel in execution. There was also a chronic lack of Arabic-speaking members who had extensive knowledge on the region. Through the character list, I see the CPA as rectifying some of those issues by including greater representation of Iraqi's. The purpose is to facilitate dialogue between short-term occupiers and long-term citizens and residents. The CPA at its largest had around 2000 members, subdivided into various groupings. The benefit of having a much smaller CPA can be realised through more meaningful dialogue. Regardless of the national or ethnic origin of the CPA member, no one character is exactly the same as the other. Americans disagreed with each other on some issues just as frequently as a Kurd would disagree with an Iraqi Shia. In many ways, the American representatives were there to carry out U.S. Foreign Policy initiatives through providing their expertise in facilitating the growth of democracy and peace. The CPA was a highly-centralised organisation, which meant that Bremer had to deal with a great number of subordinates. This centralised system of operation was not the most conducive to bringing about effective management and conflict-resolution. Although Bremer will remain the head of the CPA, all members in the committee will play an equally important role in ensuring that the broader goal of peace and stability are realised.

TOPIC ONE: DE-BA'ATHIFICATION (PROMOTING SECURITY)
Rise of Ba'athism in Iraq:

It is important to consider the historical context from which Iraq, and later the Ba'athist party originated. Eliminating Ba'athism from the political arenas of Iraq will be immensely difficult without full knowledge of the roots of the Ba'athist ideology. Iraq was carved out of the Ottoman Empire by the League of Nations following the First World War, and administered as a client monarchy by the British, slowly gained independence as the years progressed, joining the United Nations and becoming a constitutional monarchy in 1945 and officially breaking ties with the British in 1948. In 1958 elements within the Iraqi Army, who were frustrated with slow development and an unpopular monarchy, deposed the monarchy. The deposition initiated a complex period of political upheaval culminating in 1968 with the installation of Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, a former colonel in the army, as Prime Minister of Iraq. Al-Bakr's nephew, Saddam Hussein, was appointed and assumed control of the country's intelligence and security services.

Al-Bakr and Hussein were leaders in the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, a somewhat amorphous political organization that, representing Ba'athism (in Arabic, renaissance or resurrection) in Iraq, generally stood for Arab independence from the West, militarism, and a moderate form of socialism that tended towards nationalization of industry and land. Birthed as an anti-imperialist revolutionary movement during the 1920s, it shared a connection with both fascism (Nazi sympathizers overthrew the British-backed monarchy in April 1941, resulting in a military occupation of Iraq by British troops, primarily from India, until 1947) and communism (in Iraq, the local Communist Party had essentially merged with the Ba'ath Party by 1970). The Ba'athist party was one of the tools that Saddam Hussein used in maintaining tight control over his country. By the 1980s Saddam Hussein began to cast aside the party's socialist influences and, instead, emphasized nationalism; as a result, economic ideologies became more trivial. Apart from the growth in nationalist sentiment within the party, the movement towards capitalist initiatives can also be explained when considering the prevalence of oil in the country. Oil industries privatised and wealth became concentrated in the hands of top Ba'athist officials. As Paul Berman wrote in New Republic in 2012, "veering" from one ideology to another was a hallmark of Ba'athist leaders, who used the slogan "Unity, Freedom, Socialism" to their own ends. He goes on to describe this ideology as one "of resistance. Resistance to what? And on whose behalf? Resistance to imperialism and Zionism, of course. Zionism especially. Resistance on behalf of the pan-Arab people and their "spirit." Baathism's leaders would rather die than abandon these words, even when the words are meaningless. Death it is, then."

The Process of De-Ba'athification:

CPA Order Number 1 was the "De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society" and consisted of policies that sought to remove any members in any national government ministry who held connections with the Ba'athist Party. Initially, the policy was met with approbation by the Kurdish and Shi'ite population, given the historical grievances that the Ba'athist party inflicted on these two demographics. Eventually, however, the policy became immensely controversial not only in Iraq, but in the global political arenas. In many ways, the policy of de-Ba'athification was modelled after the de-Nazification of Germany following World War II. The policy was officially issued by the head of the CPA, Lewis Bremer on May 16th, 2003. Polling was conducted shortly after the implementation of this policy, which showed that the majority of Iraqis wanted either all or some of the Ba'athists removed from office. This was regarded as the most popular initiative taken by the CPA throughout its duration. Although initial plans of this policy presented de-Ba'athification as being similar to de-Nazification, in reality it was far more lenient, which was intentionally done. Only the top 1% of party members were barred from for the Iraqi government. Early problems associated with this policy came from the variability of its implementation, whereby de-Ba'athification was being enforced more in certain regions than others. It was later encouraged to give this process an "Iraqi face" through the implementation of Iraqi

institutions to deal directly with this policy. This later came to fruition in August through the creation of the Iraqi de-Ba'athification Council. The premise that Iraqis were better equipped to deal with de-Ba'athification than the CPA's proved to be incorrect, and the resulting problems that were created only hindered the promotion of security.

President George W. Bush hoped this process would set example throughout the Middle East, through eliminating all elements of the party that sought to undermine peaceful and effective governance. By the end of 2003, a rift between the American representatives of the CPA and their Iraqi counterparts began to emerge in relation to de'Ba'athification, with the latter pushing for more severe implementation of this policy. Although the CPA initially pursued de'Ba'athification with enthusiasm, a ny progress that was made was slow and unsatisfying to general public. Certain key Iraqi officials were being accused by Bremer and other members of the CPA of exploiting this problem to pursue personal political objectives. Thus, de'Ba'athification introduced mistrust between the Americans and the Iraqis, which undermined aspects of American legitimacy in Iraq.

Alongside the social implications of de'Ba'athification, delegates are encouraged to think about the broader ramifications this policy would have on the Iraqi military. It is through making this consideration that initial steps towards realising this policy may occur. Should the Iraqi military be completely disbanded? Or should it be reduced considerably and put under American supervision? The problem of Baathist ideology finding root in the Iraqi army may contribute to the violent presence of this ideology. At the same time, if the army is completely disbanded, how will this affect future Iraqi armies once the policies being pursued by the CPA are met? Delegates will need to reconcile between A) the predominantly undemocratic nature of the Iraqi army, and thus the potential problems this may pose as an oppositional force to the CPA, and B) the logistical problems involved with effectively removing thousands of soldiers from their posts. Although De'Ba'athification involves eliminating a violent ideology, greater stability may only be realised through the disbanding of the Iraqi Army.

TOPIC TWO: ESTABLISHING THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, SUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS AND THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS SOVEREIGNTY

Introduction:

Following decades of dictatorship and ethnic conflict, the CPA worked towards promoting democracy in Iraq. Foreign presence in the nation is not going to be entirely welcoming, and thus a righteous motive to justify the foreign presence ought to be in place. Long-term stability through democratisation must be promoted. In order to ensure the long-term political stability and security of Iraq (and the region as a whole), effective, reliable and unbiased democratic institutions must be established. It is difficult to fully expand upon what it means to be a democracy. How is this policy of democratisation going to be pursued? What kind of democracy is Iraq going to be? Although it is impossible to entirely envisage the democratic country that will hopefully emerge, the CPA should work towards establishing an interim government that would wholly reflect the democratic wishes of the people of Iraq. Additionally, the CPA must plan and secure the future national and regional elections of Iraq. This is a daunting task, and the running of elections may require support from international organisations. Implementing such institutions, however, will be a difficult task when we consider the multitude of actors involved. The CPA must avoid seeming to undermine Iraqi sovereignty and impose a foreign model on the Iraqi people. Instead, the political vacuum that has been created from the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, in conjunction with the policies of de-ba'athification that the CPA is committing itself to pursue, must not be filled by individuals or political organisations who look to suppress Iraqi freedom. It is imperative to establish an effective interim government and institute the means through which subsequent governments will be democratically elected. This transitional period that the CPA is about to embark on will be turbulent, and, if the process is handled incorrectly, the CPA will risk allowing the political vacuum to be filled by an adversarial organization.

Establishing the Interim Government:

How long will the United States (through the CPA) govern Iraq? The CPA is a temporary organization intended to support eventual Iraqi self-governance with an interim government. Thus an interim government must be established through CPA approval while reforms are being made for elections to be held, and for the first Iraqi government to be established. The importance of establishing an effective interim government can be explained by considering the possibility of the reforms initiated by the CPA being undone. Without an interim government under the CPA supervision, no concrete example will be in place for the Iraqi people and politicians to view as a blueprint for successive governments that promoted democracy and freedom. Prior to the invasion of Iraq, there were two competing strategies discussed in the Pentagon that would determine the succession of the CPA. The first strategy advocated for a takeover similar to that of post-World War Two Germany, while the second espoused a quick handover of power to a native Iraqi regime. In the end, a mixture of the two competing strategies occurred, as the establishment of the interim Iraqi government took place fourteen months after the creation of the CPA. The duration of the CPA effectively running Iraq was just as controversial as the de-Ba'athification policy, as long-term foreign presence was being seen as oppositional for true Iraqi freedom and a respect of their sovereignty. A report in January of 2003 from the National Intelligence Council expanded upon the importance of delegating political authority, notes that "attitudes toward a foreign military force would depend largely on the progress made in transferring power." Thus, a correlation existed between the speed in which an interim government was set-up and the perception of foreign occupation in Iraq.

Various conferences were convened through the US State Department, which sought to extol the views of Iraqi exiles in formulating the preliminary political make-up of a post-US Iraq. Various reports were released from these conferences, which were met with discontent by the US Government. After lengthy meetings, however, in March 10th, US President George W. Bush approved the Defence Department's proposal to establish an Interim Authority made up of Kurds and Iraqi exiles once the "liberation" process had concluded. The Interim Authority would work closely with the US Government in matters of foreign affairs and justice, and would subsequently be replaced by an elected government once proper provisions were put in place. Although it was hoped that the transfer of power could happen quickly, fears of a government being set-up that would act in a non-conducive manner to US objectives ensured that the CPA would stay for a longer period of time.

As delegates, it will be imperative to consider the type of relationship that you would like to see established between the Interim and American Government. These includes, but is not limited to, considering the involvement of the American Government in managing Iraqi foreign affairs, ensuring that congressionally-approved funding is being implemented according to established, bilateral agreements, and the movement towards

total Iraqi sovereignty with the establishment of the First Iraqi Government. Delegates need to remember that the Interim Government is not the goal, but the means to the goal whereby the next, freely-elected Iraqi Government will have the economic and military wherewithal to effectively run the country. Since the Interim Government is short-term, be sure to treat it as such. Furthermore, delegates should plan the initial time frame that they see the Interim Government being active in. An Interim Government that is sustained for too long may end up mitigating the entire democratic process, as true Iraqi sovereignty will not be completely realised. Once this government is established, it is important to consider the complexity of elections and the long-term implications they hold in shaping the democratic future of Iraq.

Elections:

The CPA had to ensure that elections would run freely and fairly in order to ensure proper democratic conduct. The initial logic that the CPA followed was one of slowly building the grassroots and spreading ideals of democracy before pursuing national elections. The first step was to host local elections and allow for a new generation of post-war leaders to ascend. The CPA espoused the belief that elections would have to be delayed in order to allow for the basis of representative government to develop through civil society and the proliferation of political parties. The CPA's insistence on delaying the elections caused immense aggravation in Iraq, and furthered the sentiment that long-term American presence in the region consisted of motives that went beyond promoting democracy and freedom. However, initiatives of holding elections in the regional level never truly came to fruition. Throughout the time of the CPA there was a sense of urgency to formulate a national government, and extending beyond the capital in terms of elective representatives was not significantly pursued. From its formation, the CPA was pressured to begin the process of forming a national government so as to not undermine Iraqi sovereignty. The issue of promoting effective government and democracy while maintaining presence in the political system proved to be an issue that was perennially faced by the CPA. The CPA was not successful in fostering the creation of local governments, and it was only by April 2004 that Bremer passed an order that delegated the responsibilities of provincial governors. The accelerating need to hand sovereignty to the Iraqis prevented the growth of regional elections, which would have been particularly useful in the Sunni-dominated regions, as the minority population would have gained greater political clout.

Delegates will be encouraged to start the election-formatting process early on in the CPA's inception, which began in April of 2003. The subsequent instalment of the Iraqi Interim Government and future governments will be entirely contingent upon the election process. As noted above, through constantly delaying elections tensions within Iraq grew. It would be wise, therefore, to institute an effective, long-term process of holding elections early on. Initial considerations would include the level of American involvement in the

subsequent Interim Government, (as mentioned in the previous section), and resources would be required to ensure that free and fair elections are held. It may be important to reconcile the differing importance between the national government and regional governments within Iraq. It is hoped that through establishing an accountable elective democracy through the national government that regional governments would follow similarly. That being noted, delegates may need to consider the possibility of providing a substantial amount of resources in the running of regional elections as well. The importance of elections lies in the long-term political stability of Iraq. If a free and fair election for the national government is not the precedent, then it is possible that further political instability will ensue. Another consideration that delegates ought to keep in mind involves the understanding of the multi-ethnic composition of Iraq. Referring to the Introduction of this Background Guide, it is evident that through Saddam's reign, sectarian violence has been prevalent. These areas of Iraq (predominantly the north) have been left economically destroyed. As a result, without addressing the importance of these regional and ethnic voices in the national government, social and political disparities will continue to persist. In terms of actually running the elections, these sensitive areas may require greater security and resources to ensure that these populations experience just as democratic of an election as any other group. Without measures addressing these issues, the possibility of further sectarian violence is highly likely.

TOPIC THREE: ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION (GROWING THE ECONOMY)
Introduction:

"If we don't get their economy right, no matter how fancy our political transformation, it won't work." – Lewis Bremer, May 2003

Iraq had achieved middle-income status by the 1970s, but a period of successive wars and invasions in the 1980s-90s engendered a downward spiral of the Iraqi economy. Mounting debt (which made up 55% of expenditures from Iraq's oil revenues) was met with UN economic sanctions – creating further economic instability and decline. Infrastructure was neglected and subsequently began to crumble as the nation pursued more wars in order to undermine the economic grievances. Without proper economic infrastructure and the completion of certain macroeconomic objectives, i.e. lowering unemployment and inflation, the economic situation in Iraq will only lead to further political instability. The CPA has inherited a tenuous public position as foreign occupiers; unless citizens of Iraq see clear economic progress, the CPA will quickly lose the little public support that they start with. Economic inequalities and the lack of available work, coupled with the lack of access to water, food and electricity will create an anti-CPA sentiment. In order for the long-term political goals to be satisfied, economic reconstruction must occur. The economic situation created under Saddam Hussein was one of immense inequality, which was felt disproportionately by varying ethnic minorities throughout Iraq, who felt that their demands were not being adequately met by the

government. The wars that Iraq engaged in were the primary cause of the economic collapse, and the economic situation that the CPA will look to rectify is incredibly problematic. Before examining the possible paths to pursue with regards to economic reconstruction, it is important that a *brief* overview of the economic situation be provided:

1. Iraq's per person income in 2002 was around $715
2. There has been immense deprivation in the maintenance of Iraq's infrastructure. As a result of this neglect, the majority of the nation's infrastructure is on the verge of collapsing
3. The education system during the prominence of the Ba'athist party ensured that an entire generation of students were indoctrinated in an ideology that was not conducive to economic growth

The World Bank has estimated that over the next four years approximately $55 billion will be needed to meet the basic economic objectives that encompass reconstruction. Although the CPA will only remain in place over the course of the next fourteen months, the economic support will need to continue. The role of the CPA is to provide the necessary economic foundations for the subsequent Iraqi governments to build upon. One objective of the CPA's portfolio was debt relief. The CPA authorized the largest debt-relief package in history, whereby Iraq was freed from around 100 billion dollars of public and private debt. Although the debt relief was welcomed, the economic initiatives taken by the CPA were immensely criticised as being too ideological and some of the projects that were undertaken lacking any clear vision. Regardless of the policies to be pursued, it is evident that the situation in Iraq is one of both economic and political failure. Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld described the situation that the CPA had to deal with in 2003 as "the equivalent of both a defeated Germany in 1945 and a failed Soviet Union in 1989."

Unemployment & Infrastructure Funding:

In the immediate aftermath of the war, the CPA's Ministry of Labour Advisory group estimated that around 70% of Iraqis were unable to work as a result of large-scale physical damage. Through large-scale infrastructure projects, jobs were provided and the current state of rampant unemployment was mitigated. The Iraq Construction Initiative was announced in June of 2003, whereby $100 million was pumped into Iraqi construction companies to improve the situation of the crumbling infrastructure while using Iraqi workers. Through this initiative tens of thousands of workers were employed, showing the immediate benefits of pursing a policy of infrastructure investment. Iraq's economy under the Ba'athist party was heavily dependent upon government subsidies in key infrastructural areas. The CPA pursued policies to reduce this dependence on government subsidies by promoting free-market ideology and privatisation. While damage was limited during the short initial stage of the American invasion of Iraq, the country's infrastructure was already near a point of crisis. In October 2003, the U.N. and the World Bank published a stark assessment of the conditions there, "The economy of Iraq has suffered twenty years

of neglect and degradation of the country's infrastructure, environment, and social services. Since the mid-1980s, the ruling regime has neglected public infrastructure and investment, and conflicts have resulted in further damage to buildings, pipelines, communication equipment, and transportation links... In short, the country's rich potential for economic prosperity, including water, human capital, and the world's second largest oil reserves, were squandered by the past regime, which directed public resources and efforts at the military and its own preservation and enrichment." Based on this situation, there are several key areas and projects that the CPA needed to address in Iraq following the invasion.

Areas of Need & Funds Required:

AREA OF FUNDING	SHORT-TERM COSTS (USD, 2003)
Water and Sanitation: Following the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq's public water system, which once covered almost all of the population, had declined significantly. Even in urban areas, by 2003 8% of the population lacked access to potable water. 54% lacked it in rural areas. The need for sewage collection is even more acute, in order to prevent the spread of disease - 91% of the Iraqi population outside Baghdad lacks sanitary sewers. In Baghdad, where only 80% of waste is collected, none is processed, and instead dumped raw into the Tigris River.	$6.8 billion
Transportation: While Iraq's network of expressways was in good condition, paving rapidly deteriorated on arterial and secondary roads, and major work was required. Rail bridges destroyed by American planes to limit Iraqi troop movements needed to be rebuilt, and though the Iraqi rail network was fairly extensive, new rolling stock was required to make it operational. Work was also needed at Iraq's three international airports: Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. However, by far the most important project to the Coalition was the reconstruction of the deep water port facility at Umm Qasr, where 282 inoperable vessels had been sunk by the Iraqis, and where the Americans and British desperately wanted to land supplies.	$2 billion
Communications: Iraq's communications system was antiquated at best, and the country lacked an operable post office or telephone network. Establishing agencies to manage both of these was essential. Looting of telephone substations for copper wire also needed to be addressed. (For obvious reasons, the	$1.38 billion

Internet was of secondary importance at best in 2003.)	
Electricity: Damage to power generating stations during the First Gulf War was severe, and the Iraqi power grid was limited. Following the 2003 invasion, looting of power substations occurred, and almost all the urban population, especially outside Baghdad, lacked reliable electricity (there was virtually none in rural areas).	$13.6 billion
Housing and Urban Development: Construction of new housing stock in Iraq was acute, and much of the population, especially in Baghdad, lived in tenement housing. Agencies to manage the growth of cities and to construct public housing needed to be established.	$1.83 billion
Removal of Explosive Ordnance: In advance of the 2003 invasion, thousands of tons of munitions were stashed by the Iraqi Army in the desert. Of particular concern to civilians and the Coalition security forces were landmines, which injured 394 Iraqis over six weeks in late 2003.	• $234 million for extensive survey (Joint Needs Assessment) • $250 million minimum for removal; likely much higher (Iraq Business News)
Oil Infrastructure: Iraq's most important export, and the primary part of its economy, was oil. Almost the entire system, from wellhead to pipeline to distribution centre to port, needed to be rebuilt. Aside from reconstruction at Umm Qasr port, the C.P.A. requested major funding for additional reconstruction.	$8 billion (Oil and Gas Journal)
TOTAL	**$34.1 billion**

N.B. unless otherwise noted, all figures from Iraq Joint Needs Assessment, October 2003.

As can be seen from the above table, the areas that required funding were diverse and covered all facets of Iraq's infrastructure. Although it is a difficult to task to become completely knowledgeable in all areas that required funding, initial steps should include a general understanding of the infrastructural areas. It may be useful to start with understanding the damage that was done to the Oil Industry, given its importance to the overall wellbeing of Iraq's economy. Ensuring that this industry is stabilised and rebuilt significantly may provide an impetus for the subsequent reforms. Moreover, through

properly rebuilding the oil industry, and, therefore, Iraq's fundamental source of export, steps towards greater economic autonomy for Iraqi may begin to take place.

Guiding Questions:

1. Should Ba'athist ideology be included in the new government? Can it?
2. Is the forceful, uncompromising stance of de-ba'athification anti-freedom? Does excluding an entire political party (regardless of the havoc it has caused) not lead to further division in Iraq?
3. What infrastructure reconstruction should be prioritised? Is it solely the responsibility of the US Government? Should we call upon NGO's and UN bodies to assist in these high-cost endeavours?
4. How would the Interim Government deal with ethnic and religious minorities? Will these minorities be represented in this government?
5. Based on limited resources available, which infrastructure projects need to be prioritized from list 1?
6. Should elections be monitored through a UN-established organisation? How long will the monitoring continue?

Character List:

1. Lewis Paul Bremer III (USA)
A long time Department of State employee who served as an ambassador in many countries. Prior to and after the September 11th attacks, Bremer was involved in publishing extensive reports on counter-terrorism strategies for the U.S. Government. In 2003, he was approached to serve as the Presidential convoy and head of the CPA in Iraq. Although reservations were made based on his lack of Middle Eastern knowledge, he took on the role and was in charge of the CPA from May 2013 to June 2014.

2.   Jay Garner (USA)
In 2003 Garner was elected to lead of the reconstruction efforts in Iraq. He was responsible for the preliminary efforts made by the CPA before being replaced by Bremer. In the UTMUN Committee, Garner will continue to play an influential role alongside Bremer in relaying White House orders.

3.   Muqtada al-Sadr (Iraq - Shiite)
Muqtada gained popularity in Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. It was during this time that Muqtada organised thousands into a political movement that were in conflict with the United States and other coalition forces.

4.   Massoud Barzani (Iraq - Kurd)

A Kurdish politician who was the President of the Iraqi Kurdistan region from 2005 to 2017. As such, he is a strong advocate for Kurdish autonomy.

5. John Sawers (U.K. - British Civilian Ambassador)
Official post was Ambassador to Egypt, but served as Britain's chief representative during the early stages of the CPA; career diplomat who worked on the peace process in Northern Ireland and the transition from apartheid in South Africa; after post on CPA, became Ambassador to United Nations and Director of MI6.

6. Ali Allawi (Iraq - Shiite - Minister of Finance and Minister of Defence in CPA)
Had ties to old Iraqi monarchy, family had been living in exile since king toppled in 1958 in London; Ahmed Chalabi's nephew; due to his career in-exile as a banker, appointed as CPA's Minister of Trade, and would go on to serve as Minister of Finance during the first government of Iraq.

7. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez (U.S. - Commander of Occupation Forces)
As commander of the international occupation forces in Iraq during the year following the invasion, Sanchez was an important figure on CPA; disagreed strongly with Bremer about the need to draft a constitution before establishing an Iraqi government, feeling that during the drafting process the power vacuum would be filled with sectarian violence that the army would have to suppress.

8. Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer (Iraq - Sunni)
President of Iraq under the Iraqi Interim Government from 2004 to 2005. He also served as the President of the Governing Council of Iraq in 2004).

9. Ryan Crocker (USA)
From May to August 2003, he was in Baghdad as the first Director of Governance for the Coalition Provisional Authority. He also served as the American Ambassador to Pakistan, Lebanon, Kuwait and Syria.

10. Ahmed Chalabi (Iraq)
Chalabi was an Iraqi politician and a founder of the Iraqi National Congress. He was also the President of the Governing Council of Iraq and subsequently the Minister of Oil in 2005.

11. Jawad (Nuri) al-Maliki (Iraq)
An Iraqi politician who was the Prime Minister of Iraq from 2006 to 2014. He fled Iraq following being sentenced to death during Saddam's regime. While abroad, he coordinated activities of anti-Saddam regiments. His time abroad was also spent building alliances with Syrian and Iranian officials who looked to overthrow Saddam.

12.   Jalal Talabani (Kurdish)
President of Iraq 2005-2014. Talabani founded the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), an organization that promotes independence for the Kurdish people. Talabani was also 1 of 7,700 candidates in Iraq's first free election after 50 years in 2005.

13.   Ibrahim Al Jaafari (Shiite)
Prime Minister of Iraq 2005-2006. In 1980 Al-Jaafari fled to Iran in order to escape Saddam's prosecution of members of the Dawa Party. Between 2004-2005 he served as one of two of the Vice President's in Iraq's Interim Government.

14.   Peter McPherson (USA)
Former Director of Economic Policy for the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq.

15.   Richard Jones (USA)
Worked directly with Bremer to implement the November 2003 agreement with the Iraqi Governing Council. Jones played an integral role in the establishment of the Interim Government and the restoration of sovereignty.

16.   Charles Seidel (USA)
The CIA's Iraq head of station from 2002 to 2003, and Jordan head of station from 2003 to 2005.

17.   Ayad Allawi (Iraq)
Joined the Ba'ath Party in 1960 while attending medical school, but breaks away from Saddam's regime in the 1970's. In 1991 Allawi co-founded the Iraqi National Accord who were staunch opponents of Saddam and his party. In June 2004, Allawi was sworn in as the interim Prime Minister of Iraq, making him the first person to lead Iraq after Saddam Hussein for over three decades.

18.   Clayton McManaway (USA)
Bremer's closest and most trusted colleague who helped in the initial planning and implementation of the CPA.

19.   Mowaffak al-Rubaie (Iraq)
An opponent of Saddam Hussein who backed the US Invasion of Iraq. In July 2003, al-Rubaie was appointed as a member of the 25 member Iraqi Governing Council by the Coalition Provisional Authority.

20.   Adnan Pachachi (Iraq)
Following the 2003 invasion, Pachachi played a prominent role in Iraqi politics, even though he rejected the role of President of the Interim Government. Prior to this, he served

as the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1965-67. From 1971 until the invasion of Iraq, Pachachi spent the majority of his time in exile.

21.   Adil Abdul-Mahdi (Iraq)
An Iraqi Shia politician who served as the Vice President of Iraq from 2005-2011. Abdul-Mahdi also served as the Finance Minister in the Interim Government and the Minister of Oil from 2014 to 2016.

22.   Stuart Bowen (USA)
An American lawyer who served as the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction from 2004-2013. This position was specifically created by the U.S. Congress to provide detail on the use or abuse of the $52 billion reconstruction fund for Iraq.

23.   Clare Short (UK)
A Labour MP who served as the Secretary of State for International Development in Tony Blair's Cabinet form 1997 to 2003. She resigned following her disapproval of the invasion of Iraq and the continued stationing of British troops on Iraqi soil.

24.   Jack Straw (UK)
A Labour MP who served as the Foreign Secretary from 2001 to 2006. In April of 2003, Prime Minister Blair agreed to the creation of an Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq Rehabilitation, which was chaired by Jack Straw.

25.   Geoff Hoon (UK)
A Labour MP who served as the Defence Secretary from 1999 to 2005. Hoon was known for holding a hard line against Iraq, and believed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. In a 2003 interview with the BBC, Hoon stated that the UK was willing to use nuclear weapons against Iraqi forces if such a situation presented itself.

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